The purpose of this thesis has been to analyse the managing of risks, insecurities and transactions costs that deterred economic exchange during the 1930’s and the 1940’s, within the Swedish-German bilateral clearing system, from a Swedish contractual theoretical perspective. In this thesis it has been shown that the clearing agreement was put in practice in 1934, on initiative of Sweden. In the agreement financial issues associated with risks and insecurities were to be reduced by formalising rules for the economic exchange. The basic principle was that Germany regularly had a trade surplus in relation to Sweden. The surplus was used for re-building the Reichsbank’s monetary reserves, as well as payments on financial claims. The agreement was designed in an incomplete way, to be adjusted ad hoc in a trial and error process. As both parties had different interests, they had to make concessions in order to sustain the clearing system. This was also reflected in the design of the agreement, which evolved from an incomplete to a specific, detailed agreement, due to the increasing risks and insecurities that had to be dealt with. The clearing system was ideal for wartime conditions since it maintained trade flows. It also became a line of defence: specific agreements allowed the dominant Germany less scope to assert preferential rights of interpretation of the rules and regulations. When the war intensified it was difficult for Germany to carry out its commitments to Sweden, and the Swedish party found reasons to distrust the German economy, which was entering a recession. At the same time Allied forces strengthened their political influence, and the victors would become the leaders of the future international economy. Sweden made a gradual exit from the clearing system, delivering the agreed upon exports to Germany, while keeping the Allied negotiators informed of the process. The Swedish-German clearing system collapsed in spring 1945.