本研究运用地方政治经济特征来解释商业协会与威权国家关系的分化,以及商业协会之间的系统差异，主张在地方政治经济结构中理解商业协会的角色及其之于威权政体的意义。本研究说明了在转型中国商业协会政治角色的新经验进展，探讨了社会利益能够成功地以制度化的方式输入威权政体的条件。 / 在国家一面，本项研究说明了支撑地方威权国家维持支配的制度基础。激励地方政府开拓财源的财政制度和刺激官僚追求政绩的晋升制度，促使地方政府及其组成部门利用商业协会来提供必要的财政补给、提供公共品和帮助政府执行治理职能。在社会一面，中国的地方政治经济发展模式并非消弭而是加深了私营企业主之间的利益分化，破坏了商业协会的同质性基础。大型私企、中小型私企、个体与地方政府的互动模式具有本质差别，形成了分化的利益诉求。但是当前的商业协会体系并不能处理这种分化了的社会利益诉求，试图将它们都聚集到同一个结社中，既破坏了结社的内部凝聚力，也阻碍了制度化利益传输的可能。 / 商业协会与威权国家的关系取决于政府渗透与结社凝聚力两大条件的交互作用。本研究将当下商业协会与威权国家的关系概括为四种类型：“合作型，“对抗型，“支配型和“庇护型。不同类型协会表达利益诉求的能力不同，“合作型与“对抗型都可以曲折的方式实现利益中介，但它们都还不是制度化的利益中介过程。通过“去政治化的政治整合过程，当前中国的商业协会对威权政体的政治稳定起到了正面作用。基于上述分析，合理的推论是：若地方政治经济特征存在系统差异，则商业协会的整体状况也应存在系统差异。本研究所建立的关于商业协会政治影响力的Logistic回归模型说明，商业协会的层级越高，组织凝聚力越高，与政府的“合作型关系越强，其被政府咨询以及实际影响政策的可能性也越高。在中国，在更高的政府层级上商业协会具有更可见的政治影响力。 / This research reveals how the differentiated relation between business associations and authoritarian state and the systematic organizational variations are configurated by local political economy, and argues the political significance of business associations in authoritarian state should be located in the specific political economic structure. This research displays recent development of business associations' political role in transitional China, and identify the conditions that facilitate organizational social interest pursuits to be successfully inputted into authoritarian state. / On the one hand, this research discusses the institutional bases which motivate the local authoritarian state to maintain continuing domination over society. Both the fiscal institution driving local state to expand revenue incomes and the bureaucratic promotion institution driving officials to accumulate political achievements motivate the local government to achieve following benefits from penetrating and dominating business associations: extract money from society, provide public goods, and facilitate the governance functions. On the other hand, the specific developmental pattern of local market economy actually has deepened the fragmentations among emerging private entrepreneurs instead of remedying them, which further discourage the associational cohesion of business associations. The big, middle, and small private entrepreneurs are characterized by essentially different interactions with the local government and diversified interest pursuits. However, the current associational arrangements forcing these interest pursuits into one single association do harm to the formation of organizational cohesion and the possibility of successful interest intermediation. / This research regards the relations between business associations and authoritarian state as the result of interactions between the governmental penetration and the associational cohesion. Four types can be identified from the empirical cases studies, the corporatist type, the oppositional type, the dominated type, and the clientelistic type. Both the corporatist type and oppositional type can transfer collective interest pursuits into the polity through their leverages on the governments' benefits. However, whichever type do not embody themselves as stable institutional arrangements, but as the contingent negotiations on practical interests. Through the process of depoliticized political integration, contemporary business associations in China contribute to the stability of the authoritarian regime. / After clarifying the mechanism how local political economy configurates the characteristics of business associations, one reasonable hypothesis should be that business associations' characteristics should vary with the local political economy's characteristics. Considering the hierarchical governmental structure's prominent role in shaping politics, this research then concerns its influence on the political performance of business associations. Based on Logistic regression models, this research identifies the determinants contributing to business associations' political influence in contemporary China. The statistical model reveals following patterns: (1) business associations from the higher level get more political opportunities than those from the lower level; (2) business associations from the higher level are more likely influential on policy decisions than those from lower level. These variations indicate that in the national politics the business associations in contemporary China exert most significant institutional political influence. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 纪莺莺. / "2013年7月". / "2013 nian 7 yue". / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-149). / Abstract in Chinese and English. / Ji Yingying. / 中文摘要 --- p.i / 英文摘要 --- p.ii / 全书结构 --- p.vi / Chapter 第一章 --- 导论 --- p.1 / Chapter 一、 --- 问题 --- p.2 / Chapter 二、 --- 翻转视角：以地方政治经济特征作为分析出发点 --- p.6 / Chapter 三、 --- 研究方法 --- p.12 / Chapter 四、 --- 研究概览 --- p.14 / Chapter 五、 --- 研究框架 --- p.15 / Chapter 第二章 --- 当代中国的商业协会：经验、理论与近期发展 --- p.16 / Chapter 一、 --- 当代中国的商业协会体系 --- p.16 / Chapter 二、 --- 公民社会视角中的商业协会 --- p.20 / Chapter 1、 --- “公民社会视角与问题意识 --- p.21 / Chapter 2、 --- 1990年代的经验研究 --- p.22 / Chapter 3、 --- 经验研究的近期发展 --- p.24 / Chapter 三、 --- 法团主义及其批评 --- p.28 / Chapter 1、 --- 法团主义的涵义 --- p.28 / Chapter 2、 --- 经验研究的证据 --- p.30 / Chapter 3、 --- 经验研究的挑战 --- p.32 / Chapter 四、 --- 既有研究的缺陷 --- p.34 / Chapter 1、 --- 单一维度自主性的“陷阱 --- p.34 / Chapter 2、 --- 缺乏对分化经验现象的解释 --- p.36 / Chapter 3、 --- 缺乏对组织内部特征的分析 --- p.37 / Chapter 五、 --- 近期发展：增长 --- p.37 / Chapter 1、 --- 商业协会的增长模式 --- p.38 / Chapter 2、 --- 结构自主性的分化 --- p.41 / Chapter 3、 --- 功能自主性的分化 --- p.43 / Chapter 4、 --- 讨论 --- p.47 / Chapter 第三章 --- 威权国家支配的制度基础 --- p.48 / Chapter 一、 --- 问题 --- p.48 / Chapter 二、 --- A市素描：国家主导下的市场化转型 --- p.50 / Chapter 三、 --- A市社会组织的近期发展 --- p.53 / Chapter 四、 --- 制度视角：地方政府的制度约束 --- p.57 / Chapter 1、 --- 目标：“追求发展与“维持稳定 --- p.58 / Chapter 2、 --- 财政限制 --- p.59 / Chapter 3、 --- 官僚晋升制度 --- p.60 / Chapter 五、 --- 碎片化地方政府的持续支配 --- p.62 / Chapter 1、 --- 财政补给 --- p.64 / Chapter 2、 --- “政绩与“公共品 --- p.66 / Chapter 3、 --- 有利于政府部门的管理职能 --- p.67 / Chapter 六、 --- 反思国家的角色 --- p.68 / Chapter 第四章 --- 结社的社会基础：内部分化与组织原则 --- p.70 / Chapter 一、 --- 问题：被忽略的结社内部 --- p.70 / Chapter 二、 --- 商业协会的社会基础 --- p.72 / Chapter 1、 --- 分化的私营经济 --- p.73 / Chapter 2、 --- 主导的分化维度：企业规模 --- p.75 / Chapter 三、 --- 商业协会的内部分化 --- p.78 / Chapter 1、 --- 工商联：大型企业与中小企业的分化策略 --- p.78 / Chapter 2、 --- 个民协会的双重组织逻辑 --- p.81 / Chapter 四、 --- “理事会支配：谁是结社里的积极分子？ --- p.85 / Chapter 1、 --- 谁成为“理事 --- p.86 / Chapter 2、 --- 商业协会里的“党支部：政治整合的强指标 --- p.88 / Chapter 五、 --- 讨论 --- p.89 / Chapter 1、 --- “去政治化的政治整合 --- p.90 / Chapter 2、 --- “关系与公民社会：促进或是阻碍？ --- p.91 / Chapter 第五章 --- 国家与社会之间：商业协会的类型学分析 --- p.92 / Chapter 一、 --- 新的分析框架 --- p.92 / Chapter 二、 --- “合作型：微型“卡特尔--文化娱乐行业协会 --- p.94 / Chapter 三、 --- “对抗型：维权者--代理商联合会 --- p.98 / Chapter 四、 --- “支配型：出租车行业协会 --- p.103 / Chapter 五、 --- “庇护型：水产协会 --- p.107 / Chapter 六、 --- 商业协会的行动策略及其政治后果 --- p.108 / Chapter 七、 --- 假设 --- p.110 / Chapter 第六章 --- 商业协会的层级分化 --- p.111 / Chapter 一、 --- 问题 --- p.111 / Chapter 二、 --- 文献回顾 --- p.112 / Chapter 1、 --- 为何讨论“层级差异 --- p.112 / Chapter 2、 --- 既有答案：可能的机制 --- p.115 / Chapter 3、 --- 重构既有研究 --- p.116 / Chapter 三、 --- 个案研究 --- p.117 / Chapter 1、 --- 两个工商联：政治经济特征的差异与后果 --- p.117 / Chapter 2、 --- 一个化工企业的游说策略 --- p.125 / Chapter 3、 --- 研究假设 --- p.127 / Chapter 四、 --- 统计检验 --- p.128 / Chapter 1、 --- 变量说明 --- p.128 / Chapter 2、 --- 回归结果 --- p.130 / Chapter 五、 --- 总结：“法团主义何以可能？ --- p.132 / Chapter 第七章 --- 结论 --- p.133 / Chapter 一、 --- 理论适用性的再评估 --- p.135 / Chapter 二、 --- “去政治化的政治整合 ：理解威权政体的稳定性 --- p.137 / Chapter 三、 --- 有关改革 --- p.139 / 参考文献 --- p.141 / Chapter 后记： --- 关于研究的“研究 --- p.150

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2002. / Supervisor: H. Shelton Stromquist. Includes bibliographical references.

Xia Xiang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-102). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract (in English) --- p.i-iii / Abstract (in Chinese) --- p.iv-v / Acknowledgement --- p.vi-vii / List of Figures --- p.xii / List of Tables --- p.xiii / Abbreviations --- p.xiv / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1-7 / Chapter 1.1 --- The Rationale of the Study --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- The Scope of the Study --- p.1-2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Objectives of the Study --- p.2-3 / Chapter 1.4 --- The Methodology of the Study --- p.3-4 / Chapter 1.5 --- Significance and Limitations of the Study --- p.4-6 / Chapter 1.6 --- The Organization of the Study --- p.6-7 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.8-29 / Chapter 2.1 --- Theory of Corporatism and Its Criticism --- p.8-11 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Definition of Corporatism and Two Different Types --- p.8-10 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Some Critiques on Corporatism --- p.10-11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theory of Civil Society and Its Criticism --- p.12-17 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Definition of Civil Society --- p.12-14 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Some Critiques on Civil Society --- p.14-17 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Applicability of Corporatism/Civil Society to China --- p.17-25 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Discussions on Corporatism --- p.17-19 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Discussions on Civil Society --- p.19-22 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Social Organizations: both corporatist and civil society features? --- p.22-25 / Chapter 2.4 --- Studies on the Private Business Associations in China --- p.25-29 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Federation of Industry and Commerce --- p.30-54 / Chapter 3.1 --- The All China Federation of Industry and Commerce --- p.30-35 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Establishment and Objectives --- p.30-31 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Functions of the A CFIC --- p.32 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- "Organization, Staffing and Budget" --- p.32-34 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- "Structure, Local Chapters and Membership" --- p.34-35 / Chapter 3.2 --- Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce and Its District Chapters --- p.35-45 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Functional Changes over the Fifty Years --- p.36-39 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Representative Function of the FIC --- p.39-41 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Funding and Spending --- p.41-43 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Membership --- p.43 / Chapter 3.2.5 --- Selection of Leaders --- p.44-45 / Chapter 3.3 --- Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce and the State: are there any changes? --- p.45-54 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Corporatist Features of the Dual Management System and 1989 & 1998 Document --- p.45-48 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce and the State --- p.48-54 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- The Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Associations --- p.55-80 / Chapter 4.1 --- The Self-Employed Laborers Association at the National Level --- p.55-59 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Establishment and Objectives --- p.55-56 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Functions of the SELA --- p.56-57 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- "Organization, Staffing and Budget" --- p.58 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- "Structure, Local Chapters and Membership" --- p.58-59 / Chapter 4.2 --- Shanghai Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Association and Their District Chapters --- p.59-73 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Organizational Structures of the SELA and PEA --- p.61-63 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Functional Changes --- p.63-65 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- The Representative Function of the SELA and PEA --- p.65-68 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Funding and Spending 68- --- p.71 / Chapter 4.2.5 --- Membership --- p.71-73 / Chapter 4.2.6 --- Selection of Leaders --- p.73 / Chapter 4.3 --- The Self-Employed Laborers Association and Private Enterprises Association: a new form of government appendages? --- p.74-80 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- The Relationship between the Federation of Industry and Commerce and the Private Enterprises Association --- p.81-88 / Chapter 5.1 --- The PEA as A Group Member of the FIC --- p.81-82 / Chapter 5.2 --- The FIC and the PEA: Lack of Interaction --- p.82-83 / Chapter 5.3 --- Perceived Competition between the FIC and the PEA --- p.83-84 / Chapter 5.4 --- Perceived Advantages by the FIC and the PEA's Staff --- p.84-88 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.89-95 / Bibliography --- p.96-102 / Appendix I: Profile of the Interview --- p.103-105 / "Appendix II: Interview Questions for the FIC, the SELA and PEA" --- p.106 / Appendix III: Interview Questions for Members --- p.107 / Appendix IV: Interview Questions for the BICA --- p.108