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Should we give every cow its calf? : monopoly, competition and transaction costs in the promotion of innovation and creativityPollock, Rufus January 2008 (has links)
The work presented here is part of a wider research programme oriented around three specific questions. First, how do individual agents appropriate returns from innovation and how is this affected by the availability (or not) of intellectual property rights such as copyrights and patents? Second, how does this translate into the aggregate production of knowledge, once one takes account of the interaction between producers and the cumulative nature of the process of knowledge production? Finally, How can we incorporate this into an estimate of the welfare trade-off inherent in intellectual property rights (the basic prerequisite for formulating rational IP policy)? The dissertation contains theoretical work on each of these questions together with a brief introductory preamble and a review of the existing literature on the economics of knowledge.
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Transaction costs and resampling in mean-variance portfolio optimizationAsumeng-Denteh, Emmanuel 30 April 2004 (has links)
Transaction costs and resampling are two important issues that need great attention in every portfolio investment planning. In practice costs are incurred to rebalance a portfolio. Every investor tries to find a way of avoiding high transaction cost as much as possible. In this thesis, we investigated how transaction costs and resampling affect portfolio investment. We modified the basic mean-variance optimization problem to include rebalancing costs we incur on transacting securities in the portfolio. We also reduce trading as much as possible by applying the resampling approach any time we rebalance our portfolio. Transaction costs are assumed to be a percentage of the amount of securities transacted. We applied the resampling approach and tracked the performance of portfolios over time, assuming transaction costs and then no transaction costs are incurred. We compared how the portfolio is affected when we incorporated the two issues outlined above to that of the basic mean-variance optimization.
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Knowledge, transferability cost, and transaction cost in MNC: a reconsideration of internalization theory. / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection / ProQuest dissertations and thesesJanuary 2000 (has links)
For several decades, the explanation of the existence of the Multinational Corporation (MNC) has been monopolized by transaction cost theory. The dominance of transaction cost theory in explaining the propensity of internalization was unchallenged until Kogut and Zander (1993) proposed that the superior efficiency of internalization could be explained by the nature of knowledge. Kogut and Zander claimed that the superior efficiency of knowledge transfer within the firm compared to between firms can sufficiently explain the propensity of internalization, and that market failure was not a necessary condition for internalization. Although their study is of considerably significant---they pointed out a new direction for considering the existence of MNC, the argument that market failure was not a necessary condition to internalization is logically and conceptually incorrect, and their empirical examination did not correctly support their argument. / It was found that the tacitness of knowledge is positively related to the propensity of internalization, transferability cost, and transaction cost. The positive correlations between transferability cost and the propensity of internalization, and between the transaction cost and the propensity of internalization were found. Accordingly, both transferability cost and transaction cost are mediators between the tacitness of knowledge and the propensity of internalization, and transferability cost can independently explain the superior efficiency of internalization. / The current study challenges the transaction cost theory explanation of internalization advantage by developing the construct of transferability cost, which is conceptually and empirically different from transaction cost. Transferability cost results from the dissemination and assimilation of knowledge, but transaction cost is a consequence of opportunism. The quantity of transferability cost is determined by the transferee's absorptive capability, the transferor's experience on knowledge transfer, the similarity between the transferred knowledge and the transferee's prior knowledge, and the nature of the transferred knowledge. However, transferability cost is determined by asset specificity, asymmetric information distribution, human self-interest nature, and the nature of transferred knowledge. / The identification of transferability cost provides us a convincing theoretical base to reconsider internalization theory. It is also helpful for managers to rationalize their decisions on several issues. / Cao Shengrong. / "April 2000." / Adviser: Kent Neupert. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3238. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 178-194). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.
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Optimal market timing strategies under transaction costsLi, Wei 01 January 1999 (has links)
No description available.
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Consumption commitments and precautionary savingsBanerjee, Haimanti 01 July 2011 (has links)
In incomplete market models, agents with homothetic preferences over one non-durable consumption good and exposed to idiosyncratic income shocks use precautionary savings as an instrument to smooth consumption across different contingencies. The magnitude and role of precautionary savings is therefore essential in the understanding of savings behavior of agents in such an economy. In this dissertation, I study the effects of consumption commitments on aggregate savings behavior within an otherwise standard incomplete market framework. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of a consumption commitment good like housing in an incomplete market framework (Aiyagari(1994), Huggett(1997)). Conceptually, I concentrate on the argument whether consumption of housing is associated with changes in risk aversion and therefore reflected in precautionary savings behavior of agents. I study an analytical framework that captures key elements in the data like (i) heterogeneity in earnings through fixed effects and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, (ii) fraction of income spent on housing, (iii) magnitude of moving costs. In the second chapter, I present a dynamic incomplete market model with a key feature: a commitment good (housing) with positive transaction (moving) costs. I focus on a stationary recursive equilibrium for agents in the benchmark economy. I calibrate the benchmark model to the US economy. I find that the benchmark economy replicates (i) the fraction of income spent on housing services, (ii) the fraction of people moving in each period. In the third chapter, I quantitatively evaluate the magnitude of precautionary savings in the presence of housing consumption in the benchmark economy and compare it to the standard incomplete market model. Results indicate that the presence of housing leads to higher aggregate precautionary savings by nearly 13% when compared to the Aiyagari specification. I find transaction costs to have significant impact on aggregate savings behavior.
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Impact of transaction costs on Saskatchewan's beef finishing sectorAyars, Morley Bryce 17 July 2003 (has links)
The removal of the transportation subsidy on western Canadian grain has resulted in a relative shift in competitiveness from grain to livestock production in Saskatchewan. Feedlot managers indicated that they fed cattle at a lower cost than their Alberta competitors. They suggested their feeding advantage is in the range of $45 to $75 per animal. Yet this supposed feeding advantage has not resulted in an increase in cattle being finished in the province. In fact statistics show that there has been a decrease in the number of cattle finished in Saskatchewan since the removal of the transportation subsidy.
This thesis investigated potential hindrances to developing feedlots in Saskatchewan. Interviews with 17 Saskatchewan feedlot managers were conducted in 2001. These feedlot managers suggested that lack of financing was a hindrance to feedlot development in Saskatchewan. They sited provincial land and labour laws, a grain production bias and feeding risk as potential reasons for lack of investment in the feedlot sector.
The interviews with these 17 feedlot managers led to an investigation of transaction costs in buying and selling cattle. A theoretical framework was developed in this thesis to measure transaction costs. Then some empirical evidence was calculated from transaction cost estimates provided by five finishing feedlots that indicated larger feedlots have lower transaction costs in buying and selling cattle than smaller feedlots.
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Impact of transaction costs on Saskatchewan's beef finishing sectorAyars, Morley Bryce 17 July 2003
The removal of the transportation subsidy on western Canadian grain has resulted in a relative shift in competitiveness from grain to livestock production in Saskatchewan. Feedlot managers indicated that they fed cattle at a lower cost than their Alberta competitors. They suggested their feeding advantage is in the range of $45 to $75 per animal. Yet this supposed feeding advantage has not resulted in an increase in cattle being finished in the province. In fact statistics show that there has been a decrease in the number of cattle finished in Saskatchewan since the removal of the transportation subsidy.
This thesis investigated potential hindrances to developing feedlots in Saskatchewan. Interviews with 17 Saskatchewan feedlot managers were conducted in 2001. These feedlot managers suggested that lack of financing was a hindrance to feedlot development in Saskatchewan. They sited provincial land and labour laws, a grain production bias and feeding risk as potential reasons for lack of investment in the feedlot sector.
The interviews with these 17 feedlot managers led to an investigation of transaction costs in buying and selling cattle. A theoretical framework was developed in this thesis to measure transaction costs. Then some empirical evidence was calculated from transaction cost estimates provided by five finishing feedlots that indicated larger feedlots have lower transaction costs in buying and selling cattle than smaller feedlots.
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A framework for assessing the exchange costs in the flax fibre supply chainMelitz, Siea M. 22 July 2005
Canada has been recognized as the largest exporter of flax seed in the world. Currently, very little flax straw is further processed, despite its potential as a value added product, with only about 7-10% of Canadian flax seed producers harvesting residual flax straw rather than burning the straw. A traditional use of flax straw has been for the production of fibre for the linen industry. Interest in flax fibre has been rekindled with the impetus to seek out bioproducts that replace non-renewal resources and provide value-added opportunities for agricultural producers. Flax fibre also has a range of potential uses in automotive parts, geotextiles, insulation material, etc. Despite this potential, the Canadian flax fibre sector remains largely underdeveloped, with fledgling supply chains and lack of investment in the necessary processing capacity. This paper develops a framework for analysing the relational exchanges at different stage of the supply chain to determine if the paucity in investment is the result of prohibitively high exchange costs.
A number of distinct stages in the flax fibre supply chain can be identified: farmers producing flax seed and/or straw; processors who extract the natural fibre from the straw; and manufacturers who use the fibre in their products. The paper develops a framework that draws together insights from Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory and Bargaining Theory. The role of institutions in facilitating quality measurement and providing participants with information is also considered. The theoretical framework identifies asset specificity, agency measurement costs, bargaining power and under-developed institutions as key factors in the development of the flax fibre sector. From the theoretical framework, a set of propositions is developed that examine the anticipated effect of these factors on vertical coordination in the sector.
The theoretical propositions are explored through a series of semi-structured interviews with parties at each stage of the supply chain (producers, fibre processors, final manufacturers), as well as with industry experts. Information from the interviews is used to identify the transaction characteristics and the institutional framework characterizing the flax fibre sector in Canada. This is analysed through a comparative case study approach with the flax fibre sector in Europe, and the wool fibre sector in New Zealand as an example of a fully developed and long-standing fibre sector. By also noting the different vertical coordination strategies that are present in these supply chains, a connection is drawn between the presence of certain transaction characteristics and the corresponding cost-minimizing exchange relationships. The case studies are used to investigate the propositions developed from the theoretical framework regarding the impact of transaction characteristics on the optimal vertical coordination strategy and the impediments to development and investment in the sector.
The propositions developed in the framework are verified to a great extent by the comparative case study. The uncertainty in the exchange environment regarding the future direction of the flax fibre industry and the high measurement costs due to the absent quality and grading regime in the Canadian flax fibre set the two industries apart from each other. Both of these dimensions impact the exchange costs of a transaction and subsequently, the extent to which the parties are closely coordinated. The case studies verify that using a framework to analyze transactions provides additional insights because of the joint consideration of several features of the transaction.
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Portfolio Selection Under Nonsmooth Convex Transaction CostsPotaptchik, Marina January 2006 (has links)
We consider a portfolio selection problem in the presence of transaction costs. Transaction costs on each asset are assumed to be a convex function of the amount sold or bought. This function can be nondifferentiable in a finite number of points. The objective function of this problem is a sum of a convex twice differentiable function and a separable convex nondifferentiable function. We first consider the problem in the presence of linear constraints and later generalize the results to the case when the constraints are given by the convex piece-wise linear functions. <br /><br /> Due to the special structure, this problem can be replaced by an equivalent differentiable problem in a higher dimension. It's main drawback is efficiency since the higher dimensional problem is computationally expensive to solve. <br /><br /> We propose several alternative ways to solve this problem which do not require introducing new variables or constraints. We derive the optimality conditions for this problem using subdifferentials. First, we generalize an active set method to this class of problems. We solve the problem by considering a sequence of equality constrained subproblems, each subproblem having a twice differentiable objective function. Information gathered at each step is used to construct the subproblem for the next step. We also show how the nonsmoothness can be handled efficiently by using spline approximations. The problem is then solved using a primal-dual interior-point method. <br /><br /> If a higher accuracy is needed, we do a crossover to an active set method. Our numerical tests show that we can solve large scale problems efficiently and accurately.
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Portfolio Selection Under Nonsmooth Convex Transaction CostsPotaptchik, Marina January 2006 (has links)
We consider a portfolio selection problem in the presence of transaction costs. Transaction costs on each asset are assumed to be a convex function of the amount sold or bought. This function can be nondifferentiable in a finite number of points. The objective function of this problem is a sum of a convex twice differentiable function and a separable convex nondifferentiable function. We first consider the problem in the presence of linear constraints and later generalize the results to the case when the constraints are given by the convex piece-wise linear functions. <br /><br /> Due to the special structure, this problem can be replaced by an equivalent differentiable problem in a higher dimension. It's main drawback is efficiency since the higher dimensional problem is computationally expensive to solve. <br /><br /> We propose several alternative ways to solve this problem which do not require introducing new variables or constraints. We derive the optimality conditions for this problem using subdifferentials. First, we generalize an active set method to this class of problems. We solve the problem by considering a sequence of equality constrained subproblems, each subproblem having a twice differentiable objective function. Information gathered at each step is used to construct the subproblem for the next step. We also show how the nonsmoothness can be handled efficiently by using spline approximations. The problem is then solved using a primal-dual interior-point method. <br /><br /> If a higher accuracy is needed, we do a crossover to an active set method. Our numerical tests show that we can solve large scale problems efficiently and accurately.
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