Transfer pricing has become a very popular term in South Africa over the last few years, even more so since July 2013 when the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action plan was issued by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and G20 (an international forum for the governments and central bank governors from 20 major economies). The OECD and G20 has issued the plan to address the perceived flaws in international tax rules, giving rise to profit shifting. Subsequently, the OECD has issued numerous reports and as a result has updated its 2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Many countries have adopted these guidelines. However as South Africa is not an OECD member, there is no certainty that it will be adopted. The question is therefore: has the South African Tax legislation met the OECD guidelines and addressed the BEPS issue? Therefore, the objective of the research is to understand whether the current South African tax legislation is in line with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and BEPS Action Plan. The South African tax legislation provides South African taxpayers with no guidance as to how the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines needs to be implemented and interpreted. However, even though not legislation, the SARS practice note 7 and draft interpretation note on thin capitalisation provides taxpayers with a good basis of understanding the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as these documents provided by SARS is similar to that of the guidance in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, specifically relating to transfer pricing documentation. The issue that may result where the South African tax legislation is not in line with the OECD guidelines and the BEPS Action Plan is that Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) may use South Africa as the country to shift its profits to or from, thus effectively resulting in a loss to the Fiscus.

For the last decades, transfer pricing has been one of the most important issues for both tax authorities and multinational corporations. On the one hand, tax authorities, despite their counter-measures, have not been able to cope with international tax avoidance or evasion using transfer pricing by multinational corporations owing to the deficiency of tax systems and the inability of tax administrations and this has resulted in a huge revenue loss to the coffers of their countries. On the other hand, while multinational corporations have been using transfer pricing as vehicles to maximize their overall after-tax profits as a group, they have been suffering intolerable administrative burdens and double taxation caused by enforcement of counter-measures by tax authorities. The basic principle for transfer pricing taxation legislation is the "arm's length principle", that transactions between parties that are not dealing at arm's length should be carried out for tax purposes under terms and at a price that one could reasonably have expected in similar circumstance had the parties been dealing at arm's length. This principle has been endorsed by the OECD, Canada, the U.S. and other developed countries, however, common specific guidelines under this principle have not been established among tax authorities and even multinational corporations themselves cannot always find an arm's length price acceptable to tax authorities. Since the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs issued the report "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises" in 1979, tax authorities, multinational corporations and tax practitioners have been making strenuous efforts to find a reasonable and practical transfer pricing taxation system and to coordinate its enforcement, all of which enables tax authorities to recover or keep their fair share of revenue and protect multinational corporations from double taxation. At present, the situation already shows some improvements due to efforts for the harmonization of guidelines among tax authorities, and due to multinational corporations' application of transfer pricing policy in a more self-restricted manner, and more appropriate advice from tax practitioners. However, there is still room for possible improvements. In Canada, there have been no guidelines other than the Income Tax Act which provides general principles of transfer pricing taxation, and actual enforcement has been based on the internal assessing guideline of Revenue Canada. But, on February 27, 1987 Revenue Canada issued Information Circular 87-2. Although an information circular does not carry any legal weight, it is expected that the circular will eliminate taxpayers' uncertainty and augment tax compliance. On the other hand, in Japan, despite its export-oriented economy, the Japanese tax authorities have not been keeping pace with the internationalization of economic activities. Having introduced anti-tax haven legislation in 1978, Japan in 1986 introduced transfer pricing taxation legislation. Although fairly concrete pricing methods have been written into legislation in order to permit the reasonable enforcement of the new system, there is much to be learned from the experience of the "advanced" countries. Above all, Canada's experience could be useful, as the provisions of the new Japanese transfer pricing taxation legislation are similar to those of the Canadian Income Tax Act and both countries have several similarities in terms of their relationship with the U.S. In this thesis, after reviewing the background to these problems, I will discuss the Canadian transfer pricing taxation system and its enforcement by looking at each type of intra-group transaction and the corresponding adjustment and mutual agreement procedure system. Then I will compare the Canadian approach and Japanese approach. Possible improvements will be dealt with in the conclusion. Since there has been little jurisprudence in this area, the discussions are primarily based on the tax authorities' perspectives and the OECD reports. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This treatise analyses the suitability of the Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) for the South African Transfer Pricing legislation. The transfer pricing legislation places emphasis on the arm's length principle. Determining an arm's length price is problematic and as a result some countries have resorted to APA's to establish an arm's length price up-front, and thus avoid reviews and subsequent audits. The treatise first focuses on the transfer pricing provisions and other relevant applicable sections of the Act from the South African point of view, and it then examines the current status quo, i.e. the review processes used by the South African Revenue Services (SARS) as detailed in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Developments (OECD) Guidelines and the SARS Practice Note. Since negotiated tax treaties form part of the South Africa law, the impact of these treaties are discussed in Chapter 4. The treatise discusses in detail an APA from the OECD's point of view. It examines the objectives of an APA; the benefit and the shortcomings of using an APA. It then examines the APA request processes from a Canadian perspective and the administration of the APA from an USA perspective. The treatise examines South African trading partners using APA in transfer pricing matters, with reference to the effects and the challenges such countries face. The treatise concludes by looking at the benefits provided by use of an APA by South African major trading partners. The effect and the use of such APA will have in South Africa is also discussed and how it should be modelled; the present status quo with regard to personnel at SARS; and the possible impact the introduction and implementation will have in South Africa.

This thesis examines the transfer pricing issue within the perspective of setting up a cost contribution arrangement for the international management of intangible property. / To this end, the first part presents the general rules governing the transfer pricing area in Australia, Canada, France, and the United States. The provisions of these countries will serve as a guiding line of this study. The first part presents, as well, the OECD Transfer Pricing Principles. / The second part examines the structural alternatives of the CCA tax vehicle. / The third part addresses the CCA concept itself. / The fourth part deals with the operational functioning of a CCA. The new challenges and the multiple issues raised by this new tax structure are addressed as well as the tax planning perspectives opening up through transfer pricing. / Finally, the fifth part questions the new dynamics of the conflicts between tax administrations generated by the CCA vehicle.

There is an overlap between the transfer pricing concepts that apply under tax and under customs regimes. This thesis aims to demonstrate (i) that customs and tax laws often share common principles in respect of related-party transactions; (ii) that transfer pricing as agreed to under one discipline should be recognized under the other; (iii) that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines constitute a body of rules that is appropriate to supplement the related party provisions of the GATT/WTO Valuation Code ("GVC"); and (iv) that such guidelines are generally in accordance with the provisions of the GVC and its general principles and objectives. This thesis also analyzes the tax and customs value of imported goods, and identifies which additions to or deductions from customs value might have to be taken into account in comparing tax and customs results. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the circumstances and conditions under which the introduction of transfer pricing compensatory adjustments to transaction value would be consistent with Article 1 of the GVC.

The South African Revenue Service has since 2009 introduced “reference pricing” as a tool to detect undervaluation of customs values of imported clothing and textiles. The term “reference pricing” is not defined in the Customs and Excise Act No.91 of 1964 which is the legislation that governs the importation of goods into the Republic of South Africa. The mandate of the South African Revenue Service, amongst others, is to facilitate legitimate trade. By applying the reference pricing guidelines the South African Revenue Service will target all importers who declare customs values which are less than the reference price for a targeted tariff heading associated with an item of clothing or textile. The Customs and Excise Act No.91 of 1964 is clear in that the transaction value which is the price paid or payable for the imported goods shall be the value used for customs duty purposes. The Customs and Excise Act No.91 of 1964 also requires that the interpretation of the sections 65, 66 and 67 of the said Act shall be subject to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Valuation Agreement). Part I of the Valuation Agreement deals with the rules for customs valuation. Article 17 of part 1 allows for customs administrations to satisfy themselves as to the truth or accuracy of any statement, document or declaration presented for customs valuation purposes. The Technical Committee on Customs Valuation of the World Trade Organisation decided the following in so far as Article 17 of the aforesaid agreement is concerned: “1. When a declaration has been presented and where the customs administration has reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of the particulars or of documents produced in support of this declaration, the customs administration may ask the importer to provide further explanation, including documents or other evidence, that the declared value represents the total amount actually paid or payable for the imported goods, ....” It would appear that the South African Revenue Service is using reference prices as a tool to support its reason for doubting the truth or accuracy of the declared customs values. The indiscriminate use of reference pricing, it is submitted, affects legitimate trade adversely. This treatise provides an understanding of how the customs value should be determined in terms of the Customs and Excise Act No.91 of 1964 and the Valuation Agreement. It then provides a background to reference pricing and how reference pricing will be used to detect undervalued imports of clothing and textiles, the advantages and disadvantages of using reference pricing and a comparative analysis of the approach adopted by the Mexican Tax Administration Service in so far as the use of reference pricing is concerned. It was established that the reference price cannot replace the customs value of an imported clothing item as the customs value is based on the price actually paid or payable for it and not on some arbitrary or fictitious value. The reference price can only be used as a tool to identify importers that are possibly undervaluing the customs values. The disadvantages far outweigh the advantages of using reference pricing. The treatise further provides a background to the use of a valuation database as a risk assessment tool and compares this to the use of reference pricing. The use of reference pricing and its impact on trade facilitation is then discussed as well as whether the use of reference pricing is consistent with the risk management principles as discussed in the World Customs Organisation Risk Management Guide. It was established that the South African Revenue Service has not disclosed the basis of arriving at the reference price per tariff heading that it targets and the use of reference pricing is not sanctioned by any international guideline or agreement. It was also established that the use of reference pricing targets compliant importers unnecessarily and this practice goes against the principles of trade facilitation. The use of reference pricing can be used as a tool to detect undervalued imports of clothing but should not be used as a basis to stop every consignment of clothing simply because the customs value declared is less than the reference price. It should not be used as a stand-alone tool but rather enhanced further with the recommendations provided. In the final analysis, recommendations are provided which seek to enhance the reference pricing mechanism and to further identify and exclude compliant importers and limit the use of reference pricing to target non-compliant importers who undervalue the customs value of imported clothing and textile items.

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Transfer prices are the prices charged by one party for goods and/or services transferred to a related party. While transfer prices are essential to the goal of profit maximization within the enterprise, difficulties arise over how to establish the "correct" transfer price. For the global enterprise this problem is more acute because different segments of the enterprise operate under different political jurisdictions and are subject to taxation by different political entities. Concerns have been raised by Congress and the Internal Revenue Service regarding whether multinationals, especially foreign-owned multinationals, are using transfer-pricing and cost-allocation policies across international borders to avoid United States income taxes. Generally, testimony before the hearings, limited anecdotal studies, and court case findings have suggested that multinationals do not pay their "fair share". An examination of 336 companies in the chemical industry (STC codes 2800-2899) provided mixed support for the position that multinationals are paying less than their "fair share" of U.S. income taxes. While statistically significant differences were found among the three groups for the cost-ofgood-sold (COGS) ratio (after developmental stage enterprises were removed) and for the worldwide net-profit ratio, no Statistically significant differences were found for tax-rate measures (worldwide effective income tax rate, worldwide effective operating income tax rate, and U.S. effective operating income tax rate) or for the return measures (worldwide return on assets, worldwide operating return on assets, and U.S. operating return on assets). When multinationals (U.S.-controlled and foreign-controlled combined to form a single group) were compared to domestic companies, statistically significant differences were found only for the COGS ratio. When U.S. multinationals were restricted to those companies with 50% or more of both their net sales and average total assets abroad, statistically Significant differences were found for the operating income ratios (both U.S. and worldwide) and for the worldwide net profit ratio, but such differences were found neither for the COGS ratio, the effective-income-tax-rate measures, nor for the return measures. Complicating the issue were: (1) the presence of developing stage enterprises and foreign parent companies among the total group; (2) the use of a 10% cutoff in ownership and operations to determine whether a company is or is not a multinational; and (3) the absence of access to tax or accounting records, resulting in the need to use secondary sources for data. One suggestion for simplifying the transfer-pricing issue is the adoption of a method of formulary apportionment. Ina comparison of the amount of income allocated to U.S. operations under current methods (either specific allocation Or separate accounting) and the amount that would have been allocated under formulary apportionment methods no significant differences were found, suggesting that such a method is worthy of further study. / Ph. D.

Thesis (MComm)--University of Stellenbosch, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Despite the fact that transfer pricing legislation (i.e. section 31 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (“the Act”) has been in force in South Africa since 1995, it has only been in the last three years that the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) has embarked on a number of assessments of taxpayers’ cross border transactions with foreign group companies. In particular, the SARS targets taxpayers that have rendered cross border services (including financial assistance) to a foreign group company for no consideration and has assessed these taxpayers on the adjusted interest/ fee amounts. Since the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer to demonstrate that its cross border transactions with foreign group companies do not infringe the provisions of section 31(2) of the Act, this study provides taxpayers with guidance as to when its transactions would fall within the scope of application of section 31(2) of the Act and when the SARS would be excluded from applying the provision of section 31(2) of the Act. Following upon a critical analysis of the essential components of section 31(2) of the Act the following conclusions are drawn by the author: • If the taxpayer proves that it did not transact with a connected party (as defined in section 1 of the Act), or it did not supply goods or services in terms of an international agreement (as defined in section 31(1) of the Act), or its transfer price would be regarded as arm’s length, the Commissioner would be excluded from applying the provision of section 31(2) of the Act since all of the components to apply section 31(2) of the Act are not present. • The current view held by the South African Revenue Service and tax practitioners that transactions between a South African company and an offshore company, which are both directly or indirectly held more than fifty percent by an offshore parent company, are transactions between connected persons (as defined in 5 section 1 of the Act) is incorrect in law. Section 31 of the Act is not applicable to such transactions. • The Commissioner will be excluded from making a transfer pricing adjustment to a service provider’s taxable income where the following circumstances are present: o Where the cross border transaction with a connected party does not give rise to gross income, which is the starting point in the determination of taxable income, since the service provider agreed to render services for no consideration and was therefore not entitled to receive income (i.e. no receipt or accrual) and o Where the service provider can provide evidence that demonstrates that there was no practice of price manipulation as regards the transaction under review. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Alhoewel oordragprysbeleid wetgewing (artikel 31 van die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962 (“die Wet”)) al sedert 1995 in Suid Afrika van krag is, het die Suid Afrikaanse Inkomstediens (“SAID”) eers werklik gedurende die laaste drie jaar begin om aanslae ten opsigte van belastingpligtiges se internasionale transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye uit te reik. In die besonder teiken die SAID belastingpligtes wat dienste (insluitend lenings) aan buitelandse groepmaatskappye vir geen vergoeding lewer. Aangesien die bewyslas op die belastingpligtige rus om te bewys dat sy internasionale transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye nie die bepalings van artikel 31(2) van die Wet oortree nie, word belastingpligtiges in hierdie studie van riglyne, wat aandui wanneer transaksies met buitelandse groepmaatskappye binne die omvang van artikel 31(2) van die Wet val asook onder welke omstandighede die SAID verhoed sal word om artikel 31(2) van die Wet toe te pas, voorsien. Na aanleiding van ‘n kritiese analise van die deurslaggewende komponente van artikel 31(2) van die Wet kom die skrywer tot die volgende gevolgtrekkings: • As die belastingpligte kan bewys dat hy nie met ‘n verbonde persoon (soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Wet) handelgedryf het nie, of dat hy nie goedere of dienste in terme van ‘n internasionale ooreenkoms (soos omskryf in artikel 31(1) van die Wet) gelewer het nie, of dat sy oordragprys as arm lengte beskou kan word, sal die Kommissaris verhoed word om die bepaling van artikel 31(2) van die Wet toe te pas, aangesien al die komponente van artikel 31(2) van die Wet nie teenwoordig is nie. • Die huidige sienswyse van die SAID en belastingpraktisyns dat transaksies wat tussen ‘n Suid Afrikaanse maatskappy en ‘n buitelandse maatskappy plaasvind, waar ‘n buitelandse moedermaatskappy meer as vyftig persent van albei maatskappye se aandeelhouding (direk of indirek) hou, beskou kan word as 7 transaksies tussen verbonde persone (soos omskryf in artikel 1 van die Wet) is regstegnies nie korrek nie. Artikel 31(2) van die Wet is nie van toepassing op sulke transaksies nie. • Die Kommisaris sal onder die volgende omstandighede verhoed word om enige oordragprysaanpassing aan ‘n diensleweraar se belasbare inkomste te maak: o Waar die internasionale transaksie met ‘n verbonde persoon nie bruto inkomste (die beginpunt van ‘n belasbare inkomste berekening) voortbring nie, aangesien die diensleweraar ingestem het om dienste teen geen vergoeding te lewer, wat tot die gevolg het dat die diensleweraar nie geregtig is om inkomste te ontvang nie (dus geen ontvangste of toevalling) en o Waar die diensleweraar kan bewys dat die transaksie nie onderhewig aan prys manipulasie was nie.