Amidst the global wave of democratization, modernization, and economic engagement during the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional tenets of constitutionalism have proven to be unwieldy dogma for States undergoing periods of rapid transition. In order to retain the administrative capacity to steer – rather than merely adapt to – political and social change, numerous transitioning States have adopted a new paradigm of constitutionalism, namely transitional constitutionalism, characterized by a centralized and streamlined structure of governance. However, in many instances, including Korea’s post-division transitional history, this model has demonstrably undermined fundamental human rights protections. In this thesis, I propose a hybrid constitutional paradigm for unification in Korea (another form of State transition) which seeks to balance the dual objectives of effective governance and human rights protection. I do so by examining and critiquing the core principles of traditional and transitional constitutionalism, outlining the human rights issues that the unified Korea will likely confront in its constitutional trajectory based on an analysis of Korea’s political, social, cultural, and constitutional history, and finally proposing a hybrid model of constitutionalism that utilizes an institutional approach to prevent violations of human rights in the unified Korea while allowing the State to retain governmental efficiency during transition. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-30 11:35:33.362