Following the fall of the Lehman Brothers in 2008, the U.S. saw the worst recession since the Great Depression in the 1920's. This dissertation presents a summary of two previous major U.S. recessions, the Great Depression and the Savings and Loans Crisis, and an analysis of the root causes and consequences of the 2007-2009 recession is also provided, namely the bursting of the housing bubble, loose monetary policy, lax financial regulation, and misperception of risk. The Troubled Asset Relief Program, a bailout program implemented following the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, is then discussed. Using county-level panel data, the effect of the implementation of TARP on unemployment patterns is then studied. The results show that TARP negatively affected unemployment patterns, so that TARP alleviated the sharp rise in unemployment after its inception

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In the study of government accountability, there have long been arguments about which model is superior. These arguments, which are largely made by those in the performance and political accountability camps, state that their particular model is the best, and indeed only legitimate approach to ensuring accountable government. At the same time, there is growing research in policy tools but little in how accountability models and policy tools are linked in policy design. This study makes use of the context provided by the critical cases of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). With such large sums of money in play at a time of serious economic downturn and mounting federal deficits, government clearly has a responsibility to ensure accountability so that the public can be assured not only that its funds are being spent properly but also more generally, that accountability as well as policy tool choice is in the minds of officials as they formulate, adopt and implement public policy. The intent of this study is to present an argument in two main areas using the critical case studies of TARP and ARRA. First, that no one accountability model fully explains most policy tool choices in TARP or ARRA and that the use of multiple models is superior. Second, that we can link policy tool choices and accountability models in policy design. The standards used to establish what models explain what tool choices are in the models themselves. Each policy is explored individually in a chapter, and the lessons and results of this study are then presented in the final chapter. The data presented in this study indicate that a single-model approach may explain a few, but not most and certainly not all, policy tool choices in TARP and ARRA. Indeed, a multiple model approach proves superior to a single-model approach in all but a few instances. As for the connections between policy tools and accountability models, the data presented in this study show that they were strongly impacted by the policy formulation process itself, specifically the way in which the policy problem was framed and the speed with which it was undertaken.

The objective of this diploma thesis is to examine the relationship between executive compensation and bank performance. We study the executive pay structure of the U.S. largest 100 bank holding companies during period 2002-2009. Our data analysis describes differences between behaviour of TARP recipients and the banks that did not receive state financial help with consideration of financial crisis effect. We use econometric model to test the dependence of bank performance measures and particular elements of executive remuneration - total sum, bonus, stock award and option award. The relationship is generally considered as weak, but we also find linkage between TARP recipients' compensation and Market Capitalisation and on the other hand non-TARP bank appeared to define compensation according to earning per share. A special attention is devoted to executive remuneration structures of TARP recipients with weakest results and their comparison with Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act and TARP standards. JEL Classification: G21, G35, G38, K23 Keywords: Executive compensation, bank performance, Troubled Asset Relief Program, performance-related pay, corporate governance, financial crisis, executives