OPSOMMING Alhoewel die trustfiguur reeds sedert die 19e Eeu in Suid-Afrika erken word, en as `n suiwer trustfiguur tipeer kan word, is die hantering van die regte van sekere trustbegunstigdes steeds in onsekerheid gehul. Die hoofrede hiervoor is die oorbeklemtoning van die wyse waarop trusts tot stand kom en die onderbeklemtoning van die unieke fidusiêre aard van die trust na oprigting daarvan. In Engeland, Skotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana en Quebec, waar die suiwer trustfiguur ook aanwending vind, bestaan, in teenstelling met die oënskynlike regsposisie in Suid-Afrika, die moontlikheid van trustbegunstigdes sonder regte glad nie. In hierdie jurisdiksies speel die oprigtingsinstrument `n ondergeskikte rol en ontstaan die regte van trustbegunstigdes ex lege uit hoofde van die trustfiguur as `n vertrouensverhouding sui generis. Alhoewel die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg die fidusiêre aard van die verhouding tussen trustee en trustbegunstigde erken, word die aard en omvang van die regte wat hieruit voort behoort te vloei nog nie voldoende deur die howe erken nie. Vertrouensverhoudinge waaruit regte en verpligtinge ex lege voortspruit, is bekend aan die gemenereg en word steeds hedendaags aangetref in verskeie ander vakdissiplines binne die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, waaronder die maatskappyereg. Die suiwer trustfiguur stel verder noodwendig `n vertrouensverhouding daar wat juis daarop gemik is om die regte van trustbegunstigdes te beskerm. Die standpunt word dus ingeneem dat alle trustbegunstigdes in Suid-Afrika derhalwe oor ex lege regte beskik. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat trustbegunstigdes se regte nie uitsluitlik voortvloei uit hoofde van die tersaaklike oprigtingshandeling nie, maar dat unieke regte ontstaan as gevolg van die onderliggende fidusiêre verhouding wat tot stand kom wanneer, maar ongeag hoe, die trust opgerig word. Kortom: Die fidusiêre verhouding behoort erken te word as eie, onafhanklike bron van trustbegunstigdes se moontlike regte teen die trustee in die geval van trustbreuk. Nie net is dit `n logiese stap in die ontwikkeling van die gemenereg nie, maar sal dit ook die beskerming van trustbegunstigdes in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg op dieselfde voet plaas as trustbegunstigdes in die ander jurisdiksies wat nagevors is. So 'n stap sal bydra tot regsekerheid en nie tot `n wesentlike omwenteling in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg en -administrasie lei nie. SYNOPSIS Although the trust figure has been recognised in South Africa since the 19th century and can be characterised as a proper trust, uncertainty still prevails regarding the scope and acknowledgement of the rights of some trust beneficiaries. The main reason for this is the over-emphasis of the manner in which trusts are created, and the under-emphasis of the unique fiduciary nature of the trust once it has been established. In England, Scotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana and Quebec where the proper trust figure is also applied, there is no possibility, contrary to the apparent legal position in South Africa, of trust beneficiaries without rights. In these jurisdictions the instrument used to create a trust plays a subordinate role and the rights of trust beneficiaries originate ex lege by virtue of the trust itself as a relationship of trust sui generis. Although South African trust law acknowledges the fiduciary nature of the relationship between trustee and trust beneficiary, the nature and extent of the rights that should emanate from this relationship are not adequately acknowledged by the courts. / Jurisprudence / L.L.D.

OPSOMMING Alhoewel die trustfiguur reeds sedert die 19e Eeu in Suid-Afrika erken word, en as `n suiwer trustfiguur tipeer kan word, is die hantering van die regte van sekere trustbegunstigdes steeds in onsekerheid gehul. Die hoofrede hiervoor is die oorbeklemtoning van die wyse waarop trusts tot stand kom en die onderbeklemtoning van die unieke fidusiêre aard van die trust na oprigting daarvan. In Engeland, Skotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana en Quebec, waar die suiwer trustfiguur ook aanwending vind, bestaan, in teenstelling met die oënskynlike regsposisie in Suid-Afrika, die moontlikheid van trustbegunstigdes sonder regte glad nie. In hierdie jurisdiksies speel die oprigtingsinstrument `n ondergeskikte rol en ontstaan die regte van trustbegunstigdes ex lege uit hoofde van die trustfiguur as `n vertrouensverhouding sui generis. Alhoewel die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg die fidusiêre aard van die verhouding tussen trustee en trustbegunstigde erken, word die aard en omvang van die regte wat hieruit voort behoort te vloei nog nie voldoende deur die howe erken nie. Vertrouensverhoudinge waaruit regte en verpligtinge ex lege voortspruit, is bekend aan die gemenereg en word steeds hedendaags aangetref in verskeie ander vakdissiplines binne die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, waaronder die maatskappyereg. Die suiwer trustfiguur stel verder noodwendig `n vertrouensverhouding daar wat juis daarop gemik is om die regte van trustbegunstigdes te beskerm. Die standpunt word dus ingeneem dat alle trustbegunstigdes in Suid-Afrika derhalwe oor ex lege regte beskik. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat trustbegunstigdes se regte nie uitsluitlik voortvloei uit hoofde van die tersaaklike oprigtingshandeling nie, maar dat unieke regte ontstaan as gevolg van die onderliggende fidusiêre verhouding wat tot stand kom wanneer, maar ongeag hoe, die trust opgerig word. Kortom: Die fidusiêre verhouding behoort erken te word as eie, onafhanklike bron van trustbegunstigdes se moontlike regte teen die trustee in die geval van trustbreuk. Nie net is dit `n logiese stap in die ontwikkeling van die gemenereg nie, maar sal dit ook die beskerming van trustbegunstigdes in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg op dieselfde voet plaas as trustbegunstigdes in die ander jurisdiksies wat nagevors is. So 'n stap sal bydra tot regsekerheid en nie tot `n wesentlike omwenteling in die Suid-Afrikaanse trustreg en -administrasie lei nie. SYNOPSIS Although the trust figure has been recognised in South Africa since the 19th century and can be characterised as a proper trust, uncertainty still prevails regarding the scope and acknowledgement of the rights of some trust beneficiaries. The main reason for this is the over-emphasis of the manner in which trusts are created, and the under-emphasis of the unique fiduciary nature of the trust once it has been established. In England, Scotland, Sri Lanka, Louisiana and Quebec where the proper trust figure is also applied, there is no possibility, contrary to the apparent legal position in South Africa, of trust beneficiaries without rights. In these jurisdictions the instrument used to create a trust plays a subordinate role and the rights of trust beneficiaries originate ex lege by virtue of the trust itself as a relationship of trust sui generis. Although South African trust law acknowledges the fiduciary nature of the relationship between trustee and trust beneficiary, the nature and extent of the rights that should emanate from this relationship are not adequately acknowledged by the courts. / Jurisprudence / L.L.D.

This study focuses on the discretionary inter vivos trust. It specifically investigates what the discretion of a trustee comprises and in which circumstances (if any) the court may amend the trustee‟s discretion as stipulated in the deed of trust. In order to make any meaningful conclusions, the different types of trusts, and more specific the way in which trusts are classified, needs to be researched. An inter vivos trust is classified as a contract for the sake of a third. Consequently contract law rules are applied in the interpretation and amendment of an inter vivos trust. The source, goal and tenor of a trustee‟s discretion, as well as the circumstances wherein this discretion may be amended, are investigated. The general rule is that courts have no discretion to amend a trust, but there is an exception to the rule. In accordance with article 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 courts do have the power to amend or cancel the deed of trust in certain circumstances. In Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (HHA) the court ruled that the power granted by article 13 does not enable judges to create law by amendment of the deed of trust according to their subjective interpretation of what is fair and just. The facts of the Potgieter case serve as problem statement for this study by focusing on the problems and unjust consequences of the strict application of contract law rules on a trust when the court does not take the changing circumstances of the trust founder into account. / LLM (Estate Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

This study focuses on the discretionary inter vivos trust. It specifically investigates what the discretion of a trustee comprises and in which circumstances (if any) the court may amend the trustee‟s discretion as stipulated in the deed of trust. In order to make any meaningful conclusions, the different types of trusts, and more specific the way in which trusts are classified, needs to be researched. An inter vivos trust is classified as a contract for the sake of a third. Consequently contract law rules are applied in the interpretation and amendment of an inter vivos trust. The source, goal and tenor of a trustee‟s discretion, as well as the circumstances wherein this discretion may be amended, are investigated. The general rule is that courts have no discretion to amend a trust, but there is an exception to the rule. In accordance with article 13 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 courts do have the power to amend or cancel the deed of trust in certain circumstances. In Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Others 2012 (1) SA 637 (HHA) the court ruled that the power granted by article 13 does not enable judges to create law by amendment of the deed of trust according to their subjective interpretation of what is fair and just. The facts of the Potgieter case serve as problem statement for this study by focusing on the problems and unjust consequences of the strict application of contract law rules on a trust when the court does not take the changing circumstances of the trust founder into account. / LLM (Estate Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014