Many British and American critics have argued that the wartime 'Special Relationship' ended after World War H. Britain, buffeted by postwar shocks such as the end of Lend-Lease and atomic sharing, and by the lack of U. S. support during the Suez Crisis, felt increasingly demoted from its status as a great power, which had formerly been consulted by U. S. leaders on all matters of international importance. Despite those early post-war political dismissals, the USAF and the RAF began a Cold War linkage, which grew into a fifty-year association that was closer than any comparable defence relationship between nations. This work explores that unique relationship and argues that it grew even stronger through decades of mid-level air diplomacy clearly visible in the agreements and arrangements for U. S. Air Power in the United Kingdom. Its conclusions shed new light on the Anglo-American relationship and demonstrate the importance of air power in the diplomatic history of the two nations. It adds substance to the thin body of knowledge of air diplomacy, through an analysis of events, policies, agreements, arrangements, disagreements, and issues, which led to an even stronger transatlantic defence relationship that continues to serve both nations' interests

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Eagles Overhead provides a critical history of US Air Force Forward Air Controllers and examines their role, status, and performance in the Air Force's history. It begins by examining the US's initial adoption of air power, and American participation in aerial combat during World War I and traces the FACs' contributions to every US Air Force air campaign from the Marne in 1918 to Mosul in 2017. However, since 2001 FACs' contributions have been sporadic. Eagles Overhead asks why, despite the critical importance of FACs, have they not been heavily used on US battlefields since 2001? It examines the Air Force FAC's theoretical, doctrinal, institutional, and historical frameworks in the first nine chapters to assess if the nature of air warfare has changed so significantly that the concept and utility of the FAC has been left behind. Or, has the FAC been neglected since 2001 because the Air Force dislikes the capability as it clouds the service's doctrinal preferences? From these examinations, Eagles Overhead draws conclusions about the potential future of Air Force FACs.

The explosion of information and information technology has led many firms to evolve a dispersed product development process with people and organizations spread throughout the world. To coordinate such dispersed processes managers attempt to establish a culture that implicitly rewards product development teams based on their ability to perform against a set of strategic metrics such as customer satisfaction, time to market, defect reduction, or platform reuse. Many papers have focused on selecting the right metrics and establishing the culture. In this paper we focus on a practical method to fine-tune a firm's relative emphasis on the metrics that they have chosen. In particular, we seek to advise a firm whether to increase or decrease their emphasis on each metric such that the change in emphasis improves profits. Using a thermostat analogy we apply an adaptive control feedback mechanism in which we estimate the incremental improvements in priorities that will increase profits. Iterations of adaptive control seek to maximize profits even if the environment is changing. We demonstrate the metric thermostat’s use in an application to a firm with over $20 billion in revenue. In developing the metric thermostat we recognize that there are hundreds of detailed actions, such as the use of the house of quality and the use of robust design, among which the product development team must choose. We also recognize that they will act in their own best interests to choose the actions that maximize their own implicit rewards as determined by the metrics. Management need not observe or dictate these detailed actions, but rather control the process by establishing the culture that sets the implicit weights on the metrics. The thermostat works by changing those implicit weights. We define the problem, introduce the adaptive control mechanism, modify “agency” theory to deal with incremental changes about an operating point, and derive methods that are practical and robust in light of the data that firms have available. Our methods include statistical estimation and internal surveys. The mathematics identify the critical few parameters that need be determined and highlight how to estimate them. Both the measures and the estimation are illustrated in our initial application to a large officeequipment firm. The metrics thermostat suggests that this firm has about the right emphasis on timeto- market, but has overshot on platform reuse and has lost its focus on customer satisfaction. We describe how the firm reacted to the recommendations and changed its organization. We describe additional ongoing applications with the US Air Force, the US Navy, and a major automobile and truck manufacturer. / This research was funded by the Center for Innovation in Product Development (CIPD) and the International Center for Research on the Management of Technology (ICRMOT), M.I.T.