LL.M. (Banking Law) / It has long been the vogue that the traditional fraud exception is the only exception capable of defeating the doctrine of independence in documentary-credit and performance-guarantee practice. The reason for this is self-explanatory, for it has been stated authoritatively that fraud unravels all. And on construction, this must be the correct legal position. Even then however, the fraud exception is not in itself unassailable. Given the nature and exigency of the contractual relationships peculiar to documentary credits and performance guarantees, it is indubitable for their success that these unique contractual relationships be independent of one another. The latter argument is well established in the law and practice of many jurisdictions. Commercial comity, aspirations, expediency, fair trading and a measure of certainty, inter alia, dictate the necessity for the sanctity and preservation of the doctrine of independence. Without such certainty, international commercial enterprise and entrepreneurship will be the victims. Nevertheless, it would still be fair to state that there is a broad consensus within various jurisdictions regarding the application of a fraud exception to the doctrine of independence, which simply cannot be said for an exception based on unconscionability. There are cogent reasons for this disparity, some in favour of and some against an unconscionability exception. The question which begs an answer is whether the recognition of such an exception would erode the certainty and cash characteristics, inherent and integral to documentary credit and performance guarantee practice. These instruments were, after all, designed and predicated upon tenets of certainty and considered as immediately redeemable cash. Ultimately, this debate involves a choice between embracing commercial certainty on the one hand, and fairness on the other hand. In South Africa however, unconscionability does not exist as a specific concept of law with wide and uncertain parameters. But, the concept of good faith, equally confusing, awkwardly finds its place in the South African general law of contract, but in an informative capacity to the substantive requirements of the law, and not as an independent general defence. A defence in the general law of contract in South Africa, premised on the lack of good faith is bad in law, given the established brocards such as inter alia, caveat subscriptor, caveat emptor, pacta sunt servanda, 5 and the contra proferentem rule. South African legal heritage and precedent have jettisoned the exceptio doli generalis, and this precedent is peculiarly protected by the judiciary at the highest level. Good faith, in the South African context, is not the equivalent of the so called doctrine of unconscionability analysed and discussed in the academic literature and court decisions of certain common-law jurisdictions, but the exceptio doli generalis may have been, or rather, if properly developed, could have been. And so, from a South African perspective, there is the added difficulty of considering the introduction of a foreign broad-based, uncertain and undefinable doctrine grounded in equity, when the narrowly defined concept of good faith, only informative of the substantive law, finds no general application in the law of contract in South Africa. Regard will thus be had to inter alia: the nature, scope and elements (facta probanda) of this exception; certain arguments for and against its recognition; its inability to be defined with the necessary precision required for legal efficacy and practice; its lack of certainty being in essence descriptive of a host of other conduct short of fraud and inclusive of fraud; and whether the case for its recognition might perhaps have merit and applicability in relation to performance guarantees, separate and distinct from documentary credits.