This treatise interrogates the concept of bumping and commences with the background and rationale to the study. It poses a problem statement and sets out the aims and objectives it intends to achieve by virtue of specific research questions identified in the first chapter. The second chapter deals with the history and origin of the concept of bumping whereafter it elaborates on the evolution of bumping in the South African labour-law context and it furthermore introduces the retrenchment guidelines as drafted by Halton Cheadle in 1985. A review and reappraisal of the retrenchment guidelines by Andre van Niekerk are also raised in the second chapter. This is followed by a discussion on the aspects relating to fair selection criteria as pronounced by South African labour-law jurisprudence and deals specifically with the concept of LIFO and the employment universe. The third chapter also raises the various forms of bumping, as well as applicable limitations thereto. Following an in-depth look at the South African courts’ interpretation of bumping-related scenarios, a comparison with international standards is launched whereby relevant ILO recommendations are used as reference. An interpretation of United Kingdom case law is discussed, whereafter it is compared with the South African approach. The fifth chapter deals with the legislative requirements for fair dismissals and fair retrenchment dismissals in particular. The nexus between substantive and procedural fairness requirements is highlighted and the remainder of the fifth chapter deals with procedural fairness requirements which would be applicable in bumping-related retrenchment scenarios. The final chapter briefly alludes to whether bumping should be categorised as a genuine alternative to retrenchment, or merely as an extension of LIFO as a selection criterion. The treatise concludes with procedural recommendations in dealing with bumped employees in the form of retrenchment guidelines for consultations with employees affected by bumping.

Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their businesses. The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. By law employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. They have to obtain the consent of the affected employees. This is where collective bargaining fits in. The employer has to negotiate with the employees. One way in which through the process of collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes is to effect a lock-out. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon. This conditional dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s demand. In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal. This made the lock-out quite effective. The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual interest. Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option. The employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion. The definition of a lock-out in terms of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal. This makes the lock-out option to be less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they follow a fair procedure. Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the operational requirements of a business. If the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them. The employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the changes. He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. iv The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii). Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly prohibits the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on operational grounds. The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no tension whatsoever between the two sections. The court has also ruled that the dismissals that are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of reemployment. According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand. Dismissals not accompanied by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of opening the floodgates. Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the form of a dismissal. As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip. It is an option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of replacement labour is prohibited. The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during negotiations. This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment a farce. The employer would have an upper hand. The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching. The long held view that dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under serious challenge. Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining v arena. Permanent dismissals are permitted. This negates the very purpose of the collective bargaining process. This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored. Recommendations are made to that effect.

The LRA 66 of 1995 was established to give effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which guarantees that everyone has a right to fair labour practices. Amongst others, the purpose of the LRA is to advance economic development, labour peace and the effective resolution of labour disputes. At common law termination of employment was occasioned by the conduct of the employer or employee, in terms of which either party may terminate an employment contract by giving agreed notice or reasonable notice. The LRA broadened the common law concept of “repudiation” of a contract of employment in terms of which section 186 of the LRA now defines the term “dismissal” to mean various possible instances that can be caused by the employer or employee. Furthermore, section 185 of the same Act clearly states that a dismissal can be found to be unfair and makes provision for redress to an employee who would be aggrieved by a dismissal. Compensation is one of the remedies that can be awarded to an employee who is found to have been unfairly dismissed. Unlike the LRA of 1956 which gave the courts an unfettered discretion regarding the compensation that could be awarded, section 194 of the current LRA places a limit on the compensation amount that can be awarded. A decision hereon is determined with reference to whether the dismissal is found to have been procedurally, substantively unfair or both. The Act further requires that the compensation must be just and equitable. A challenge in applying section 194 of the Act in this regard is that there would be vast inconsistencies in terms of the amount of compensation to be awarded and that certain presiding officers could consider different approaches in considering factors to be determined when deciding on compensation. In many other instances compensation for unfair dismissal would be decided around the idea of solely punishing the employer. This research document is mainly concerned with identifying the said challenges through case law by considering the decisions of the commissioners and judges in interpreting the old and current provisions of section 194 of the Act. The old section 194 of the Act created a formula to be followed by presiding officers when making a determination on the compensation awarded. The interpretation of the section and its formula brought with it its own complications. The amended section 194 on the other hand, conferred a discretion on presiding officers to award compensation within the caps of 12 months and 24 months for procedurally and substantively unfair dismissal respectively, for as long as the compensation would be just and equitable in all circumstances. Relevant case law and the opinions of labour law experts have been of great assistance in interpreting the current section 194. The factors do not constitute an exhaustive list. They are a mere guideline to presiding officers so as to eliminate or minimize inconsistencies in awarding compensation.

The meaning of the term “benefits” in the context of unfair labour practice jurisprudence, having previously been unsettled for more than a decade, has now been settled by the Labour Appeal Court in the Apollo.1 Prior to Apollo,2 our courts have struggled to adopt a stance to maintain the distinction between disputes of rights and disputes of interest as separate compartments. The prevalent view at that stage was that, in order for an employee to lodge a dispute at the CCMA or Bargaining Council the employee would have to show that he or she had a right to the benefit that arises by virtue of contract, statute or collective agreement, failing which the CCMA or a Bargaining Council would not have the jurisdiction to determine the dispute, in which case it may constitute a dispute of interest and the employee will have to embark on an industrial action to secure a benefit. Apollo3 endorsed a previous decision of the Labour Court,4 i.e. by placing “benefits” into the following two categories: (1) Where the dispute is about a demand by employees concerning their benefits, it can be settled by way of industrial action. (2) Where the dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's conduct, it must be settled by way of adjudication or arbitration. As a result of the above categorisation, the CCMA or Bargaining Council may adjudicate a dispute relating to benefits where there is a pre-existing benefit and the employer refuses to comply with its obligation towards the employer in that regard. It may also adjudicate disputes relating to the provision of a car allowance (i.e. where the employer retains the discretion to grant or withhold the allowance) and disputes relating to the provision of bonuses (i.e. where the employer retains the discretion to grant or withhold the bonus). In this treatise, I set out the history and development of the legislation in relation to the concept of “benefits” (in the context of unfair labour practice) so as to understand how our Labour Appeal Court has now come to settle the issues above.

At the outset of this treatise the development of the unfair labour practice is traced. The point is made that common law knows nothing about fairness and it is pointed out that the concept was introduced as a statutory concept in 1979. In 1995 the development of unfair labour practices since 1979 was relied upon to provide a list of unfair labour practices. The main thrust of the treatise concerns an evaluation of an unfair labour practice relating to benefits – listed presently in section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act. Reference is made to Industrial Court cases and case law since 1996 is considered and commented upon. In particular, the issue of remuneration not being a benefit, and the fact that interest disputes are not justiciable as unfair labour practices for instance are canvassed.

It is the right of every employee in South Africa not to be unfairly dismissed. According to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 an employer may fairly dismiss an employee on the grounds of conduct, capacity or operational requirements. In addition, the employer is required to also comply with a fair procedure before effecting a dismissal. The requirement of procedural fairness is, however, not as stringent as it was under the previous dispensation established by the former Industrial Courts in terms of the earlier Labour Relations Act. The question as to whether or not a reason for dismissal is fair, is to be established by the facts of each individual case, and the suitability of dismissal as an appropriate remedy. It remains a challenge to establish if dismissal would be an appropriate sanction in a particular case of misconduct. The test is whether the award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could arrive at taking into account the evidence to be considered. It is no longer the employer’s view that is dominant, but “[u]ltimately, the commissioner’s sense of fairness is what must prevail”. The notion of fairness however applies equally to employer an employee and it involves balancing the competing and, every so often, inconsistent, interests of the employer on the one side, and the employee on the other side. The relative weight afforded to the particular interests creates very specific challenges, but nonetheless depends essentially on the overall circumstances of each individual case. Whether dismissal for misconduct is for a fair reason would established by the facts of the case, coupled with the appropriateness of dismissal as a sanction. Dismissal as a penalty should be reserved for cases involving serious misconduct and repeated disciplinary infractions. A crucial question would be whether the misconduct is of such a serious nature that it goes to the core of the employment relationship and makes any possible continued employment relationship intolerable. Additionally, apart from aspects like the importance of the rule breached and the harm caused by the employee’s breach, certain considerations should also be accounted, like length of service disciplinary history, and the employee’s personal circumstances, as well as the particular circumstances surrounding the infringement. Dishonest conduct by an employee that destroys the goodwill, trust and confidence an employer holds towards an employee, would normally be deemed as a significant breach which may justify a sanction of dismissal. The test is whether or not the misconduct was of such serious nature that it would make a continued employment relationship intolerable; “whether or not respondent’s actions had the effect of rendering the continuation of the relationship of employer and employee intolerable”. It still remains for the employer to present evidence that a continued relationship would be intolerable and not to merely liken serious misconduct with such a finding. Relatively recent case law seems to suggest that employers are entitled to a strict attitude towards dishonesty as a ground for dismissal. The objective of the CCMA Guidelines on Misconduct Arbitrations, effective from 1 January 2012, is to ensure that arbitrators issue consistent awards on dismissals involving misconduct. The questions that the guidelines seek to address are, inter alia, (i) how an arbitrator should conduct the proceedings; (ii) the valuation of evidence for the purpose of making an award; (iii) assessing the procedural fairness of a dismissal; (iv) assessing the substantive fairness of a dismissal; and (v) determining the remedy for an unfair dismissal. The Guidelines are peremptory in that arbitrators will have to take them into account and will have to provide an explanation if they deviate. It is undoubtedly a useful tool in guiding employers on what they need to present to commissioners at arbitration.

In terms of section 193 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, there are basically three remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice, namely reinstatement, re-employment and compensation. In disputes of unfair labour practice an arbitrator may determine a dispute on terms that the arbitrator deems reasonable, including the abovementioned three remedies. For example, in an unfair labour practice dispute relating to promotion or appointment, an arbitrator may order that the process of appointment be started afresh, if is found that the process was flawed. The right to fair labour practice is a right that is enjoyed by everyone and it is a right upon which every employee enjoys not to be unfairly dismissed is entrenched in section 23 of the Bill of Rights. The rights of every employee contained in the Labour Relations Act give content and effect to the right to fair labour practice contained in section 23 of the Bill of Rights. Every trade union, employer’s organisation and employer has a right to engage in collective bargaining, which includes but not limited to the formulation of disciplinary policies in the workplace, which should be observed by every employee. Our constitution mandates the Legislature to enact legislation that regulates collective bargaining. One of the purpose of our Labour Relations Act is to promote collective bargaining and the effective resolution of labour disputes. The remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice therefore give content and effect to the purpose of the Act, which is to promote effective resolution of labour disputes. The Legislature has given a legislative and policy framework, in terms of which the labour disputes may be resolved. In order to restrict the powers of the arbitrators and courts, section 193 of the Act provides that in ordering the reinstatement and re-employment of dismissed employee, they must exercise a discretion to order reinstatement re-employment, not earlier than the date of dismissal. The remedy of compensation is an alternative remedy, which must be ordered if the circumstances set out in section 193(2)(a) to (d) are applicable. Some arbitrators have made a mistake of treating this remedy as part of the primary remedies. However, our courts have clarified the intention of the Legislature in crafting the remedies for unfair dismissal.

Diploma thesis evaluates the effectiveness of legal instruments to prevent the use of aggressive commercial practices. Thesis is divided into two main chapters, the first is the protection against aggressive commercial practices in business to consumer market and the second part is dedicated to the protection against aggressive practices in the business to business market. Each section compares the European protection of aggressive commercial practices (and also through European legislation implemented in Czech law) with the protection of those practices in U.S. law. The first part of thesis deals with the protection of consumers against aggressive commercial practices. In European law it mainly regulated by Directive on unfair commercial practices. The Directive is implemented in Czech Republic in mainly in Consumer Protection Code and in the Advertising Code. Private protection against aggressive commercial practices is embodied in provision of unfair competition of the Commercial Code. Protection of personality, privacy and personal data is another form of protection against aggressive practices. In U.S. law, public consumer protection is represented by Federal Trade Commission. In private law, consumers seek redress in court through actions for torts. In relations between competitors is the protection against aggressive commercial practices regulated by unfair competition and by antirust law. Antitrust law in European Union is represented by 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Unfair Competition Law in the U.S. in the B2B market is the part of business torts. Antitrust law is represented by Federal Trade Commission and the Ministry of Justice. The last part of Diploma Thesis is concerned with aggressive commercial practices that very often are accompanying the offers in time-sharing field and with children aggressive commercials, as a example of aggressive commercial practices in practice.

Boilerplate contracts made by an entrepreneur Abstract The diploma thesis thematically focuses on an issue of contracts of adhesion which are concluded by entrepreneur in the course of trade. Contracts of adhesion are characterised by a specific, adhesive, method of entering into contracts based on the principle of take it or leave it which relies on the fact that the basic terms of contract are determined by one of the contractual parties which results in reducing the options of the weaker contractual party to full acceptance of unilaterally determined basic terms of contract or to the rejection of the contract as a whole. The aim of this diploma thesis is the presentation of a comprehensive analysis of the legal institute of contracts of adhesion de lege lata which is completed by synthesis of the insights in question into relevant theoretical and practical conclusions, including considerations de lege ferenda. The legal institute of contracts of adhesion with regard to the aim of the diploma thesis is subjected to theoretical analysis from the point of view of historical development, from the point of view of definition of the thematically relevant legal concepts de lege lata which are entrepreneur, weaker entrepreneur, consumer or legal regimes of contractual relations, from the point of view of...

Thesis title: Aggressive business practices in competition This thesis deals with an analysis of aggressive business practices within competition, focusing on aggressive business practices in relation to other competitors, i.e. B2B relations. The thesis is divided into four chapters with an unnumbered introduction and conclusion. The most crucial part of the thesis can be found in the second and third chapter. The first chapter introduces reader to the issue of unfair competition. In particular, the chapter deals with the analysis of the general clause, as the key provision within the private law framework of unfair competition. Above mentioned is the reason of a brief historical development of this provision being also included in this chapter. Furthermore, the chapter considers the adaptation of unfair competition among the European Union. The second chapter deals with the analysis of the factual phenomena of aggressive business practices, namely denigration (section 2984), unlawful comparative advertising (section 2980) and breach of trade secrets (section 2985), considering the newly adopted directive on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets). The chapter also incorporates relevant case law. Third chapter deals with aggressive business practices...