Equality is a fundamental constitutional value in the Constitution. Formal equality presupposes that all persons are equal bearers of rights and that inequality can be eliminated by extending the same rights to all. Formal equality is blind to social and economic differences between groups and individuals. Substantive equality, on the other hand, is receptive to entrenched, structural inequality, meaning that the equality clause of the Constitution must be read as founded on a substantive concept of equality. An employer can utilise the defence of an inherent requirement of a job in the case of an unfair-discrimination claim since the defence is available in terms of both the Employment Equity Act, in respect of employment discrimination, and the Labour Relations Act in respect of discriminatory dismissals. The defence is narrow in that only essential duties of a particular job will be taken into account to determine inherent requirements of a particular job. Reported judgments where this defence is used are scant. What makes the defence more onerous is that an employer has to show that the particular employee could not be reasonably accommodated, before the inherent-requirement defence will succeed. It is integral to the determination of whether there was unfair discrimination and whether such discrimination was justifiable. An important debate in our discrimination law relates to the question of whether any significance should be attached to the fact that only unfair discrimination is outlawed. Neither of the aforementioned pieces of legislation clearly state that affirmative action or an inherent requirement of a job are the only defences available to employers. Where these two defences are found to be not applicable, may the fairness be decided in terms of a general fairness defence? This question is also addressed in the present treatise. It is submitted that foreign law is a valuable interpretive tool, provided it is used wisely, in that judgments originating from courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom and Canada may assist to provide an understanding of the issues central to employment discrimination law and the parameters of the defence of inherent requirements of the job. Thus, in developing employment discrimination law in South Africa, consideration of foreign jurisprudence may prove informative.

This treatise interrogates the concept of bumping and commences with the background and rationale to the study. It poses a problem statement and sets out the aims and objectives it intends to achieve by virtue of specific research questions identified in the first chapter. The second chapter deals with the history and origin of the concept of bumping whereafter it elaborates on the evolution of bumping in the South African labour-law context and it furthermore introduces the retrenchment guidelines as drafted by Halton Cheadle in 1985. A review and reappraisal of the retrenchment guidelines by Andre van Niekerk are also raised in the second chapter. This is followed by a discussion on the aspects relating to fair selection criteria as pronounced by South African labour-law jurisprudence and deals specifically with the concept of LIFO and the employment universe. The third chapter also raises the various forms of bumping, as well as applicable limitations thereto. Following an in-depth look at the South African courts’ interpretation of bumping-related scenarios, a comparison with international standards is launched whereby relevant ILO recommendations are used as reference. An interpretation of United Kingdom case law is discussed, whereafter it is compared with the South African approach. The fifth chapter deals with the legislative requirements for fair dismissals and fair retrenchment dismissals in particular. The nexus between substantive and procedural fairness requirements is highlighted and the remainder of the fifth chapter deals with procedural fairness requirements which would be applicable in bumping-related retrenchment scenarios. The final chapter briefly alludes to whether bumping should be categorised as a genuine alternative to retrenchment, or merely as an extension of LIFO as a selection criterion. The treatise concludes with procedural recommendations in dealing with bumped employees in the form of retrenchment guidelines for consultations with employees affected by bumping.

Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their businesses. The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. By law employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. They have to obtain the consent of the affected employees. This is where collective bargaining fits in. The employer has to negotiate with the employees. One way in which through the process of collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes is to effect a lock-out. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon. This conditional dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s demand. In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal. This made the lock-out quite effective. The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual interest. Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option. The employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion. The definition of a lock-out in terms of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal. This makes the lock-out option to be less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they follow a fair procedure. Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the operational requirements of a business. If the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them. The employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the changes. He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. iv The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii). Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly prohibits the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on operational grounds. The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no tension whatsoever between the two sections. The court has also ruled that the dismissals that are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of reemployment. According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand. Dismissals not accompanied by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of opening the floodgates. Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the form of a dismissal. As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip. It is an option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of replacement labour is prohibited. The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during negotiations. This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment a farce. The employer would have an upper hand. The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching. The long held view that dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under serious challenge. Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining v arena. Permanent dismissals are permitted. This negates the very purpose of the collective bargaining process. This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored. Recommendations are made to that effect.

The LRA 66 of 1995 was established to give effect to section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which guarantees that everyone has a right to fair labour practices. Amongst others, the purpose of the LRA is to advance economic development, labour peace and the effective resolution of labour disputes. At common law termination of employment was occasioned by the conduct of the employer or employee, in terms of which either party may terminate an employment contract by giving agreed notice or reasonable notice. The LRA broadened the common law concept of “repudiation” of a contract of employment in terms of which section 186 of the LRA now defines the term “dismissal” to mean various possible instances that can be caused by the employer or employee. Furthermore, section 185 of the same Act clearly states that a dismissal can be found to be unfair and makes provision for redress to an employee who would be aggrieved by a dismissal. Compensation is one of the remedies that can be awarded to an employee who is found to have been unfairly dismissed. Unlike the LRA of 1956 which gave the courts an unfettered discretion regarding the compensation that could be awarded, section 194 of the current LRA places a limit on the compensation amount that can be awarded. A decision hereon is determined with reference to whether the dismissal is found to have been procedurally, substantively unfair or both. The Act further requires that the compensation must be just and equitable. A challenge in applying section 194 of the Act in this regard is that there would be vast inconsistencies in terms of the amount of compensation to be awarded and that certain presiding officers could consider different approaches in considering factors to be determined when deciding on compensation. In many other instances compensation for unfair dismissal would be decided around the idea of solely punishing the employer. This research document is mainly concerned with identifying the said challenges through case law by considering the decisions of the commissioners and judges in interpreting the old and current provisions of section 194 of the Act. The old section 194 of the Act created a formula to be followed by presiding officers when making a determination on the compensation awarded. The interpretation of the section and its formula brought with it its own complications. The amended section 194 on the other hand, conferred a discretion on presiding officers to award compensation within the caps of 12 months and 24 months for procedurally and substantively unfair dismissal respectively, for as long as the compensation would be just and equitable in all circumstances. Relevant case law and the opinions of labour law experts have been of great assistance in interpreting the current section 194. The factors do not constitute an exhaustive list. They are a mere guideline to presiding officers so as to eliminate or minimize inconsistencies in awarding compensation.

The meaning of the term “benefits” in the context of unfair labour practice jurisprudence, having previously been unsettled for more than a decade, has now been settled by the Labour Appeal Court in the Apollo.1 Prior to Apollo,2 our courts have struggled to adopt a stance to maintain the distinction between disputes of rights and disputes of interest as separate compartments. The prevalent view at that stage was that, in order for an employee to lodge a dispute at the CCMA or Bargaining Council the employee would have to show that he or she had a right to the benefit that arises by virtue of contract, statute or collective agreement, failing which the CCMA or a Bargaining Council would not have the jurisdiction to determine the dispute, in which case it may constitute a dispute of interest and the employee will have to embark on an industrial action to secure a benefit. Apollo3 endorsed a previous decision of the Labour Court,4 i.e. by placing “benefits” into the following two categories: (1) Where the dispute is about a demand by employees concerning their benefits, it can be settled by way of industrial action. (2) Where the dispute concerns the fairness of the employer's conduct, it must be settled by way of adjudication or arbitration. As a result of the above categorisation, the CCMA or Bargaining Council may adjudicate a dispute relating to benefits where there is a pre-existing benefit and the employer refuses to comply with its obligation towards the employer in that regard. It may also adjudicate disputes relating to the provision of a car allowance (i.e. where the employer retains the discretion to grant or withhold the allowance) and disputes relating to the provision of bonuses (i.e. where the employer retains the discretion to grant or withhold the bonus). In this treatise, I set out the history and development of the legislation in relation to the concept of “benefits” (in the context of unfair labour practice) so as to understand how our Labour Appeal Court has now come to settle the issues above.

It is the right of every employee in South Africa not to be unfairly dismissed. According to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 an employer may fairly dismiss an employee on the grounds of conduct, capacity or operational requirements. In addition, the employer is required to also comply with a fair procedure before effecting a dismissal. The requirement of procedural fairness is, however, not as stringent as it was under the previous dispensation established by the former Industrial Courts in terms of the earlier Labour Relations Act. The question as to whether or not a reason for dismissal is fair, is to be established by the facts of each individual case, and the suitability of dismissal as an appropriate remedy. It remains a challenge to establish if dismissal would be an appropriate sanction in a particular case of misconduct. The test is whether the award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could arrive at taking into account the evidence to be considered. It is no longer the employer’s view that is dominant, but “[u]ltimately, the commissioner’s sense of fairness is what must prevail”. The notion of fairness however applies equally to employer an employee and it involves balancing the competing and, every so often, inconsistent, interests of the employer on the one side, and the employee on the other side. The relative weight afforded to the particular interests creates very specific challenges, but nonetheless depends essentially on the overall circumstances of each individual case. Whether dismissal for misconduct is for a fair reason would established by the facts of the case, coupled with the appropriateness of dismissal as a sanction. Dismissal as a penalty should be reserved for cases involving serious misconduct and repeated disciplinary infractions. A crucial question would be whether the misconduct is of such a serious nature that it goes to the core of the employment relationship and makes any possible continued employment relationship intolerable. Additionally, apart from aspects like the importance of the rule breached and the harm caused by the employee’s breach, certain considerations should also be accounted, like length of service disciplinary history, and the employee’s personal circumstances, as well as the particular circumstances surrounding the infringement. Dishonest conduct by an employee that destroys the goodwill, trust and confidence an employer holds towards an employee, would normally be deemed as a significant breach which may justify a sanction of dismissal. The test is whether or not the misconduct was of such serious nature that it would make a continued employment relationship intolerable; “whether or not respondent’s actions had the effect of rendering the continuation of the relationship of employer and employee intolerable”. It still remains for the employer to present evidence that a continued relationship would be intolerable and not to merely liken serious misconduct with such a finding. Relatively recent case law seems to suggest that employers are entitled to a strict attitude towards dishonesty as a ground for dismissal. The objective of the CCMA Guidelines on Misconduct Arbitrations, effective from 1 January 2012, is to ensure that arbitrators issue consistent awards on dismissals involving misconduct. The questions that the guidelines seek to address are, inter alia, (i) how an arbitrator should conduct the proceedings; (ii) the valuation of evidence for the purpose of making an award; (iii) assessing the procedural fairness of a dismissal; (iv) assessing the substantive fairness of a dismissal; and (v) determining the remedy for an unfair dismissal. The Guidelines are peremptory in that arbitrators will have to take them into account and will have to provide an explanation if they deviate. It is undoubtedly a useful tool in guiding employers on what they need to present to commissioners at arbitration.

In terms of section 193 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, there are basically three remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice, namely reinstatement, re-employment and compensation. In disputes of unfair labour practice an arbitrator may determine a dispute on terms that the arbitrator deems reasonable, including the abovementioned three remedies. For example, in an unfair labour practice dispute relating to promotion or appointment, an arbitrator may order that the process of appointment be started afresh, if is found that the process was flawed. The right to fair labour practice is a right that is enjoyed by everyone and it is a right upon which every employee enjoys not to be unfairly dismissed is entrenched in section 23 of the Bill of Rights. The rights of every employee contained in the Labour Relations Act give content and effect to the right to fair labour practice contained in section 23 of the Bill of Rights. Every trade union, employer’s organisation and employer has a right to engage in collective bargaining, which includes but not limited to the formulation of disciplinary policies in the workplace, which should be observed by every employee. Our constitution mandates the Legislature to enact legislation that regulates collective bargaining. One of the purpose of our Labour Relations Act is to promote collective bargaining and the effective resolution of labour disputes. The remedies for unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice therefore give content and effect to the purpose of the Act, which is to promote effective resolution of labour disputes. The Legislature has given a legislative and policy framework, in terms of which the labour disputes may be resolved. In order to restrict the powers of the arbitrators and courts, section 193 of the Act provides that in ordering the reinstatement and re-employment of dismissed employee, they must exercise a discretion to order reinstatement re-employment, not earlier than the date of dismissal. The remedy of compensation is an alternative remedy, which must be ordered if the circumstances set out in section 193(2)(a) to (d) are applicable. Some arbitrators have made a mistake of treating this remedy as part of the primary remedies. However, our courts have clarified the intention of the Legislature in crafting the remedies for unfair dismissal.

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2012 / Indirect discrimination is a concept which originated from the United States of America. The concept came about after the failure of anti- discrimination legislation to improve the position of Black Americans, particularly in the employment field. The legislature realized that there are structural practices and policies, in the employment field which affect certain racial groups negatively. These practices of discrimination were not clearly defined hence the meaning and interpretation of the concept was left to the administrative body, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the courts. The concept was imported into the South African jurisprudence after the inception of the government of National unity in 1994. The new government was committed to bring to an end all forms of discrimination which were in the past practiced against the Black community. Section 9(3) of the Constitution of South Africa Act 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) proscribed direct and indirect discrimination. These sections served as the basis for sections 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act 1998 (Act 55 of 1998) which proscribes “unfair direct and indirect discrimination” in any employment policy or practice. Its scope is wide and allows Plaintiffs to prove their claims in jurisdictions where it could have been very difficult for them to do so. While in the United States, statistical evidence is required to prove indirect discrimination, this is not the case in South Africa as seen in the landmark case of v Leonard Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (PTY) LTD (1998) 19 ILJ 285 (LC). In this case when the Court gave its decision it simply relied on the facts of the case instead of complicated statistical evidence. Seemingly this will apply only in more obvious cases. In more complicated cases, Plaintiffs will still need to submit statistics to prove their claim.

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2008

Section 23 of the Constitution provides that everyone has a right to fair labour practice. The constitutional right to fair labour practices includes the right not to be unfairly dismissed and is given effect to by section 185 of the LRA. The constitutional right not to be unfairly dismissed is given effect to by Chapter VIII of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA), which provides a remedy for an unfair dismissal. Schedule 8 of the LRA contains a “Code of Good Practice: Dismissal”, which the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) and the Labour Courts must take into account when determining the fairness of a dismissal. The LRA expressly recognises three grounds for termination of the employment contract namely; misconduct on the part of the employee, incapacity due to an employee’s poor work performance, ill health or injury and termination due an employer’s operational requirements. In terms of the LRA, a dismissal must be procedurally and substantively fair. The requirements for procedural and substantive fairness are contained in Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. The provisions of section 185 of the LRA apply to all employers and employees in both the public and the private sectors, with the exception of members of the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service and the South African National Academy of Intelligence. Section 213 of the LRA defines an “employee” as any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration and any person who in any manner assists in carrying out or conducting the business of an employer. Section 200A of the LRA sets out the presumption as to who is an employee. This is a guideline to assist in determining who is an employee. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA) sets minimum terms and conditions of employment including the notice of termination of employment. Under the common law an employment contract of employment can be terminated on either the expiration of the agreed period of employment or on completion of the specified task in cases of fixed-term contracts. Also, in terms of general contract principles an employment contract may be terminated by notice duly given by either party or by summary termination in the event of a material breach on the part of either party. The death of either party may terminate the employment contract. However, the death of an employer will not necessarily lead to the contract’s termination. An employment contract may also terminate by operation of law or effluxion of time namely retirement and coming into being of fixed-term contracts, by mutual agreement, employee resigning, due to insolvency of the employer and due to supervening impossibility of performance. In the circumstances indicated above, the termination of the contract of employment does not constitute dismissal. This means that the CCMA and the Labour Court do not have jurisdiction to determine should the employee allege that his or her dismissal was unfair. It has been argued that the instances where a termination of a contract of employment is terminated, but there is no dismissal should be scrutinised to avoid a situation where employees are deprived of protection afforded by the fundamental right not to be unfairly dismissed. There have been some instances where employment contracts contain clauses that provide for automatic termination of employment contracts. It has been held by the courts in various decisions that such clauses are against public policy and thus invalid. The Labour Court stated that a contractual device that renders the termination of a contract something other than a dismissal is exactly the exploitation the LRA prohibits. There are various court decisions providing guidelines of circumstances in which termination of employment may be regarded as not constituting dismissal. The main focus of the treatise is to discuss these instances and critically analyse the approach taken by forums like the CCMA, bargaining councils and the Labour Court in dealing with such instances.