As a mode of intervention in which the UN assumed direct authority over disrupted states, transitional administrations represent unique examples of ambitious state-building projects. This thesis investigates the apparent failure of transitional administrations to establish the rule of law in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. It identifies nine explanatory factors which are tested against each case study. In addition, it seeks to enhance conceptual understandings of the UN???s state-building agenda and to add to empirical studies regarding attempts by external actors to establish the rule of law in disrupted states. Three findings emerge. First, in each case, UN transitional administrations failed in each of the following ways: to make the best use of their mandate; to establish effective state justice institutions; to build local commitment to the rule of law as a value system; to promote social relationships supportive of the rule of law; to ensure sufficient state capacity post-intervention; to maintain adequate levels of security; to address the existence of informal justice structures; to deal with the legacies of the past; and to ensure an adequate level of mission performance. Of these, establishing effective state justice institutions, building local commitment and addressing informal justice structures proved most crucial. Second, the state-based ???enforcement??? approach adopted by transitional administrations proved ineffective. Enacting laws and establishing coercive state structures such as judicial, police and prison services were critical to, but could not be equated with the rule of law. This approach did not account sufficiently for the importance of entrenched informal justice institutions, of the voluntary consent of local actors, or of appropriate institutional design choices. As a result, it did not offer real solutions to real problems faced by local actors. Finally, the UN failed to consider fully how to create an enabling ???space??? in which internal processes of change could occur, to engage appropriately with local actors, to overcome the tyrannies of truncated deployment, or to address these issues at the ???front-end??? of the mission. This ???entry without strategy??? approach to state-building seriously undermined the UN???s ability to establish the rule of law, as the self-declared touchstone of its state-building agenda.

As a mode of intervention in which the UN assumed direct authority over disrupted states, transitional administrations represent unique examples of ambitious state-building projects. This thesis investigates the apparent failure of transitional administrations to establish the rule of law in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. It identifies nine explanatory factors which are tested against each case study. In addition, it seeks to enhance conceptual understandings of the UN???s state-building agenda and to add to empirical studies regarding attempts by external actors to establish the rule of law in disrupted states. Three findings emerge. First, in each case, UN transitional administrations failed in each of the following ways: to make the best use of their mandate; to establish effective state justice institutions; to build local commitment to the rule of law as a value system; to promote social relationships supportive of the rule of law; to ensure sufficient state capacity post-intervention; to maintain adequate levels of security; to address the existence of informal justice structures; to deal with the legacies of the past; and to ensure an adequate level of mission performance. Of these, establishing effective state justice institutions, building local commitment and addressing informal justice structures proved most crucial. Second, the state-based ???enforcement??? approach adopted by transitional administrations proved ineffective. Enacting laws and establishing coercive state structures such as judicial, police and prison services were critical to, but could not be equated with the rule of law. This approach did not account sufficiently for the importance of entrenched informal justice institutions, of the voluntary consent of local actors, or of appropriate institutional design choices. As a result, it did not offer real solutions to real problems faced by local actors. Finally, the UN failed to consider fully how to create an enabling ???space??? in which internal processes of change could occur, to engage appropriately with local actors, to overcome the tyrannies of truncated deployment, or to address these issues at the ???front-end??? of the mission. This ???entry without strategy??? approach to state-building seriously undermined the UN???s ability to establish the rule of law, as the self-declared touchstone of its state-building agenda.