Thesis (M. S.)--Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004. / Norton, Bryan, Committee Chair; Noonan, Douglas, Committee Member; Kirkman, Robert, Committee Member. Includes bibliography.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simeral, Robert L. Second Reader: Van Nuys, Thomas J. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 26, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Terrorism, classified evidence, disruption, intelligence and evidence, preventative detention, interagency integration, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Military Commissions, Classified Information Protection Act (CIPA), national security, homeland security. Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-126). Also available in print.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the issue of civil-military relations has become critical to the development of the new Eastern European democracies. Both the United States and Germany have a long civil-military relations tradition. A comparison of the United States' and Germany's approaches to civil-military relations will provide clear examples for new democratic states to follow, as they develop their civil-military relations, especially as they consider multi-national NATO units. Following an overview of civil-military theory, this thesis highlights the historical and political developments of civil-military relations within both countries. The thesis further explains the similarities and differences in their developments, as well as the implications for the military profession. The thesis provides a comparison of both approaches to the military profession and to the primary civil-military relations theory, in order to determine if the requirement of democratic civilian control over the military has been met. The thesis summarizes advantages and disadvantages of both American and German approaches. / Lieutenant Colonel (GS), German Army

This thesis reviews the significance of the 1969 Japan-US Summit between Prime Minister Satii Eisaku and President Richard Nixon in light of official documents that have been disclosed in Japan since 2010 and in the United States since the 1990s. Based on newly available sources, this thesis shows that the 1969 Summit should be considered a Japanese-led initiative with two aims: firstly, to announce a deadline for Okinawa's return with all nuclear weapons removed; and secondly, to reform the Japan-US security treaty system without repeating the kind of outright revision concluded in 1960. The Japanese plan to reform the security treaty system involved simplifying the prior consultation formula by making a public commitment to the security of South Korea of sufficient strength that the United States would agree to the dissolution of the 1960 secret 'Korea Minute'. The Japanese Government achieved its first aim but only partially succeeded in its second. Whilst the return of Okinawa was announced, the status of US bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan continued to be governed by an elaborate web of agreements, public and secret, which damaged public confidence and hampered an improvement in relations between Japan and its neighbouring countries. This thesis shows that commonly held academic opinions about the 1969 Summit are incorrect. Firstly, there was no quid pro quo in which Japan linked its security to South Korea in exchange for Okinawa: both these outcomes were in fact Japanese objectives at the beginning of the summit preparations. Secondly, the success of the summit did not depend on 'backchannel' negotiations between Wakaizumi Kei and Henry Kissinger: it is likely that an announcement on Okinawa's reversion would have been achieved in 1969 even if preparations for the summit had been left to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the US State Department. Word Limit: Approx. 98,000 words, excluding Bibliography