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This study examines the use of graduated escalation in Vietnam under the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson and attempts to discover the underlying causes that led to the enactment and the continuation of this policy throughout his administration.Factors studied include Johnson's perception of his place in history, his personal style of control, his dual loyalties to expanding "The Great Society" as well as stopping communism through military pressure, and his limited cultural understanding of the needs of the Vietnamese people and the intentions of their leaders.The conclusion is that, while Johnson was a canny politician in his own arena, his controlling personality probably prevented him from considering all of the options open to him in resolving the Vietnam problem and his simplistic, frontier type of diplomacy closed other doors and forced him along a path of frustration and defeat. / Department of Political Science

In the mid-1960's, the American people were gripped by a certain nameless fear brought on by America's military failure in Viet Nam, racial tension, student unrest, crumbling cities, and the nuclear arms race. This fear caused many to turn to a new conservatism, for the Democratic Party, symbolized by Lyndon Johnson, seemed to be the cause of many of these frightening problems. The Democrats were believed to be responsible for Viet Nam, for the growing racial confrontations, and for the overgrowing federal bureaucracy. This new conservatism benefited the Republican Party, and between 1964 and 1968, this party became ascendant. Throughout American history, a realignment of party identification has occurred every thirty to thirty-five years, and now the time was ripe. This thesis attempts to prove that there was a realignment in the partisan identifications of the electorate's support for the two parties, and that in the last half of the past decade realignment did take place.

The idea that Blacks were the prominent force in Southern governments during Reconstruction has been the theme of a number of Southern Whites and others who had sympathy for the South. They have emphasized this view so long that it has almost become an established fact. They have also pounced upon the weaknesses of a number of Black politicians of this period, labeling these men as "not fit to hold political positions." This writer has proven that not all of these men were unqualified as office holders through the life and career of John R. Lynch. The background and accomplishments of Lynch denies the "not fit to hold political positions" idea.Since there is little published on John R. Lynch apart from general histories of other prominent Black leaders of this period, the purpose of this study was to examine the life of John R. Lynch, the impact he had on Reconstruction and selected American historians' views of Lynch and Reconstruction. This writer did this study in hopes that an examination of the life of Lynch might serve to provide a more balanced account of the part played by Black office holders of that period.The research showed that Lynch was a significant political leader in post-Civil War Mississippi and in the United States Congress and that his contemporaries, Black and White, recognized his competence and his honesty. However, this record has remained obscure since no historian, White or Black, with the exception of John Hope Franklin, has selected Lynch as a major topic of historical research. While a number of historians have mentioned Lynch in their writings, none have given him full credit for his accomplishment. White historians such as James Ford Rhodes, John W. Burgess and William A. Dunning omitted him in their justification of White treatment of Blacks during Reconstruction. Black historians proved almost as neglectful in their lack of treatment.