This dissertation seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the political pressure group the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), which formed in 1976. The group's establishment, attainment of credibility, and influence in critical national security debates during the late 1970s has not yet been given sufficient attention. The Committee on the Present Danger has often been interpreted as a disingenuous propaganda group that dishonestly compiled an alarmist message to deceive politicians and journalists of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, the dissertation argues that the Committee's alarmism was genuine. The fact that CPD board members themselves became so fearful of the Soviet threat is the most striking aspect of the group's first four years of operation, and is the primary focus of this study. An examination of the group's formation and activities from 1976 to 1980 permits a more sophisticated appreciation of the group's goals, the promotion of its views, and the effects of its campaign on national security debates during this period. The dissertation adopts a chronological approach that recognises the creeping alarmism of the CPD over these years: warning of the dangers of détente gave way to prophesising an imminent Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Keeping the CPD as the focus of study in this period permits one to argue that the Committee's members, as a private citizens' group without government oversight and a shared worst-case methodology for assessing national security risks, sincerely came to believe in the veracity of their analysis of imminent Soviet military expansion. Committee experts generated and publicised a number of metrics that purported to demonstrate a military imbalance between the Soviet Union and the United States. Over time, and seemingly confirmed by alleged Soviet global aggression, the Committee came to believe that their worst-case estimates reflected reality.

On 23 April 1964, five months after assuming the office of President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson launched the "More Flags" program as United States policy. While the publicly stated purpose of.the "More Flags" program was to obtain as much non-military free world aid for the Republic of Vietnam as possible, the program's principle goal centered around Lyndon Johnson's desire to obtain an international consensus for America's policies toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia. The "More Flags" program continued to serve both goals for the remainder of Johnson's presidency. Although started with high expectations of success, the "More Flags" program never succeeded in achieving the levels of international cooperation Lyndon Johnson desired. In fact, the program's significant lack of success necessitated a number of changes, during the program's first year, in both its stated goals and in the methods used to prosecute it's implementation. The most important of these changes would be Washington's use of the program's beneficent objectives to mask it's use as the means through which the United States would purchase mercenary troops to fight in South Vietnam. "Mercenaries in Service to America: The 'More Flags' Foreign Policy of the United States," presents the available history of the "More Flags" program during the years of the Johnson Presidency, with an emphasis on the documentation of the program's use as a disguise for America's obtaining mercenary forces from the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. The non-mercenary troop contributions from Australia and New Zealand are likewise examined. The majority of documentary evidence comes from the original sources documents in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas.

During the Korean War, US-Japan relations changed dramatically from the occupation status into one of a security partnership in Asia. When North Korea invaded South Korea, Washington perceived Japan as the ultimate target. Washington immediately intervened in the Korean peninsula to protect the South on behalf of Japanese security. Japanese security was the most important objective of American policy regarding the Korean War, a reality to which historians have not given legitimate attention. While fighting in Korea, Washington decided to conclude an early peace treaty with Japan to initiate Japanese rearmament. The issue of Japanese rearmament was a focal point in the Japanese peace negotiation. Washington pressed Japan to rearm rapidly, but Tokyo stubbornly opposed. Under pressure from Washington, the Japanese government established the National Police Reserve and had to expand its military forces during the war. When the Korean War ceased in July 1953, Japanese armed forces numbered about 180,000 men. The Korean War also brought a fundamental change to Japanese economic and diplomatic relations in Asia. With a trade embargo on China following the unexpected Chinese intervention in Korea, Washington wanted to forbid Sino-Japanese trade completely. In addition, Washington pressed Tokyo to recognize the Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the representative government of the whole Chinese people. Japan unsuccessfully resisted both policies. Japan wanted to maintain Sino-Japanese trade and recognize the Chinese Communists. The Korean War brought an economic boom to Japan. As a logistical and service supporter for United States war efforts in Korea, Japan received a substantial amount of military procurement orders from Washington, which supplied dollars, technology, and markets for Japan. The Korean War was an economic opportunity for Japan while it was a military opportunity for the United States. The Korean War was the beginning of a new era of American-Japanese military and economic interdependence. This study is based on both American and Japanese sources--primary and secondary.

No description available.

This study has been an attempt to describe and project trends in the perceptions of key American foreign policy-makers with respect to "Communism" in the Third World. In order to expedite matters, it focuses specifically on the verbalized concerns of the Presidency and the State Department with various Communist agents operating in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The period covered by the study spans from 1960 to 1971. An overriding purpose has been to measure as objectively and systematically as possible what in the past has generally been left to subjective impression. The questions guiding the research are listed as follows: (1) During the past decade what changes have occurred in American assessments of the Communist threat to the Third World? (2) Which agents of Communism (e.g., Communist China, International Communism or the Viet Cong) are perceived to be the most threatening to American and Third World interests? (3) Which Third World targets of Communism (e.g., Latin America, Asia or Africa) are most strongly threatened? (4) What are the projected or feasible directions of these American preoccupations for the early 1970s? (5) How closely do Presidential and State Department assessments of the agents and targets resemble each other? In order to respond to these questions thereby analyzing the perceptions or verbal preoccupations of the designated decisional units regarding Third World Communism, a manual form of content analysis was utilized. Indicators were developed by means of a procedure based on the Stanford Political Dictionary developed by Holsti, and associates. This tool is designed to investigate psycho-political factors of state behavior incorporating the normative (good-bad), potency (strong-weak) and behavior (active-passive) dimensions of the semantic differential. The data was gathered from (1) Public papers of the President, 1960-1968; (2) Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents, 1968-1971; and (3) The Department of State Bulletin, 1960-1968. From a general perspective, the data reveals that the perceived Communist threat to the Third World gains intensity beginning in 1960 and continuing until 1967 or 1968. At this point an overall decline in concern emerges. In some cases this change in perception occurred as early as 1963. The study analyzed American preoccupation with what was termed general manifestations of Communism: International (Communism perceived as an international, monolithic conspiracy), National (embracing national based agents such as the Soviet Union or Cuba) and the Internal Communism (Communist phenomena emerging and operating within nations). It showed that International Communism has almost been erased as a threat in the eyes of the Presidents and State Department. Their greatest concern is directed toward national Communist entities. Concern with Internal Communism increased during the period. However until 1964, American preoccupation with the international manifestation had been greater than it had been with the internal or national aspects. With the exception of North Vietnam, the Communist nations (the Soviet Union, Communist Chine, Cuba, and North Korea) gave rise to relatively inconsistent, less intense preoccupations from the decisional units. As the period (1960 to 1971) closes, the ranking of Communist nations from the most threatening to the least is (1) North Vietnam, (2) Communist China, (3) the Soviet Union, (4) North Korea and (5) Cuba. But which Third World continents do Americans feel are most threatened by Communist agents? The data indicates that the concern is greatest for Asia and least for Africa, with Latin America ranking in the middle. In comparing the decisional unit preoccupations with Communist agents, the Presidency tends to view them as more threatening to American and Third World interests. However, relative to the Third World targets, the Presidency and the State Department display very little difference.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1963 C75 / Master of Science

LD2668 .T4 1966 B583 / Master of Science

This study analyzes recent developments in U. S.- Iranian relations during the Nixon administration and attempts to portray the principal objectives of the United States and Iran vis-a-vis each other. Complex Interdependence is the model for development of the arguments. Due to the circumstances, however, the study substantially draws on Realism as well. Chapter I discusses methodology. Chapter II focuses on the Nixon Doctrine and its impact on U. S.-Iranian relations. Chapter III discusses the evolution of mutual interests between the two nations in the Gulf area. Chapter IV drawing on the previous chapters, concludes that an interdependent relation between the two nations has developed to the extent that in some areas policy of one nation would have an impact on the other, i.e., increase in the price of oil.

As an issue affecting the foreign relations of the United States and Britain, impressment has been given varying emphasis by different authors. This thesis is first a chronological outline of the events and correspondence that trace the subject. Beyond this basic delineation I will consider exactly how important impressment was to the two countries. James F. Zimmerman, in Impressment of American Seamen, posits that impressment was of paramount significance while other authors have attempted to down grade it into a status of utter inconsequence. This paper will show that the actual influence of impressment varied from one time, one set of circumstances, to another. Finally, my thesis will attempt to show more of the British side of the question, heretofore primarily ignored. It will be shown that members of the British government had what they felt to be perfectly valid reasons for continuing the practice, even though it eventually led to war. Chapter one serves as an introduction and explanation of the legal and historical backgrounds of impressment. The chapter also covers the first difficulties the two countries had over the issue, when England and France nearly went to war in 1787. These would serve as a model for the problems to come. Chapter two looks into the reasons behind the need for impressment and America's argument against it. Britain needed men to man the navy, America needed these same men for its merchant marine, out of this the basic conflict was born. Chapter three deals with American efforts to contain or eliminate impressment, mostly through acts of Congress to protect United States sailors. The problem America had with issuing proofs of citizenship and Britain's requirement that America issue them began to bring impressment to the fore. James Monroe was sent to London for talks of which impressment was to be a major topic. Chapter four covers the parallel careers of Monroe, United States envoy to London, and Anthony Merry, British minister to America. Both men had troubles dealing with what they felt were obstinate foreign governments and both mens' missions were, in the end, failures. Merry, feeling America to be inflating the reaction against impressment, paid little attention to the complaints and ended up having to deal with harsh anti-British legislation. Monroe's lack of success took longer and forms the basis of chapter five. This chapter details how the Jefferson administration and Monroe were incapable of getting Britain to give an inch on the subject. This culminated in the Treaty of 1806, which was silent on impressment. Chapter six shows how this lack of action set the stage for the encounter between the Chesapeake and the Leopard. This skirmish almost led to war and represents the peak of impressment's importance as an issue in foreign affairs. Chapter seven details other differences between the two countries as they slid toward the War of 1812. Impressment was but one of many causes of the conflict, though one which both sides contributed to keeping alive. Finally, chapter eight covers war-time diplomacy and shows how impressment quickly became the only subject the two countries were fighting over. Later actions on America's part reveal that impressment, as a single complaint, was no longer considered a war-worthy topic, or even much of a cause for complaint.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration