United States military interventions commonly attempt to generate a post-conflict political order congenial to American national interest, that is, to shape a usable peace. The Clausewitzian imperative, that the use of force must serve policy, points to the strategic significance of the postconflict environment. The civil dimension is the arena where US policy succeeds or fails. This study examines US military doctrine and practice of civil affairs in order to address a strategic problem: how to translate the use of force into a usable peace? Civil affairs or civil military operations cope with civilians during operations, control populations and facilitate US military exit. This study offers theoretical, historical, and policy analysis of US civil affairs. Theoretically, if war is a continuation of policy by other means, civil affairs effect a transition back to a mode of policy. Over time, US doctrine adjusted to different conflict environments and policy imperatives provided by civilian leadership, shifting emphasis to military government, civic action, counterinsurgency, and finally, to peace operations. Because US military culture disdains involvement of soldiers in governance, and in order to expedite transitions, two principles are consistent features of the US approach: civilianization, to transfer authority to civilian agencies; and indirect rule, to nurture friendly indigenous regimes. Civil affairs implements policy. US interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) imperfectly translated political goals into military objectives; suffered from inconsistent goals from Washington; and failed to plan adequately for the civil dimension. The study identifies a number of factors that influenced the American approach to civil affairs in these cases, including analogical reasoning behind the US interventions, orientation toward low-intensity conflict at the time of the intervention, the impact of combat operations during interventions, and the availability of local resources for reconstruction after intervention. The civil dimension of military operations has become more prominent in last decade of intervention in internal conflicts, under limited rules of engagement, in the service of humanitarian objectives. As operations have become more multilateral and multi-agency, cultural tensions have become more pronounced. This study provides a basis for further exploration of the fundamental, but increasingly complex strategic imperative for US military forces, to shape a usable peace.

The role of Japan in any U.S. strategic policy will be decided from the outcome of two debates. These two debates, the Japanese security policy debate and the American strategic policy debate, have been conducted within the leading groups of each country. The debates, both independently and at their points of interaction, illustrate the dynamic nature of the problem of forecasting the kind of security role Japan will perform in any future American strategic policy for the Northeast Asian region. Against a background of a Soviet regional military build-up and increasingly strident American calls for Japan to improve its defence capabilities, the Japanese debate signals a growing consensus for an enhanced security role. However, this trend must be severely qualified by the enduring impact of certain constitutional, political and economic constraints upon security policy-making. The importance that certain leading Japanese groups give to the domestic determinants of policy seems to have been discounted by many leading Americans. Any enhancement of Japan's security role must be accommodated by the Japanese domestic political environment; an environment which retains strong pacifist sentiments. The recent movement towards a military alliance between the two countries needs to be balanced against the continuing relevance that a good proportion of leading Japanese and the Japanese public hold for a minimum defence posture supported by the American security commitment, as embodied in the U.S.-Japan treaty. The American strategic policy debate is concerned with two main policy arguments. The unilateralist/maritime supremacy argument sees the world in essentially bipolar terms and seeks to augment American power so as to be able to overcome a potential enemy, solely through the use of U.S. power. The coalition/defence argument views the world in multipolar terms and believes that deterrence against an enemy should suffice and that this can best be achieved through the utilization and management of allied as well as American forces. The examination of the policy arguments within each of the debates reveals that each is in an insufficiently developed stage to greatly assist our predictions as to Japan's future security role in any American strategic policy. Arguments that Japan is willing to accept specific regional security are easily countered by equally valid ones which foresee no direct security role within any American strategic policy of the near future. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

United States military interventions commonly attempt to generate a post-conflict political order congenial to American national interest, that is, to shape a usable peace. The Clausewitzian imperative, that the use of force must serve policy, points to the strategic significance of the postconflict environment. The civil dimension is the arena where US policy succeeds or fails. This study examines US military doctrine and practice of civil affairs in order to address a strategic problem: how to translate the use of force into a usable peace? Civil affairs or civil military operations cope with civilians during operations, control populations and facilitate US military exit. This study offers theoretical, historical, and policy analysis of US civil affairs. Theoretically, if war is a continuation of policy by other means, civil affairs effect a transition back to a mode of policy. Over time, US doctrine adjusted to different conflict environments and policy imperatives provided by civilian leadership, shifting emphasis to military government, civic action, counterinsurgency, and finally, to peace operations. Because US military culture disdains involvement of soldiers in governance, and in order to expedite transitions, two principles are consistent features of the US approach: civilianization, to transfer authority to civilian agencies; and indirect rule, to nurture friendly indigenous regimes. Civil affairs implements policy. US interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) imperfectly translated political goals into military objectives; suffered from inconsistent goals from Washington; and failed to plan adequately for the civil dimension. The study identifies a number of factors that influenced the American approach to civil affairs in these cases, including analogical reasoning behind the US interventions, orientation toward low-intensity conflict at the time of the intervention, the impact of combat operations during interventions, and the availability of local resources for reconstruction after intervention. The civil dimension of military operations has become more prominent in last decade of intervention in internal conflicts, under limited rules of engagement, in the service of humanitarian objectives. As operations have become more multilateral and multi-agency, cultural tensions have become more pronounced. This study provides a basis for further exploration of the fundamental, but increasingly complex strategic imperative for US military forces, to shape a usable peace. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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The Military Intelligence Division (MID) was the U.S. Army's intelligence agency that reported to the Chief of Staff within the War Department. During the years 1917- 1927, the MID routinely conducted surveillance of Mexico, including: espionage, mail censorship, radio intercepts, intelligence gathering, and development of plans for the invasion of Mexico. This study utilizes a tripartite model to evaluate the production and analysis of military "intelligence" by the MID in Mexico during the period 1917-1927. First, the organization and development of the Military Intelligence Division from its origins in 1885 through the year 1927 is explored with sections on institutional history and objects of investigation. Second, a quantitative analysis of intelligence documents identifies the focus and priorities of the MID in Mexico. Third, a textual analysis of intelligence documents makes use of a cross-cultural framework to demonstrate the prevailing attitudes, perspectives and world views of the MID toward the Mexican state and its peoples. The thesis question as to whether the U.S. Military Intelligence Division created an accurate and complete picture of "reality" of Mexico is answered in the negative. The MID perspective was colored by cultural bias, ignorance, and misunderstanding. Ultimately, the MID failed to grasp the reality of Mexico because it failed to ask the right questions. It seriously misunderstood the nature of Mexico and its peoples, especially in its relationship with the United States .. The particular model developed for this study lends itself to the possibility of further research in the area of international history and cross-cultural studies. The use of multiple analysis techniques provides a more comprehensive picture of the various factors involved that influence historical events.

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This paper examines United States arms transfer policies as they have been applied to Peru since the end of World War II and analyzes the role of these policies in achieving the goals of the United States as delineated by Luigi Einaudi et al. in their Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect. The paper traces the course of recent U.S.-Peruvian relations, with special emphasis on Peru's arms acquisitions since 1968. The author concludes that, while U.S. arms transfer policies have undoubtedly strained U.S.-Peruvian relations over the past decade, the refusal of the U.S. to provide advanced weapons to Peru will prove to be in the best interests of the United States in the long run.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Many authors, critics, and policy makers question the presence of a unified grand strategy with which the United States has striven toward in recent years. This is a topic worthy of pursuit since such a strategy is responsible for identifying how this nation intends to accomplish its goals. This thesis defines what, if any, grand strategy the United States is currently pursuing. It observes several prominent theories of grand strategy, from both the realist and liberal perspectives. This analysis is set in context of historical grand strategy decisions since World War II and uses the framework of Taiwan as the case study. The thesis then compares the three theories, Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing, and the Liberal Milieu and their recommendations to real-world activities of the United States with a focus primarily on military deployments and national objectives. The study reveals that of the three in question, the Liberal Milieu grand strategy is the only one that is supported by ongoing deployments in the East Asia region as well as by the national rhetoric which define our policy objectives.