No description available.

No description available.

There is no abstract available for this thesis.

In view of the ability of the Court to retain and increase its power in the face of criticism, a study of past historical precedents should furnish some guide to an assessment of the position of this branch of the government today.

This study examines the agenda setting and decision-making behavior of the United States Supreme Court from 1888 to 1989.

The ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 brought freedom of the press into the sphere of constitutional legitimacy such that it could not be nullified by the whims of elected officials. Traditionally the guarantee of a free press has been treated as an adjunct of the Speech Clause with little, if any, independent status. Recently, however, that traditional conception has come under increasing attack. Many attorneys, judges and academicians have argued for a separation of the Press and Speech Clauses. For example, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart has stated his belief that the Press Clause is a structural guarantee which provides greater First Amendment protection to the press than that generally accorded the public. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) that ratified searches of non-suspect, third-party newsmen exemplified for these supporters the nadir of press freedom in recent years. In this study the importance of the Zurcher decision to public policy, public law and legal studies is examined in detail. The study utilizes the systems model popularized by David Easton to observe the events leading up to the decision and both the judicial and legislative responses to that decision. In addition, a new theory of press freedom is presented which analogizes the Press Clause to the Free Exercise of Religion Clause. This theory suggests that the Press Clause should be separated from the Speech Clause in the same way as the Free Exercise Clause has been separated. This would establish the Press Clause as an independent clause granting a special status to the press: a status which the author believes to be warranted by the language of the First Amendment and the absolute necessity for a press free of governmental intrusion and regulation.

This project explores the role that the United States Supreme Court plays in shaping public opinion. Previous scholars have successfully demonstrated that political elites influence public opinion, but those researching the Court's influence on attitude change have reached mixed findings. I build on previous work in three important ways. First, I employ a method of attributing attitude change to the Court that is a theoretical and empirical improvement over previous ways of identifying those who should be influenced by the justices, "reception" of cases. By "reception", I mean whether an individual understands the Court's decisions. Second, I place Court decisions within the broader information environment that includes the cues sent to the public by other political elites. These cues may reinforce or undermine the justices' decision, which could amplify or undercut the effect of receiving cases on attitude change. Third, I take advantage of recent work on the dynamics of attitude change by interacting reception with one's relevant pre-existing beliefs and personal characteristics. To test these assertions, I use a mixed method, multi-case design that combines existing survey research with original data collected from a quasi-experiment conducted in summer 2005. The results indicate that under certain conditions, receiving Court decisions is associated with attitude change on the issues involved in the cases. This project closes with several suggestions for future research including how to refine reception as a method of attributing attitude change to the Court. / text

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.