No description available.

On 24 February 1996, two US-registered civil aircraft operated by members of the anti-Castro organisation Brothers to the Rescue were shot down by Cuban fighters. This action was denounced by the United States and the majority of the international community on the grounds that international air law, as reflected in Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention, prohibits the use of force against civil aircraft. However, at the time of the incident, the 1984 Protocol introducing Article 3bis in the Chicago Convention was not in force nor had it been ratified by Cuba or the United States. This thesis will examine the international legal rules applicable to the incident and will assess the legality of the Cuban action.

The present study was designed to investigate possible situational determinants of anxiety (state and trait) as a function of either a stress provoking situation or a non-stress provoking situation. Also under investigation were possible differences that would emerge on measures of anxiety between subjects labeled as having an internal or external locus of control. Time was a third variable under consideration. This factor was manipulated as a repeated measures variable as a function of whether anxiety scores would increase or decrease when measured at two different points in time. A state measure of anxiety, a trait measure of anxiety, an internal-external locus of control scale and a questionnaire were administered to forty-five undergraduates. An analysis of variance for a 2X2X2 factorial design with repeated measures was used to analyze the data. A significant main effect was found for the factor Time on the dependent measure of trait anxiety. A correlational analysis was also performed.The significant effect of Time on trait measurements of anxiety suggest that this variable may fluctuate more frequently than previously considered by other researchers or that the state/trait dichotomy of anxiety may not be a discriminant variable and that, therefore, only one anxiety component exists. Another viable hypothesis in regards to the state measure of anxiety, is that the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) is not as sensitive to day-to-day fluctuations of anxiety as reported in previous research (Zuckerman, 1974).

There is no abstract available for this thesis.

This thesis has dealt critically with U. S. diplomacy during the 1956 Suez crisis. The American approach was correct in opposing the use of force by the allies, but was at times confusing to them. The main conclusion of this thesis is that such misunderstandings are inevitable in the complicated realm of International politics. The American response in 1956 represents a search for a viable American policy toward the Middle East. A study of these events also helps one to understand the present tension in that area of the world, a tension that is of crucial importance to international peace and security.

There is no abstract available for this dissertation.

One unusual aspect of recent American foreign policy is the Tom Connally Amendment, the eight words appended to provision "b" of Senate Resolution 196 (1946): "as determined by the United States of America." In its final form the complete reservation provides that the International Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction over anything the United States considers essentially domestic.Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon introduced Senate Resolution 196 (1946). The italicized Amendment to the Resolution was offered by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally from Texas. The so-called Connally Amendment to Senate Resolution 196 (1946), pertaining to Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, reserved the right of the United States to deny jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice in cases involving the United States' self-interest. The reservation is self judging: a party to a justiciable dispute reserves the right to say whether or not a case exists.Using Senate Resolution 196 (1946), this study attempted to show how governmental policy and public opinion changed from a militant ideological-isolationist position before World War II to one which advocated the United States' taking a leading role in post-war planning for peace and security. This change in public opinion and the leadership of the popular President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration forced Congress to reassess the traditional American foreign policy of unilateralism.This study of Senate Resolution 196 showed how Congress, and particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the leadership of Chairman Tom Connally, tried to assert itself and take a leadership role in the Senate in the development of post-war planning. This study also shows the difficulties that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee encountered in taking a leadership role. The Committee and its leadership were under constant pressure. In the end the Committee's leadership role was successfully challenged by its own chairman, who, ironically, worked so hard to build the Committee's leadership role in the Senate of the United States Congress.

The main purpose of this study was to identify the positions taken by Representative Francis H. Case of South Dakota on major foreign policy questions during the years 1937 through 1941 and to determine why those positions were taken.The research focused on several questions: (1) Were there experiences in Case's early life which shaped his adult attitudes? (2) What were Case's stands on major foreign policy questions prior to his election to Congress in 1936? (3) What stands did Case take on major foreign policy questions as a congressman between 1937 and 1941? and (4) What factors contributed to the formation of Case's foreign policy views between World War I and World War II?Research indicated that the experiences of growing up in the rural environment of Iowa and South Dakota in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did shape Case's adult attitudes. As a congressman Case was conscientious, dedicated, hard-working, and deeply concerned about his state and the nation.The problem that concerned Case the most upon entering Congress in 1937 was keeping the nation out of foreign wars. As a young college student during the First World War he developed strong anti-war views. Eventually, however, he was swept up in the Wilsonian idealism of the day and joined the United States Marine Corps to do his part to help win the "war to end war." Although Case saw no fighting in World War I his military service served to strengthen his anti-war views.During the 1920's, as a newspaperman, Case displayed a cautious internationalism. He supported membership of the United States in the World Court and in some sort of international peacekeeping organization. In the 1930's, however, he became disillusioned by the deterioration of world peace and turned toward isolationism. By the time he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1936 he was a confirmed isolationist.A careful examination of Case's speeches, writings, and letters revealed that the twin pillars of his isolationism were unilateralism and noninterventionism. As a unilateralist Case believed that the nation should follow an independent foreign policy. As a noninterventionist he believed the United States should resist the temptation to intervene in the quarrels of ethers and dedicate its efforts to solving its problems at home. Case united his efforts with other confirmed congressional isolationists between 1937 and 1939 to promote a unilateral and noninterventionist foreign policy for the nation.After the outbreak of World War II, however, Case had to constantly adjust his isolationist views to changing circumstances e the United States moved closer and closer to involvement in theconflict which raged abroad. He fought against the Roosevelt Administration's "steps short of war" to aid the Allies but once policy decisions were made he supported them energetically. He believed this was the only sensible course of action to take.In this regard he differed from the more extreme isolationists in Congress who only reluctantly supported such measures as the destroyers-bases trade, the Selective Service Act, and the LendLease Act. By late 1941, although he hoped war might be averted )y some means, Case was willing to accept it.The isolationism of case in the pre-World War II years was got simple obstructionism based upon ignorance or folly. It was he carefully considered response of a conservative Middlewestern Republican to complex domestic and foreign developments. Although it was an unwise policy to follow it is understandable given the circumstances of the times.

There is no abstract available for this dissertation.

The purpose of this study was to examine the primary reasons for the refusal of the United States to grant diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary government in Greece between 1821-1833. The generally accepted reason has been the Monroe Doctrine. This policy statement by James Monroe in 1823 seemed to preclude any form of diplomatic recognition of the provisional government in Greece by the United States because the Greek Revolution was a European affair. If the American government were to prevent intervention in the Western Hemisphere by the European powers, then certainly the United States should not interfere in an area of primary concern to the Holy Alliance.President Monroe's words in his annual message to Congress were a statement of existing American policy and the principles should not be ignored entirely. However, it is the thesis of this paper that the desire for a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire was more significant in the development of American policy toward the Greek War of Independence. The expansion of American trade and commerce were goals of a government that practiced commercial diplomacy. The government of the United States sought in this particular case more trade in the Eastern Mediterranean and the right to navigate the waters of the Black Sea. A treaty with the Ottoman Empire was the key to this goal.To prove this thesis it was necessary to demonstrate that the menace from European powers, or the Holy Alliance, was minimal because those powers were too divided to pose a credible deterrent to American diplomatic recognition of Greece. Chapter one is devoted to a discussion of the European diplomatic situation with particular emphasis on the collapse of the Congress System and the "Eastern Question". Both bore direct bearing on American decisions concerning the Greek Revolution.The next chapter attempts to demonstrate that the United States had direct and serious involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since 1794 the United States had sought commercial advantages in the Levant, indeed, part of America's colonial legacy had been involvement in the Mediterranean trade. In addition to commerce, missionary activity, scholarly concern, and America's democratic heritage drew Americans to the Levant. By the time of the Greek Revolution the United States had bountiful interests in the Ottoman Empire. There were expectations of further advances in many quarters.The United States' response to the Greek Revolution between 1821-1833 is the subject of chapter three. America was divided between the philhellenes who advocated aid and recognition for Greece and those who did not wish to antagonize the Ottoman Empire and thereby lose commercial advantages in the Levant. This was the central issue in the debates on the Greek Question in the eighteenth Congress. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, led the fight against the philhellene position so as not to jeopardize his secret attempts to secure a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire.The negotiations between representatives of the United States and Turkey, conducted in secret throughout the Greek Revolution, is the subject of chapter four. Only after the conclusion of the American-Turkish Treaty of Commerce did the United States grant diplomatic recognition to an already independent Greek nation. A commercial treaty with Turkey, a dying empire, in order to foster the expansion of American trade was the crucial determinant of American policy toward the Greek War of Independence.