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The rise of the United States as the dominant actor in international affairs since the end of the Cold War has motivated the development of theories of leadership and hegemony. Additionally, new questions about the role of unilateralism have emerged, following the events of September 11, 2001, and the recent U.S.-led war in Iraq. However, despite the emphasis on leadership and unilateralism, the applied research using these concepts has not kept pace with their increasing importance in today's world. In this context, this paper develops a framework that conceptualizes leadership as having two main components: (1) the structural capabilities that provide the context for leadership; and (2) the unilateral contributions and commitments that constitute the exercise of leadership. This framework will be used to understand trends in alliance formation and the implications of leadership for the institutionalization of alliances.

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This thesis applies a schools of thought analysis to American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In chapter 1, it discusses what a schools of thought analysis involves and its usefulness as an analytical tool, with particular reference to Franz Schurmann's book, The Logic of World Power, an earlier attempt at an overarching review. In chapters 2-4, it classifies and analyses the specific schools of thought of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era; the democratists, the neo-realists, and the institutionalists. It illustrates how general schools of thought predilections lead to policy preferences with reference to five issue areas in the post-Cold War era; US-Western European .relations, US-Russian relations, American initiatives in Bosnia, the MFN controversy with China, and the American position on regional and global trade pacts (Nafta and Gatt). It also classifies various opinion-makers in the overall schools of thought analysis by matching their specific policy preferences in the five issue areas to the general schools of thought positions. In chapter 5, it places individual administration and legislative decision-makers into the model, using the same techniques applied to the opinion-makers in chapters 2-4. In chapter 6, it uses schools of thought analysis as a template for analysing the Clinton administration's response to the Bosnian crisis, with particular reference to US-Russian relations and US- European relations. It identifies overall administration stances regarding these three areas by classifying White House initiatives using the schools of thought rubric. In chapter 7, having identified overall American foreign policy initiatives regarding Bosnia, Russia, and Western Europe and having placed individual political actors within the assessment, it is able, through the fusion of bureaucratic analysis and schools of thought analysis, to determine how specific policy inputs advocated by decision-makers partly due to their schools of thought orientation, lead to overall American foreign policy outputs. In chapter 8, it concludes by reassessing schools of thought analysis, both in relation to the Bosnian crisis and in general, and evaluating its worth as an analytical tool. This thesis represents an attempt to relate theory directly to political processes and specific policy-makers. By its use I am trying to both classify and analyse the intellectual and practical nature of the American foreign policy-making process in the post-Cold War era.

This paper is an examination of conflicting views regarding American defense policy which surfaced in a debate during the winter and spring of 1950-51 between the Truman Administration and its supporters and a group of conservative Republicans. The research problem involved unraveling the debate’s manifold issues, determining its outcome, and analyzing the impact of that outcome on the future of American foreign policy, particularly in Asia. The debate’s principle issues centered around American defense of Europe versus defense of Asia and the reliance on ground troops rather than on sea and air power. The Administration, while believing the United States should help repel the Communist invasion of South Korea, also advocated sending additional troops to Europe. Republican critics disagreed, arguing there was no overt Communist threat in Europe, only in Asia, and American efforts there should be redoubled. Furthermore, they claimed that whatever defense of Europe was necessary could best be accomplished through the use of naval and air power, not the infantry. The immediate result of the debate was victory for the Administration. A majority of senators was convinced that additional American troops were needed in Europe, and the Senate passed a resolution expressing that opinion in early April, 1951, ostensibly ending the debate. The victory was short-lived, however. The debate had repercussions at the polls in 1952 and helped sweep the Republicans into office. The ultimate outcome of the debate was to bring the conservative arguments to the fore and remold American foreign policy so that it conformed to those views. The information used in this paper was collected from books and contemporary periodicals, newspapers, and government publications. The only leading conservative critic still living, William F. Knowland, did not respond to a letter requesting clarification of statements he made during the debate. The memoirs of President Truman and Dean Acheson, his Secretary of State, received special attention. Works on and by Senator Robert A. Taft, the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, The New York Times and The Times of London, and the Department of State Bulletin were particularly useful. One potentially important primary source, a paper written by the National Security Council in 1950, remains classified and was thus unavailable.

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