This thesis is an exploration of the images which define revolution's meaning. It suggests a possible shifting of emphasis from the scientific imaginary which centres on identifying the correct way to totalising revolution, towards a post-structuralist-anarchistic imaginary which privileges prefigurative radicalisations of social relations in the here and now. It looks specifically at how the field of post-structuralism intertwines with historically anarchist concepts to generate an horizon of social change animated by experimental and open-ended transformations. While the thesis offers positive characterisations of the types of contemporary movements, tactics and principles which embody the change from closed to open utopianism, it is chiefly a commentary on the role of theory in depicting the complexity of relations on the ground and the danger of proposing one totalising pathway from one state of society to another. It asks the reader to consider, given the achievements of movements and given the insights of post-structuralism, whether it is still worthwhile to proclaim certainty when sketching the possibilities for transcendence toward emancipation, an aim, which in itself, is always under construction. I engage this by firstly establishing a practical foundation for the critique of endpoints in theory by exploring the horizontal and prefigurative nature of a few autonomous movements today. Secondly I propose the contemporary theory of post-structuralist anarchism as concomitant with conclusions about transformation made in the first chapter. Finally I recommend a few initial concepts to start debate about the way forward from old objectivist models of transformation. The uncertainties of daily life, crumbling of economic powers and rapid pace of change in the twenty-first century have opened up fantastic spaces for innovative thought. Reconsidering old consensus around what constitutes a desirable image of revolution is of considerable importance given today's burgeoning bottom-up political energy and the global debate surrounding the possibilities for bottom-up revolutionisation of society. I submit that theories which portray stories of permanent, pure and natural end-points to revolution are deficient justifications for radical action.

Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Utopie is dood. Daar is geen meer hoop dat die toekoms radikaal anders of moreel meerwaardig kan wees gemeet teen die hede nie. Om utopiese alternatiewe tot ons huidige samelewingsrangskikking te verbeel is onrealisties, en selfs gevaarlik. Daarom lewer die utopiese verbeelding vandag slegs distopieë – as ons vandag 'n andersoortige samelewing verbeel kan ons slegs dink dat dit 'n nagmerrie moet wees. Die resultaat is politieke apatie en 'n gewilligheid om onsself te versoen met die status quo. As teenvoeter vir die bogenoemde politieke apatie vra ek in hierdie proefskrif of dit vandag nog moontlik is om utopies te dink. Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord ondersoek ek eers die sogenaamde "einde" of "dood" van utopie. Utopie is vandag dood omdat die metafisiese onderbou daaran verdag geraak het, en omdat 'n utopiese gees aktief onderdruk word via 'n verskeidenheid ideologiese strategieë. Ten spyte van hierdie probleme is 'n andersoortige en postmetafisiese utopisme wel vandag moontlik, en die kontoere van hierdie nuwe utopiese rasionaliteit word nagespoor in die werk van eietydse filosowe soos Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek en Jacques Derrida. In hulle werk herleef 'n utopiese gees wat nie meer gebonde is aan ons metafisiese filosofiese erfenis nie. Hierdie gees manifesteer ook nie (slegs) in die vorm van sketse van ideale samelewings nie, maar eerder as hermeneutiese praktyke wat die koms van sosiale alteriteit fasiliteer. Hierdie utopiese gees, in voeling met 'n postmetafisiese intellektuele klimaat, bied ek aan as 'n noodsaaklike voorwaarde vir sosiale hoop. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Utopia is dead. There is no hope today that the future will be radically different from, or ethically superior to the present. To dream up utopian alternatives to our society is unrealistic, even dangerous. It is no surprise, then, that the existing utopian imagination produces only dystopias – if we think at all of a radically different society, we can only imagine something nightmarish. The result: a political apathy and a willingness to reconcile ourselves with the status quo. To counter the abovementioned political apathy, I ask in this dissertation if it is still possible to think in a utopian fashion. In order to answer this question I start off by examining the so-called "end" or "death" of utopia. Utopia is dead today because of its questionable metaphysical foundations, and because of an active ideological repression of any utopian impulse. In spite of these problems a new and postmetaphysical utopianism is possible. The contours of this new utopianism can be extrapolated from the work of contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek and Jacques Derrida. In their work a utopian spirit is revived – a spirit no longer constrained by our metaphysical philosophical heritage. This spirit is manifested, not (only) in sketches of ideal societies, but rather in hermeneutic practices that facilitate the arrival of social alterity. I present this utopian spirit, in touch with a postmetaphysical intellectual climate, as a necessary condition for social hope.

In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.