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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Essays In Industrial Organization

Fix, Aaron Matthew January 2011 (has links)
Thesis advisor: Frank Gollop / My doctoral dissertation consists of three essays in the field of Industrial Organization. The first two consider exclusive dealing contracts between upstream and downstream firms theoretically, while the third measures consumer substitution among geographically differentiated air travel products empirically. In the first chapter I study the ability of an incumbent seller to use exclusive dealing contracts to foreclose efficient entry when there are n downstream buyers, where n can be viewed as a measure of the degree of downstream competition. The effect of downstream competition on the ability of the upstream incumbent to use exclusive contracts anticompetitively depends on whether upstream firms compete over linear or two-part prices. The model also highlights an interesting effect of the sunk cost of upstream entry that is ignored in models with exactly two buyers. In the second chapter I investigate the ability of an incumbent monopolist to exclude a potential entrant via exclusive dealing contracts when these contracts include an agreement over price. I find that a simple entry game yields both exclusionary and entry equilibria. The exclusionary equilibrium is unique, however, under most reasonable assumptions; for example if buyers are downstream competitors, if entry or the marginal cost of the potential entrant are uncertain, or if the incumbent can commit not to compete for unsigned buyers. When buyers compete with one another downstream, the optimal guaranteed price is above (below) the marginal cost of the incumbent when downstream buyers compete over strategic complements (substitutes). In the third and final chapter (co-authored with Kyle Buika) I study the question of geographic market definition in the US airline industry. Though an accurate definition of an economic market is important for any study of industry, there is no rule governing what exactly constitutes a market. To define a market we must ask the question "between which products do consumers substitute,'' knowing that the answer to this question will depend on how "close'' products are to one another in product space, as well as how close they are to one another, and to consumers, in geographic space. We estimate a discrete choice model of air travel demand that uses known information about the locations of products and consumers, which allows us to study substitution patterns among air travel products at different airports. We evaluate the commonly used city-pair and airport-pair definitions of a market for air travel, and conclude that a city-pair is the appropriate definition. We also employ the Hypothetical Monopolist test for antitrust market definition, as defined by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, and conclude that the relevant geographic market for antitrust analysis is, according to this test, frequently more narrowly defined as an airport-pair. Finally we conduct merger simulations under different market definitions and compare the results to those obtained using our own results, and conclude that accounting for geography is important when studying mergers. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.
2

Fixação de preços de revenda no Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência: análise do direito sancionador antitruste à luz do princípio da segurança jurídica / Resale price maintenance within the scope of Brazilian System for the Defense of Competition: analysis of antitrust law in the light of the principle of legal certainty

Mello, Fernando Amorim Soares de 15 February 2017 (has links)
Objetivou-se colocar em evidência as políticas realizadas na função repressiva do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência (SBDC) sobre a fixação de preços de revenda (FPR) a partir da Lei n. 8.884/1994 (revogada pela Lei n. 12.529/2011). Do mesmo modo que a conduta poderia acarretar consequências perversas ao ambiente concorrencial, a falta de padrões claros para caracterizar a conduta como ilícita também pode ensejar efeitos deletérios ao ambiente institucional protegido pelo SBDC. O problema central da pesquisa está nos arranjos institucionais para promover a maximização da segurança jurídica no contexto da FPR no SBDC. Partiu-se da hipótese de que essas alternativas institucionais podem ser encontradas no próprio arcabouço normativo no SBDC, sem prejuízo de outras soluções estruturais. A partir dessa premissa, foi aplicado o método de análise de instituições para resolver um problema de arcabouço institucional aplicado. Inicialmente, o método abordou uma análise como um fim descritivo, objetivando identificar os elementos/particularidades do ambiente recortado para delimitar os contornos do problema da pesquisa. Para tanto, foram analisadas as decisões paradigmáticas do Cade sobre o tema. Ato contínuo, passou-se à função analítica aplicada do método, para formular um instrumental propositivo a respeito das possíveis falhas do arcabouço anteriormente estudado. Para tanto, a linha de raciocínio subjacente à tarefa foram os métodos dedutivo e hipotético-dedutivo, tomando como fontes a bibliografia especializada, além das estruturas balizadoras do ordenamento jurídico nacional. Concluiu-se que a estabilidade institucional é um dos fatores a ser considerado na promoção da defesa da concorrência, devendo ser garantida na intersecção entre as funções repressiva e educativa do SBDC, isto é, por meio de medidas educativas (medidas ex ante de conscientização) antes de medidas sancionadoras (ações punitivas ex post). Cabe ao Cade considerar os postulados da razoabilidade e proporcionalidade não apenas em suas atividades-fim, mas também nos reflexos de seus atos administrativos sobre o ambiente institucional, o que inclui o dever de proteção da segurança jurídica. Portanto, qualquer inovação institucional in pejus ao administrado aplicada pelo Cade, inclusive no caso de standards interpretativos, deverá ser considerada na perspectiva dos pilares da lei de processo administrativo como ponderação necessária, vedadas medidas contraditórias àquelas que se têm praticado no mesmo ambiente institucional. / The research encompasses the policies enforced by the Brazilian System of Competition Defence (SBDC) with regard to Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). While the conduct may produce a negative impact over competition - reducing the welfare of consumers -, the lack of predictability from the rulings enforced by SBDC on the subject might, likewise, produce deleterious outcomes to the institutional environment. The focus of this research rests on the premise of promoting a maximization of legal security in the context of RPM within SBDC. The initial hypothesis is that the institutional alternatives may be found within the very normative scope of SBDC, without prejudice of other structural solutions. Based on those premises we applied the Analysis of Institutions method in order to solve the issue within an institutional scope. Such method encompassed the analysis as a descriptive means, with the objective of identifying the elements/particularities of the given environment in order to define the contours from the object of the research. Subsequently, we moved on to the analytical method in order to instrumentally investigate possible flaws within the scope of what was previously studied. Thus, the subsequent lines of thought were both deductive and hypothetico-deductive. As a conclusion, the institutional stability is one of the factors to be considered in the promotion of competition defense, and it should be warranted within an intersection of repressive and educative functions from the SBDC, that is, through educative measures (ex ante) before repressive actions (punitive actions, ex post). It was concluded that institutional stability is one of the factors to be considered in promoting competition and should be guaranteed at the intersection between the repressive and educational functions of the SBDC, that is, through educational measures (ex ante measures) before punitive measures ex post. It will always be up to Cade to consider the claims with regard to reasonability and proportionality, not only with regard to the end activity but also with regard to the outcomes over the institutional environment - which also encompasses the duty of legal protection as well. Moreover, the notion of restrictions of competition \"by the object\" - as well as any institutional innovation contrary to the ones previously administered - should be considered from the perspective of the pillars of the Administrative Process Law.

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