Epistemology is an evaluative enterprise. But what should we take to be the primary unit of evaluation? Traditionally, individual beliefs have served as the primary units of epistemic evaluation. I argue that epistemology should instead use a different unit of evaluation--the agent and her character traits. Such a theory is a virtue epistemology.What makes a character trait a virtue? There are two competing answers to this question. The externalist holds that it depends on the relationship between the character trait and the world. The internalist holds that it depends on the ways the character trait motivates us to respond to our perceptions of the world. I argue, contrary to recent developments in virtue epistemology, that we should accept an internalist conception of virtue.How universal are the standards for virtue and vice? Rather than holding that standards are universal and do not depend on context, the contextualist holds that the standards for virtue and vice vary depending on the particulars of the context. I argue for a contextualist version of virtue epistemology, and show why context-sensitive virtue theory is superior to other potential versions of contextualism.Finally, I apply the developed notion of a contextually-sensitive, internalist virtue epistemology to two intriguing areas in epistemology. I argue that my view is better able to account for certain otherwise puzzling phenomena, including questions about the epistemic relevance of the testimony of others and about how we could have the capacities with reasoning about probability that we routinely exhibit.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 209-212).

The two traditional views in the epistemology of disagreement have offered distinct responses to the challenge of epistemic conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to challenge these responses and offer a satisfactory position. This position is congruent with social epistemology as well as Christian apologetics. Chapter 1 introduces the epistemology of disagreement, giving attention to the concepts of disagreement found in the literature on religious diversity. This introduction also demonstrates that the two responses to disagreement possess features that are problematic for apologetics. Chapter 2 addresses the epistemic problems of the conciliatory response to disagreement. This chapter concludes that conciliation possesses an excessive view of testimony, and a low view of self-trust. Chapter 3 focuses on the epistemological matters of the steadfast position. This chapter maintains that steadfastness is premised on a deficient view of testimony, and an excessive view of self-trust. These two chapters show the internal deficiencies of both positions; thus, weakening their challenge against apologetics. Chapter 4 presents the position of virtue responsibilism as a satisfactory and advantageous response to the epistemology of disagreement. This response is the virtuous response to disagreement. Chapter 5 expands on the natures of two intellectual virtues: intellectual courage and open-mindedness. These two intellectual virtues are particularly relevant to the discussion of disagreement and apologetics. Chapter 6 applies the virtuous response to disagreement with experts and the challenge of religious diversity. The chapter shows that conciliation and steadfastness are unable to provide satisfactory responses to these issues, while the virtuous response presents an advantageous response for Christian apologetics. Chapter 7 summarizes the main points of the dissertation, offering practical applications as well as areas for further research.

Recent literature in religious epistemology has overlooked a significant debate in mainstream epistemology. In short, theories in religious epistemology have failed to consider the value problem. This essay, then, hopes to rectify this omission by arguing that one of the most influential accounts of religious epistemology - reformed epistemology - fails to adequately account for the value of knowledge. I argue, however, that a reasonable way out for the reformed epistemologist comes by way of endorsing the achievement thesis. The achievement thesis, put simply, states that knowledge is valuable because it is a cognitive achievement - unlike, for example, mere true belief. The central question of this essay, then, is this: Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? In order to better answer this question I highlight two different ways in which one can understand the nature of cognitive achievements. First, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is always primarily creditable to the agent. Or, second, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is jointly creditable to the agent. Both, I argue, are compatible with knowledge and the achievement thesis. Whether knowledge of God is primarily or jointly creditable, however, will depend on the way in which one understands the role the agent plays in the belief forming process. Given the nature of reformed epistemology, I argue that knowledge of God is the kind of achievement that is jointly creditable. Further, and central to the argument, I argue that the reformed epistemologist is in a good position to meet the requirements for the strong achievement thesis. The strong achievement thesis argues that an achievement should be understood in terms of overcoming some obstacle whereby the agent's belief is the result of some ability that can be credited to the agent. The account I propose not only meets the requirements of the strong achievement thesis, but also retains a distinctive feature of reformed epistemology - namely, that the belief in God can be said to overcome the obstacle of cognitive malfunction that, as the reformed epistemologist argues, is brought about by sin. It's an achievement becasue it overcomes an excessively hostile environment (what I call the maxi-environment) that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. In the end, it is possible to provide an account of reformed epistemology where the value of knowledge (over and above mere true belief) is adequately demonstrated.

This dissertation develops and explores how a particular variety of virtue epistemology (VE) applies to the theory and practice of education. To this end, several key issues are addressed: knowledge and epistemology, knowledge in education, virtue and culture, and the application of a particular variety of VE to education. Furthermore, this dissertation employs a philosophical methodology based in theoretical work from two disciplines—philosophy and education. In Chapter I, I explicate the purpose of this dissertation and provide a rationale for pursuing this project. I also clarify some key terminology, discuss some delimiting factors, and offer chapter previews. In Chapter II, I discuss how Edmond Gettier challenged the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief. This resulted in the development of virtue-based epistemologies. Having distinguished between several forms of VE, I conclude this chapter by advancing regulative virtue epistemology (RVE). In Chapter III, I provide a conceptual and historical overview of the concept of knowledge in the specific context of educational theory. This discussion provides important context for the application of RVE to educational matters. In Chapter IV, I consider how the concept of virtue is understood in several diverse cultural contexts. Here I ameliorate a potential worry—that virtue is a distinctly Western concept. Finally, in Chapter V, I apply RVE to the theory and practice of education. It is shown that RVE has important implications for the epistemic aims of education—that is, the ultimate knowledge-related purposes of education. Specifically, I find that understanding offers a more holistic account of educational theorizing, and places greater responsibility on teachers and students in their educational activities. I also conclude that RVE widens the aims of education to include other epistemic goods. I then demonstrate that communication—an important feature of education—is also regulated by intellectual virtue. Finally, I present two proposals for teaching from an RVE perspective, and find that each has particular strengths and weaknesses. I conclude with some areas for future research.

Thesis (M.A.)--Abilene Christian University, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-87).

Thesis (M.A.)--Abilene Christian University, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-87).

This thesis addresses the problem of the analysis of knowledge. The persistent failure of analyses of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is used to motivate exploring alternative approaches to the analytical problem. In parallel to a similar development in the theory of truth, in which the persistent failure to provide a satisfactory answer to the question as to what the nature of truth is has led to the exploration of deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of truth, the prospects for deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of knowledge are investigated. While it is argued that deflationary approaches are ultimately unsatisfactory, a minimalist approach to epistemology, which characterises the concept of knowledge by a set of platitudes about knowledge, is defended. The first version of a minimalist framework for the theory of knowledge is developed. Two more substantive developments of the minimalist framework are discussed. In the first development a safety condition on knowledge is derived from the minimalist framework. Problems for this development are discussed and solved. In the second development, an ability condition is derived from the minimalist framework. Reason is provided to believe that, arguably, the ability condition can avoid the problems that beset traditional analyses of knowledge. It is also shown that even if this argument fails, minimalist approaches to epistemology may serve to provide a functional definition of knowledge. Reason is thus provided to believe that minimalist approaches to epistemology can make progress towards addressing the problem of the analysis of knowledge.

This dissertation endeavors to address a gap in current academic discourse by initiating a dialogue on existential/ontological virtues and the establishment of a virtue ontology. Despite the enrichment of virtue theory through the lens of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, as well as the scrutiny of ethical and intellectual virtues within ethical and epistemological paradigms, there remains little said about existential/ontological virtues. Moreover, while moral and epistemic excellence have been extensively researched, the exploration of ontological/existential excellence has not.To address this gap, I propose initiating a discourse centered on existential virtues. These virtues, when cultivated, enhance our ability to appreciate life and exist “more.” I thus investigate the concept of experiencing varying degrees of existence, influenced by one’s existential stance, which illuminates states of life as varied as near-death to those characterized by profound fulfillment and vitality. Existential virtues, or “virtues of the heart,” enhance our engagement with Being, the self, and others. A central inquiry of this study concerns the influence of individuals’ metaphysical beliefs on their vitality. I also consider whether existential virtues can be nurtured through a cognitive shift in one’s perception of ontological reality. To this purpose, I analyze three philosophical perspectives—Stoicism, Sufism, and Neuroexistentialism—and elucidate the resulting attitudes of Stoic Serene Acceptance, Sufi Ecstatic Love, and Neuroexistential Angst. An overarching objective of this study is to examine how differing ontological perspectives shape the cultivation of existential virtues and influence one’s art of living. To illustrate this interplay, I conduct an analysis of Sufism, highlighting the corresponding existential virtues of existential joy, existential self-worth, and existential reverence within the ontological domains of Being, the self, and others. This study advocates for an expansion of scholarly inquiry into existential virtues, fostering a discourse on virtue ontology that would bridge ethics and ontology. Through an exploration of existential virtues as the foundation for a virtue ontology, this dissertation aims to deepen our understanding of virtuous human existence and the potential for existential excellence. Ultimately, it seeks to illuminate pathways toward a more inspired mode of existence and the possibility of a progression through varying degrees of being.

This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski's grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.