Thèse (de maîtrise)--Université Laval, 2002. / Bibliogr.: f. 101-107. Webographie: f. 107. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Low voter turnout among America’s youngest voters has been a subject of concern and research. Research has shown that education is closely related to participation, making college campuses are a great place to engage America’s youth in the democratic process. This report outlines best practices of Getting Out the Vote on university campuses, as well as addressing the additional challenges of community colleges. / text

Thèse (Ph. D.)--Université Laval, 2002. / Bibliogr.: f. 92-93. Publié aussi en version électronique.

La chute de la monarchie absolue en Thaïlande ne signifie pas l’instauration achevée de la démocratie dans le pays ; depuis la révolution de 1932, la démocratisation ne semble pas encore accomplie malgré plusieurs réformes constitutionnelles. Il est possible d’expliquer cet échec par l’influence excessive de l’armée royale, l’intervention politique de l’ancien pouvoir, les inégalités économiques et le conflit social entre les élites et le peuple, ou encore l’incapacité des représentants parlementaires. Il existe par ailleurs un fait qu’il ne faut pas oublier : le système juridique et le fonctionnement des juridictions font également partie de ces difficultés notamment en ce qui concerne le fonctionnement de la vie politique. À cet égard, plusieurs questions ont été soulevées par « le contrôle des élections politiques » en Thaïlande : ce contrôle peut-il vraiment assurer la sincérité électorale et les droits et libertés politiques du peuple ? La démocratisation de la Thaïlande peut-elle aller jusqu’au bout avec le système juridique et politique actuel ? Quel sera l’avenir du régime politique thaïlandais ? Les réponses à ces questions sont apportées par l’étude d’une part du régime juridique des élections politiques, et d’autre part du fonctionnement des juridictions en matière d’élections. / The fall of the absolute monarchy in Thailand does not mean the complete establishment of democracy in Thailand. Since the Siamese Revolution of 1932, democratization has not seemingly accomplished despite that fact that the constitution has been continuously revised and the current constitution is the eighteenth one. There are many possible reasons for this failure: the excessive influence of the Royal Thai Army, the political intervention of the former power, the economic and social gap between the elites and the lower-class, and the inability of parliamentary representatives. In addition, the more important fact is that the legal system and the functioning of the courts create these difficulties, in particular, concerning the electoral litigation. As one of reasons for the political failure, the election has also been questioned at the issue of its sincerity and people’s political rights and liberties. Does “the control of the political elections” really keep the electoral sincerity and sufficiently ensure political rights and liberties of the people? How the democratization of Thailand can be carried out under the contemporary legal system and this political context? What will the future of the Thai political system look like? The answers to these questions are in the study of the legal regime of political elections and of the functioning of the courts in electoral system.

Cette thèse s'attache à déterminer les facteurs économiques et politiques qui influencent le vote aux élections municipales françaises. Elle cherche à vérifier les hypothèses qui sous-tendent le vote économique dans le cas des élections municipales françaises, à l’aide d’une base de données originale et détaillée couvrant la période 1983-2008. Nous montrons que le parti sortant est sanctionné si la situation macroéconomique est mauvaise. À l’inverse, il est victime du climat politique national, notamment en période de cohabitation. Par ailleurs, les variables environnementales locales influencent également le score du sortant, pour le scrutin de 2001. Cette thèse conclue également à un comportement électoral complexe ou divers degrés de sociotropisme sont révélés : concernant les variables fiscales, le niveau local est pris en compte par les électeurs, alors que c’est le niveau national qui les intéresse pour les variables macroéconomique (chômage). Enfin, le mode de scrutin à deux tours n’est pas anodin quant aux déterminants du vote municipal. Ainsi, la structure des budgets locaux est déterminante au premier tour. Plus précisément, les dépenses de salaires et d’équipement par tête élevées accroissent la probabilité que le parti sortant soit reconduit dès le premier tour alors que les dépenses de fonctionnement (hors salaires) la réduisent. A l’inverse, certains facteurs politiques (nombre de candidats en lice par exemple) n’entrent en jeu qu’au second tour. / This thesis examines the impact of economic conditions and political context on the result of parties' candidates in local elections in France. It confirms hypothesis of economic voting, in the case of French local elections, on the basis of an original and detailed database, covering the 1983-2008 period. We show that the incumbent’party is considered as a victim of national political events (cohabitation notably) but it shares the responsibility for the level of economic variables and is consequently rewarded (or penalized). Furthermore, for the 2001 elections, environmental variables also impact incumbent’s share of vote. This thesis also investigates the behaviour of the voter, showing a complex mechanism of varied degrees of sociotropism: regional level is relevant for fiscal variables, but national level is in voter’s mind for economic factors (unemployment). Finally, the electoral rule (two rounds) is also crucial for identifying the decisive factors. Municipal budget structure is important for the first round, particularly; wages and investments expenditures increase the incumbent’s winning probability but consumption spending (wages off) decrease this probability. Political variables (number of candidates) come into play for the second round.

Técnicas de estimação de pontos ideais baseadas na teoria espacial do voto têm sido largamente utilizadas para retratar legislaturas ao redor do mundo. No entanto, tais técnicas foram pensadas inicialmente para o estudo do caso norte-americano, que possui um sistema político bipartidário e no qual as migrações partidárias são eventos raros. Em países como o Brasil, algumas precauções devem ser tomadas. Assim, o primeiro objetivo deste trabalho é metodológico. Como os pressupostos sobre a distribui ção dos erros não são factíveis para o caso brasileiro, o uso de técnicas como o W-Nominate e o IDEAL não é recomendável. Desta maneira, defenderemos o uso do método não paramétrico Optimal Classication. Ainda neste sentido discutiremos a questão da unidade de análise e como ela pode inuenciar na escolha do número de dimensões relevantes. O segundo objetivo é substantivo. O que pretendemos responder é quantas e quais dimens ões são necessárias para representar razoavelmente bem as preferências dos senadores brasileiros. Mostraremos que uma só dimensão que expressa o conito entre governo e oposição é suciente. / Ideal point estimation methods based upon the spatial theory of voting has been broadly used to represent legislatures around the world. However, such methods were initially thought to analyze the U.S case, that has a bipartisan system and in which party switching are rare events. In countries like Brazil, some precautions must be taken. Thus, the rst aim of this study is methodological. As the assumptions of the error distribution are not feasible to the Brazilian case, the use of techniques like W-Nominate and IDEAL are not recommended. So, we argue in favor of the use of the non-parametric method Optimal Classication. Further, in this direction, we discuss the problem of the unit of analysis and how it can mislead the choice of the number of relevant dimensions. The second aim is substantive. What we intend to answer is how many and which dimensions are necessary to represent fairly well the preferences of Brazilian senators. We will show that only one dimension that manifest the conict between government and opposition is sucient.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Michael Binford, committee chair; Scott Graves, Richard Engstrom, committee members. Electronic text (62 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Aug. 7, 2008; title from file title page. Includes bibliographical references (p. 57-59).

Th. doct.--Sci. polit.--Rotterdam--Erasmus Universiteit, 1989. / Mention parallèle de titre ou de responsabilité : Ruimtelijke analyse van electorale concurrentie : vraag en aanbod van economische politiek in een representatieve democratie, Nederland 1946-1982. Contient un résumé en néerlandais. Bibliogr. p. 281-294.

Técnicas de estimação de pontos ideais baseadas na teoria espacial do voto têm sido largamente utilizadas para retratar legislaturas ao redor do mundo. No entanto, tais técnicas foram pensadas inicialmente para o estudo do caso norte-americano, que possui um sistema político bipartidário e no qual as migrações partidárias são eventos raros. Em países como o Brasil, algumas precauções devem ser tomadas. Assim, o primeiro objetivo deste trabalho é metodológico. Como os pressupostos sobre a distribui ção dos erros não são factíveis para o caso brasileiro, o uso de técnicas como o W-Nominate e o IDEAL não é recomendável. Desta maneira, defenderemos o uso do método não paramétrico Optimal Classication. Ainda neste sentido discutiremos a questão da unidade de análise e como ela pode inuenciar na escolha do número de dimensões relevantes. O segundo objetivo é substantivo. O que pretendemos responder é quantas e quais dimens ões são necessárias para representar razoavelmente bem as preferências dos senadores brasileiros. Mostraremos que uma só dimensão que expressa o conito entre governo e oposição é suciente. / Ideal point estimation methods based upon the spatial theory of voting has been broadly used to represent legislatures around the world. However, such methods were initially thought to analyze the U.S case, that has a bipartisan system and in which party switching are rare events. In countries like Brazil, some precautions must be taken. Thus, the rst aim of this study is methodological. As the assumptions of the error distribution are not feasible to the Brazilian case, the use of techniques like W-Nominate and IDEAL are not recommended. So, we argue in favor of the use of the non-parametric method Optimal Classication. Further, in this direction, we discuss the problem of the unit of analysis and how it can mislead the choice of the number of relevant dimensions. The second aim is substantive. What we intend to answer is how many and which dimensions are necessary to represent fairly well the preferences of Brazilian senators. We will show that only one dimension that manifest the conict between government and opposition is sucient.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.