The military concept of a Center of Gravity (COG) in conflicts, introduced by Carl von Clausewitz in the 1820s, is now an element of numerous military doctrines that planners draw on in designing strategies for winning wars. Over the last twenty-five years, the concept has become increasingly central to U.S. warfare doctrine. The world has changed a great deal since the introduction of COG. And in today's asymmetric environment, in which non-state actors use unconventional tactics, it is becoming extremely difficult to apply the COG concept. The primary reason for this difficulty is that non-state actors do not operate as a unitary body, which makes it difficult to target a COG that would lead to a decisive victory. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze both conflicts in which state-sanctioned militaries' applied the COG concept and conflicts in which non-state actors used asymmetric tactics. The thesis attempts to determine the applicability of COG in an asymmetric environment. If the Center of Gravity concept is determined inapplicable, then the U.S. military must either redefine it or create a new means to deal with this new type or warfare. / US Navy (USN) author.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies. / Title from title screen (viewed Nov. 3, 2003). "June 1999." Includes bibliographical references.

Throughout American history, there has been a tension between conventional and unconventional forces on the field as well as between the commanders; we even see this at the strategic level. Force misperceptions created a gap between U.S. conventional and unconventional forces that reached a peak at the conclusion of the Vietnam War. This gap has slowly been reduced with the creation and efforts of SOCOM; however, inefficiencies in the conduct of major combat campaigns still remain as a result of poor integration. The Burma Campaign and the Liberation of the Philippines 1942-1945 provide two unique case studies in which unconventional forces worked under the overall guidance and command of a conventional leader. Throughout the Burma Campaign and the struggle for the Liberation of the Philippines, conventional forces relied heavily on the ability of unconventional forces to support and contribute to the overall campaign strategy. Direct and indirect communication, coordination, and autonomy of operations between these forces resulted in strategic successes enroute to victory in World War II. The coordination and roles of these forces throughout the campaigns provide valuable insights and lessons learned that can be applied to today's forces, who find themselves working together - and needing to work together - in conflicts abroad. / US Navy (USN) author.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-120). Also available online.

This thesis argues that a shift in the doctrine, organization, equipment and training of armies is required due to a shift in the nature of war. This thesis refers to the "new way of war" as Fourth Generation War (4GW) and this analysis is restricted to the army component of the defense forces. Armies at present are geared to fight the earlier generation of attrition and maneuver wars. In 4GW, an army structured for earlier generations of warfare is militarily dysfunctional. The thesis statement is: Infantry based armies practicing unconventional warfare (UW) are essential for the 4GW battlefield. The thesis argues for the conventionalization of UW. Hypothesis One states that heavy armor/artillery based armies should give way to infantry based armies. Hypothesis Two states that the military doctrine of these infantry based armies should be based on UW. The thesis explains 4GW and examines the relationship between terrorism and 4GW. It studies the impact of 4GW on the Principles of War. It examines whether Special Forces (SF) are the panacea for 4GW and whether increasing the size of SF is the solution. Lastly, the thesis discusses the changes required in the army to fight in a 4GW environment and provides recommendations.

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1992. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-82). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kalev Sepp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 173-185). Also available online.

The goal of this work was to evaluate an electronic warfare system from a human factors engineering perspective. The evaluation began by looking at the top-level system requirements and included a functional analysis of critical components of the man-machine interface. Once a critical operator task was identified, two separate trade-off studies provided objective data for redesign recommendations. The first section of this work defines the operational requirements and maintenance concept for an electronic warfare system. This is the first step in defining the human interface requirements for the system. The second section provides a brief history of the U.S. Navy's AN/SLQ-32(V) Electronic Warfare System. Although recognized as an integral part of the U.S. Navy's defense against low-flying anti-ship missiles, several incidents indicate a need for system improvement. The next section of this work defines the AN/SLQ-32(V). The definition starts from a macro-level and, then, discusses the system to the level necessary to understand the system. The goal was to conduct and document a task analysis of the interface between the operator and the AN/SLQ-32(V). This task analysis was used as a tool to compare system redesign options. The final section of the work involved the acquisition of information from naval operators and the assessment of existing system design features from actual and simulated Display Control Consoles (DCC). The critique of these data considered operator task requirements in actual and simulated electronic warfare scenarios. This included the time required to detect, analyze, and act-upon radar intercepts in anti-ship missile defense. From this evaluation, recommendations were developed and justified for DCC system design changes. / Master of Science

This diploma thesis embraces the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emphasizing the Alliance's capability to adequately adapt and react to the rapidly growing number of security challenges in our globalized world. Using the historical turning points and the experiences gained during the various conflicts the dissertation's focus is on the future of NATO in the "era of unpeace" where it is required to "defend against known unknowns" (Jankowski and Stepniewski (ed.) 2021). The first chapter of the thesis consists of an overview of the four main stages of the Alliance's development. The first phase (1949-1990) is the Cold War period, when the member states' emphasis was to build a strong collective defence strategy but at the same time, they established a liberal democratic system and accepted common values from the institutional point of view. The new members have adopted these governance standards and institutions, proved the effective assertion of the liberal institutionalism doctrine but never gave up military realism. The second stage (1990-2001) was represented by emerging new security challenges due to the fact that the bipolar world order had came to an end and the Alliance reacted to this by spreading the "security umbrella" with crisis management policies and...