Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Les politiques françaises de redistribution locale sont relativement méconnues et ne font pas l'objet de beaucoup de travaux. Elles représentent pourtant un enjeu important. Elles regroupent une multitude de prestations sociales qui s'adaptent aux configurations familiales et territoriales. Elles sont un outil flexible, largement utilisé par les collectivités locales et peuvent avoir des effets non négligeables notamment sur les ménages en situation précaire.Le caractère décentralisé des politiques de redistribution locale fait émerger deux problématiques correspondant aux deux aspects étudiés dans cette thèse. D'une part, nous interrogeons les choix politiques qui guident l'offre de transferts sociaux locaux. Nous inscrivons notre réflexion dans le cadre des théories sur les interactions stratégiques, qui avancent que les élus locaux adoptent des comportements stratégiques basés sur la comparaison et prennent leurs décisions en fonction des collectivités voisines. Partant du constat que de nombreux travaux, dans plusieurs pays font état de la présence d'interactions stratégiques dans la fixation des taux d'imposition, nous nous concentrons sur l'aspect dépenses sociales. Nous montrons leur présence dans des choix de transferts sociaux au niveau local. Nous observons en effet des phénomènes de mimétisme. Notre analyse montre également que, entre les deux origines de ce mécanisme souvent avancées, la comparaison politique et la mobilité, la seconde joue un rôle significatif. Les collectivités locales tendent à augmenter leur niveau de générosité avec la faible mobilité des individus.En second lieu, cette thèse s'intéresse aux conséquences de la décentralisation des transferts sociaux locaux sur la demande des différents types de ménages en faveur de redistribution. Nous étudions les choix des ménages en termes de mobilité résidentielle et de localisation en fonction de l'offre de biens et services publics locaux. Nous questionnons ainsi les phénomènes de sélection adverse liés aux choix politiques locaux. Les résultats mettent l'accent sur le fait que les ménages défavorisés sont peu mobiles et connaissent plus de trajectoires résidentielles descendantes. Nous montrons également que la générosité des villes joue un rôle significatif dans la localisation des ménages. / French policies of redistribution set at the local level are little known and have not been the topic of many works. Yet they represent a major challenge. They include a multitude of benefits that fit family configurations in different territories. They are a flexible tool, widely used by local governments and which may have a significant impact on poor households.The decentralized nature of local redistribution policies naturally raises two main questions corresponding to the two aspects studied in this thesis. First, we question the political choices that guide the provision of local social transfers. We base our analysis on the literature about strategic interactions which suggests that local policy-makers adopt strategic behavior relying on the comparison of surrounding governments. Numerous studies in many countries have reported the presence of strategic interactions in the setting of local tax rates. Those focusing on the spending side are less frequent. We show that strategic interactions also exist when deciding the level of social transfers at the local level. One can observe mimicry mecanisms. Our work shows that, between the two origins of this phenomenon that are usually put forward, yardstick comparison and mobility, the second plays a significant role. Local authorities tend to increase their level of generosity when the mobility levels of individuals are low.Second, the other consequence of the decentralization of local social transfers is related to the different types of households' demand for redistribution. We study the choices of households in terms of residential mobility and location associated with the supply of local public goods and services. We question the adverse selection phenomena related to local political choices. The results emphasize the fact that poor households are less mobile and experience more downward residential trajectories. We also show that the generosity of cities plays a significant role in the location of the households.

<p>While competition among companies tends to be beneficial for the general public, this is not necessarily the case for competition among governments. Key in the fiscal competition theory is that the mobility of firms and households yields incentives for governments to aim to improve their relative position through successive undercutting of tax rates and welfare state arrangements. This mechanism has the potential to work as a disciplining device because it ensures that no jurisdiction is allowed to be grossly inefficient, because if it were grossly inefficient, mobile factors of production would move away. The main concern in the theoretical fiscal competition literature, however, has been that fiscal competition lowers government spending below their efficient levels. Another concern related to fiscal competition is that household mobility is likely to undermine attempts by governments to redistribute income. Empirical evaluation of both the existence and consequences of fiscal competition is the central topic of the thesis “An Empirical Analysis of Decentralization, Fiscal Competition and Welfare Policy”. </p><p>A particular focus of this thesis is on fiscal competition in welfare policy. With decentralized responsibility for the welfare benefit system in Norway, theory predicts that local governments will behave strategically in setting their welfare policy in order to avoid becoming ‘welfare magnets’. The key finding in Chapter 2 of this thesis is that Norwegian local governments in fact engage in such a ‘welfare game’. A local government will respond with reducing their welfare benefits when neighboring local governments reduce their welfare benefits. Encouraged by the finding in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 seeks to answer the question: Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? The analysis shows that Norwegian welfare recipients respond to changes in welfare policy by migrating. Local politicians concern about being to generous compared to their peers seem warranted. The analysis in Chapter 4 evaluates whether strategic interaction among Norwegian local governments in property tax decisions occurs. With limited mobility of the tax base and politically highly visible decisions, we interpret the strategic interaction found to be driven by yardstick competition, rather than competition for a mobile tax base. The final chapter differs from the rest in that it utilizes data from 18 OECD countries. The essay analyzes the effects of decentralization of government on the size and composition of government spending. Since jurisdictions with limited geographic scope (such as local governments) are, in general, more likely to face greater competitive pressures than larger ones (such as countries), it follows that the more fiscally decentralized countries are expected to experience stronger fiscal competition. One of the key findings is that decentralization of taxing powers is associated with less transfer spending, but unrelated to government consumption.</p> / Paper I reprinted with kind permission of Elsevier, Sciencedirect.com

While competition among companies tends to be beneficial for the general public, this is not necessarily the case for competition among governments. Key in the fiscal competition theory is that the mobility of firms and households yields incentives for governments to aim to improve their relative position through successive undercutting of tax rates and welfare state arrangements. This mechanism has the potential to work as a disciplining device because it ensures that no jurisdiction is allowed to be grossly inefficient, because if it were grossly inefficient, mobile factors of production would move away. The main concern in the theoretical fiscal competition literature, however, has been that fiscal competition lowers government spending below their efficient levels. Another concern related to fiscal competition is that household mobility is likely to undermine attempts by governments to redistribute income. Empirical evaluation of both the existence and consequences of fiscal competition is the central topic of the thesis “An Empirical Analysis of Decentralization, Fiscal Competition and Welfare Policy”. A particular focus of this thesis is on fiscal competition in welfare policy. With decentralized responsibility for the welfare benefit system in Norway, theory predicts that local governments will behave strategically in setting their welfare policy in order to avoid becoming ‘welfare magnets’. The key finding in Chapter 2 of this thesis is that Norwegian local governments in fact engage in such a ‘welfare game’. A local government will respond with reducing their welfare benefits when neighboring local governments reduce their welfare benefits. Encouraged by the finding in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 seeks to answer the question: Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? The analysis shows that Norwegian welfare recipients respond to changes in welfare policy by migrating. Local politicians concern about being to generous compared to their peers seem warranted. The analysis in Chapter 4 evaluates whether strategic interaction among Norwegian local governments in property tax decisions occurs. With limited mobility of the tax base and politically highly visible decisions, we interpret the strategic interaction found to be driven by yardstick competition, rather than competition for a mobile tax base. The final chapter differs from the rest in that it utilizes data from 18 OECD countries. The essay analyzes the effects of decentralization of government on the size and composition of government spending. Since jurisdictions with limited geographic scope (such as local governments) are, in general, more likely to face greater competitive pressures than larger ones (such as countries), it follows that the more fiscally decentralized countries are expected to experience stronger fiscal competition. One of the key findings is that decentralization of taxing powers is associated with less transfer spending, but unrelated to government consumption. / Paper I reprinted with kind permission of Elsevier, Sciencedirect.com

Submitted by Maurício Muniz (mauriciopmuniz@gmail.com) on 2018-08-13T21:23:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2018-08-14T15:42:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-08-14T17:19:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T17:19:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-04 / A definição das instâncias governamentais adequadas para a gestão de diferentes recursos e políticas públicas é tema de extensa e histórica discussão. Partindo do princípio de que a população de um país disfruta e exerce livre movimento no seu território, podendo migrar e se estabelecer em novas localidades, argumenta-se que, de acordo com as especificidades de cada política ou o nível central ou os níveis locais dos governos seriam melhores gestores/alocadores e garantiriam a maximização da utilidade dos impostos aos seus “consumidores”, ou seja, os habitantes de uma nação. O presente trabalho busca analisar esse fenômeno utilizando a política habitacional brasileira como indicador. Em 2009, através do Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida, denotouse a retomada parcial à competência federal desse tipo de política desde o fim do BNH (Banco Nacional de Habitação) em 1986 e, a partir dela, torna-se válido analisar se o aumento da centralização federal trouxe ganhos de eficiência na alocação dos recursos. A literatura e artigos sobre o tema apresentam teoria e evidências de que a gestão local de políticas habitacionais de cunho social podem causar spillover populacional entre municípios vizinhos advindo do welfare migration e, ao tomar isso como verdade, instaurar um jogo estratégico dos gestores municipais para reduzir a provisão de habitação popular (Mattos et al. 2014), o chamado race to the bottom. Este estudo investiga se após 2009, com o aumento da centralização na tomada de decisão da política, ainda é possível verificar essa interação, e procura encontrar indícios que a política habitacional seria uma potencial causadora de movimentação populacional, através de uma análise de spillover laboral entre os municípios. Utilizando um painel com dados anualizados de 2009 a 2014, aplicado a modelos de autocorrelação espacial, constatou-se que na média nacional ainda existem evidências de um jogo estratégico intermunicipal na alocação de recursos da política habitacional. No entanto, ao analisarmos a evolução quantitativa dos indicadores do Programa, sugere-se que a centralização da política inverteu o panorama de Race to the Bottom para um de Yardstick Competition, ou seja, um ganho significativo de eficiência quando comparado com a política local anterior. Os resultados também sugerem que há indícios de uma correlação estatisticamente significativa entre investimentos de política habitacional com movimentações laborais entre os municípios o que pode estar relacionado à teoria de Welfare Migration. / The choice of appropriate governmental instances for managing different resources and public policies is the subject of extensive and historical discussion. Assuming that a country’s population enjoys and exercises free movement within its territory, being able to migrate and settle in new localities, it is argued that, according to the specificities of each policy, the central or local levels of governments would be better managers / allocators and would ensure the maximization of utility of taxpayers. The present essay seeks to analyze this phenomenon using the Brazilian housing policy as an indicator. In 2009, through the establishment of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program, the policy got partially back to federal government control since the end of BNH (National Housing Bank) in 1986 what raised the valid question of assessing if the increase of federal centralization brought efficiency gains on the allocation of resources. The literature and articles on the subject present theory and evidence that local management of social housing policies can cause population spillover among neighboring municipalities arising from Welfare Migration. This could establish a strategic game of municipal managers to reduce the provision of social housing when they assume the migration actually takes place (Mattos et al., 2014), the so-called Race to the Bottom. This study investigates if after 2009, with the increase of centralization in the policy decision making, it is still possible to verify this game, and seeks to find evidence that housing policy would be a potential cause of population movements through a labor spillover analysis. Using a panel with annualized data from 2009 to 2014 applied to spatial autocorrelation models, it was observed that in the national average there is still evidence of a strategic intermunicipal game in the allocation of housing policy resources. However, when analyzing the quantitative evolution of the Program indicators it is suggested that the policy centralization reversed the panorama from Race to the Bottom to one of Yardstick Competition, what is a significant gain of efficiency when compared with the previous local politics. The results also suggest that there is indeed evidence of a statistically significant correlation between housing policy investments with labor movements which, in turn, could be related to the Welfare Migration theory.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2015-12-15T12:50:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 erikacristinabarbosadealmeidaribeiro.pdf: 999031 bytes, checksum: bad7bf06e1c548d476fd710f3f22a105 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2015-12-15T13:05:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 erikacristinabarbosadealmeidaribeiro.pdf: 999031 bytes, checksum: bad7bf06e1c548d476fd710f3f22a105 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-15T13:05:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 erikacristinabarbosadealmeidaribeiro.pdf: 999031 bytes, checksum: bad7bf06e1c548d476fd710f3f22a105 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-25 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Em um país como o Brasil, marcado pelas desigualdades de renda pessoal e regional, o governo pode e deve utilizar políticas fiscais para tentar reduzir essas desigualdades. Caracterizado também por uma alta carga tributária e, por vezes, regressiva, a busca pela redução das desigualdades por meio de impostos no Brasil parece não surtir tanto efeito. Uma das formas para resolver esse problema seria focar nos gastos públicos de forma a tentar melhorar o bem-estar dos indivíduos brasileiros. Contudo, para tornar a política de gastos públicos eficiente é necessário conhecer as despesas municipais e entender as suas dinâmicas ao longo do tempo e do território brasileiro. Assim, essa tese busca verificar a existência de fenômenos que podem afetar o desempenho dos gastos públicos, sendo eles: efeito flypaper, race to the bottom (corrida para o fundo) e welfare migration (migração de bem-estar). O primeiro fenômeno ocorreria quando a sensibilidade dos gastos públicos fosse maior em relação a aumentos nas transferências intergovernamentais do que em relação a aumentos na renda local, se contrapondo ao Teorema do Eleitor Mediano. Já os outros dois fenômenos, a saber, race to the bottom e welfare migration, estariam ainda mais relacionados. Economistas argumentam que a migração de bem-estar (welfare migration) e a competição tributária poderiam gerar uma situação em que esses gastos municipais (direcionados a suprir a demanda de bens públicos) tenderiam a valores muito baixos, ou seja, a uma corrida para o fundo (ou, em inglês, race to the bottom). Na presença desses fenômenos, aconteceria uma interação espacial entre os gastos dos municípios com os gastos dos seus vizinhos. As análises da existência do efeito flypaper, da corrida para o fundo e da migração de bem-estar são feitas em dois ensaios para os municípios brasileiros. O primeiro contempla os anos 2000 e 2010 e analisa o efeito flypaper e suas variações, considerando a dependência financeira, a heterogeneidade espacial e desmembrando os gastos públicos entre despesas correntes e despesas de capital. Já o segundo ensaio busca indícios dos outros dois fenômenos nos mesmos anos, 2000 e 2010. Ambos usam dados em painel com correção espacial. Os principais resultados indicam a existência de efeito flypaper e de migração de bem-estar. Todavia, não são encontradas evidências de corrida para o fundo. / In a country like Brazil, marked by inequalities of personal and regional income, the government can use fiscal policy to try to reduce these inequalities. Also characterized by a high tax burden and sometimes regressive, the quest for reducing inequalities through taxes in Brazil seems not to take much effect. One way to solve this problem would be to use public expenditure in order to try to improve the welfare of Brazilian individuals. However, to make the expenditure policy effective is necessary to know the municipal expenditures and understand their dynamics over time and over Brazilian territory. Thus, this thesis seeks to verify the existence of phenomena that can affect the behavior and efficiency of public spending, namely: flypaper effect, race to the bottom and welfare migration. The first phenomenon occurs when public spending is more sensitivity to increases in intergovernmental transfers than to increases in local income, in contrast to Theorem of Median Voter. The other two phenomena, namely, race to the bottom and welfare migration, are still more related. Economists argue that the welfare migration and tax competition could lead to a situation in which these municipal expenditures (targeted to meet the demand for public goods) tend to very low values. In the presence of these phenomena, a spatial interaction between spending of municipalities with the spending of their neighbors takes place. Analysis of the existence of the flypaper effect, the race to the bottom and the welfare migration is done in two essays for the municipalities using spatial panel data. The first essay covers the years 2000 and 2010 and analyzes the flypaper effect considering the financial dependence, spatial heterogeneity and separating public expenditure between current and capital expenditures. The second one seeks for evidence of race to the bottom and welfare migration in the same years, 2000 and 2010. The main results indicate the existence of flypaper effect and welfare migration. However, there is no indication of race to the bottom.