Rights today are a jumble of conflicting and incompatible claims. Without correction, the concept of rights will be eroded and eventually abandoned. The loss would be tragic, because rights are essential to our long-term planning and success. Incompatible claims have arisen from incommensurable conceptual foundations. Historically and essentially, rights are egoistic. Attempts to justify rights according to other criteria - divine command, human dignity, altruism, utilitarianism - fail on their own terms. Egoism or self-interest is fully compatible with social responsibility and with regard for the interests of others. The nature of rights is examined and ethical diversity is defended. The evolution of rights is traced from Roman antiquity through medieval developments through modern refinements, with particular attention paid to the rights theories of Gerson, Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. A will theory of rights is proposed based on contract rather than on natural law and teleology. This will theory is explained using state of nature theory, with reference to Olson's logic of collective action. It is contrasted with the egoistic theories of Rand and Smith, with the utilitarian will theories of Hart and Wellman, and with the interest theories of MacCormick and Kramer. / Philosophy

The United Nation’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft is correlated with the promotion of universal human rights. Universal human rights are held to apply consistently to everyone everywhere without conceivable exception. There is some debate as to whether universal human rights possibly exist. This debate centers around two difficulties: 1) the task of identifying a single trait or capability that all human beings necessarily share, and 2) the task of relating human rights to this trait or capability. Conventional epistemic justifications defending the existence of universal human rights attempt to address both difficulties. However, they have become the focus of numerous criticisms. By conducting systematizing and critically reviewing text analyses, I will conclude that conventional epistemic justifications are unable to refute standard criticisms satisfactorily. In their place, I will introduce an epistemic justification from the philosophy of mind. I will attempt to demonstrate that this justification is capable of 1) identifying a single trait that all human beings necessarily share, 2) relating human rights to this trait, and 3) satisfactorily refuting the standard criticisms raised against conventional epistemic theories. I have produced this paper in the hope of further legitimizing the UN’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft by providing a more philosophically optimal justification of claims affirming the existence of universal human rights.