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Lim Wai-Man Jenifer. / Thesis submitted in: December 2002. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-105). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- The Problem of Personal Identity --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Personal Identity: A Review --- p.3 / Chapter 3. --- Different Versions of the Theory of Personal Identity --- p.6 / Chapter 3.1 --- Different Versions of the Physical Theory --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2 --- Different Versions of the Memory theory --- p.8 / Chapter 4. --- Cases of Exchanging Bodies --- p.14 / Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.17 / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- THE REDUPLICATION ARGUMENT --- p.19 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.19 / Chapter 2. --- Shoemaker's Brownson Case --- p.21 / Chapter 3. --- The Reduplication Argument --- p.22 / Chapter 4. --- "Memory Claims, Bodily Presence and Reincarnation" --- p.27 / Chapter 5. --- Objections to the Reduplication Argument --- p.31 / Chapter 5.1 --- The Two Cases are Different --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2 --- A Counter-Example by Robert Coburn --- p.33 / Chapter 5.3 --- A Too High Standard Set by the Reduplication Argument --- p.36 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.38 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- THE NONDUPLICATION ARGUMENT --- p.40 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.40 / Chapter 2. --- Story 1: The Memory Theorist's Understanding of 'Exchanging Bodies' --- p.41 / Chapter 3. --- Story 2: Williams' Analysis of the Experiment --- p.44 / Chapter 4. --- Conventionalist Decision and the Best Candidate Theory --- p.49 / Chapter 5. --- Conceptual Undecidability --- p.51 / Chapter 6. --- The Relationships between Criteria and Perspectives --- p.52 / Chapter 7. --- Conclusion: 'Exchanging Bodies' as an Artificial Neatness --- p.55 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- PARFIT'S THEORY --- p.56 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.56 / Chapter 2. --- The Nature of Personal Identity --- p.57 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Basic Teletransportation Case --- p.60 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Branch-Line Teletransportation Case --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3 --- Physical Spectrum and Combined Spectrum --- p.65 / Chapter 2.4 --- Personal Identity: A Conceptual or Linguistic Issue --- p.68 / Chapter 3. --- The (Un)-Importance of Personal Identity --- p.71 / Chapter 3.1 --- Cases of Brain Operation --- p.71 / Chapter 3.2 --- Cases of Duplication --- p.73 / Chapter 3.3 --- Survival and its Moral Significance --- p.76 / Chapter 4. --- Conclusion --- p.78 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF ONE'S IDENTITY --- p.79 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.79 / Chapter 2. --- The Dependence on External Facts Versus the Principle of Intrinsicness --- p.81 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Non-Branching Memory Theory --- p.81 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Best Candidate Theory --- p.86 / Chapter 3. --- The Importance (or Unimportance) of Personal Identity --- p.92 / Chapter 3.1 --- Unimportance: ´بPersonal Identity' as a Linguistic Issue? --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2 --- Importance: Subjective Linkage of the First Person --- p.94 / Chapter 4. --- Conclusion --- p.98 / References --- p.102

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

What should I do? As long as I am aware of the relevant facts of the situation and deliberating soundly, Bernard Williams argues that I should do what I want to do. It makes no sense to say that there are reasons that are fixed objects of concern, or values, that exist for an agent regardless of what she is in fact motivated to do. Reasons, for Williams, are hypothetical. I argue that he takes this view of practical reason because of a prior answer to the question “How should I live?”. A universal account of the good life would mean an account of values, or interests, that all human beings should have. Williams thinks it is not possible to give a universal account of the good life for human beings; any such account must be constructed out of the particular reasons of a community. But, he takes a constructivist view of the good life because he thinks that to be universal an account of the good life would have to be objective. Since objectivity cannot be achieved, he argues, neither can universality. Williams is only half right. That objectivity is not possible is inconsequential. A foundation for ethics has to be internal, but this does not preclude it being universal. I develop such a foundation based on the Aristotelian conception of human nature. A life cannot be wholly good if it is not self-respecting. Moreover, self-respect fits the framework for the specification of the good life that this foundation provides: I argue that self-respect can be shown to have a structure which provides an account of real interests - reasons that are objects of fixed concern. As such, reasons recognise rather than construct the good, making categorical reasons possible. A person can have a reason to change or act, even if reason itself cannot effect that change or action. Thus, I can be wrong about what I should do not only by being wrong about what would count as a satisfaction of my interests, but also by being wrong about what my interests are.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 1998. / Bibliogr.: f. [143]-145. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Ce mémoire s'interroge sur la façon appropriée d'articuler les perspectives objective et subjective en éthique. Il évalue et compare les réponses respectives de Bernard Williams et de Thomas Nagel. Williams refuse de considérer la perspective subjective comme la seule acceptable en morale à cause du danger que cela représente pour l'identité personnelle et le savoir éthique forgé dans une communauté. Il propose plutôt que la morale soit basée sur des règles substantielles reflétant l'anthropologie propre à un groupe d'appartenance. Nagel met l'emphase sur une tension irréductible entre les perspectives, autant au niveau des choix individuels que politiques. Aussi, même s'il favorise la prédominance des exigences morales objectives, il ne néglige pas les préoccupations subjectives et propose des moyens de diminuer la tension perspectuelle. J'esquisse finalement un moyen de dépasser Williams et Nagel dans la réconciliation des perspectives et l'accroissement de la motivation morale, en ayant recours au dialogue intersubjectif.