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Following recent developments in philosophy of education, this thesis attempts to relate work done in analytic philosophy of education to work done in normative philosophy of education. The first part of the thesis focuses on the analysis of the concept Curriculum. The aim of this analysis is to attempt to clarify Curriculum and show that it is an essentially normative concept. An examination of the nature of this concept raises serious moral issues, e.g. that of the justification of the content of the Curriculum. This issue is dealt with in the second part of the thesis where I investigate two major philosophical attempts to justify the content of the Curriculum (that of R. S. Peters--an approach couched essentially in terms of the intrinsic value of certain activities--and that of P. S. Wilson--an approach couched essentially in terms of the notion of 'what interests someone') and show that the arguments adduced by Peters and Wilson do not satisfactorily resolve the issue, either in their own terms or in terms of the extent to which they speak to practical considerations. Mary Warnock attempts to merge the double rift, between Peters and Wilson, and between theoretical and practical considerations, by arguing that imagination and work are the criteria (equally important) by which decisions as to the content of the Curriculum should be made. This moderate position, although more adequate, is not devoid of problems, especially with regard to the relationship between imagination and work. It is my belief that a fundamental change in the understanding of theory and practice in the field of education must occur before serious advances can be made with regard to the justificatory issue.