Inaug.-Diss.--Bonn. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 6-21.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Louisiana State University, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 647-663).

The systematic monitoring of citizens by the state in Peru was revealed in 2000, after the collapse of the second administration of ex-president Alberto Fujimori (1995-2000). Fujimori resigned in his last year in office, after a network of government espionage and corruption was revealed. This included video recordings of secret meetings and alleged communications surveillance conducted and managed by presidential advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, working with the National Intelligence Service (SIN). This systematic surveillance by the state resulted in the dissemination of private information, recordings and videos of public officials, journalists and many other influential people. These events sparked the beginning of the debate around the purpose of surveillance in Peru, and the violation of the right to private communications by state agencies and private entities – and what legislation could be developed to regulate this. This discussion is ongoing, with more cases of communications interception being revealed.

Communications-related investigatory powers are ostensibly regulated within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, under the descriptive headings: 'interception of communications'; 'acquisition and disclosure of communications data' and 'investigation of data protected by encryption'. The scope, legality and extent of these hitherto infrequently examined powers experienced increased scrutiny following the controversial 2013 disclosures of fugitive United States National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, scrutiny generally founded on subjective conceptions of 'privacy', 'intrusiveness' or 'security'. This research however, adopts 'communications' as its conceptual common denominator. It comprehensively explores the separate politico-legal evolution of RIPA's communications-related investigatory powers, whilst identifying and critically analysing alternative statutory provisions that permit circumvention of RIPA's purported human rights-centric integrity. The detailed chronology provides conclusive evidence that current UK Secretaries of State and their executive agencies possess virtually unlimited communications-related information acquisition powers bequeathed by their predecessors. Perhaps more importantly, its simultaneous exposure of an executive culture of secrecy and deference to the UK's intelligence community assists in explaining why any fettering of the current powers will be so difficult to achieve. Drawing from Intelligence Studies, Information Science and Computer Science, this research logically deconstructs RIPA's communications-related powers, finding them more accurately describable as narrowly defined techniques facilitating the acquisition of communications-related data. Consequently, RIPA fails to envisage or regulate all types of acquisition, such as that obtained extra-jurisdictionally or via Computer Network Exploitation, thus partially legitimizing the status quo. The research also examines RIPA's seemingly all-encompassing definition of 'communication', finding it under-utilised, in that communications from the mind into electronic storage ('expression-related data') are not included. Consequently, the boundaries between 'communication', 'expression' and 'property,' and between RIPA's powers and those enabling Computer Network Exploitation are currently unnecessarily complicated. It concludes by recommending the enactment of a single statute regulating all investigative expression-related data acquisition.

This paper examines the history of electronic surveillance for national security purposes within the United States and relates the statutory and constitutional law to the current, post September 11th practices. An extensive examination of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the recently leaked, classified Terrorist Surveillance Program shows that the FISA Court, within its narrow jurisdiction, adequately accounts for constitutional standards, yet the TSP—including recent reforms—is in clear violation of constitutional and statutory law.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Craig R. Scott. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-95).

A Constituição brasileira de 1988 estabeleceu o direito à inviolabilidade da intimidade, da vida privada e do sigilo das comunicações, apresentando-se os dois primeiros como princípios e o último como regra. A regra da inviolabilidade do sigilo das comunicações se fez acompanhar de cláusula de exceção pela qual o constituinte admitiu hipóteses de restrição a esse direito, notadamente para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer. Uma das formas de restrição vem a ser a interceptação das comunicações telemáticas, que o trabalho se propõe a analisar, de modo a verificar os limites da atuação estatal no uso desse método de investigação. Em tal análise, de modo a definir o âmbito de proteção dos direitos acima citados, o autor considera, além dos dispositivos da Constituição e legislação brasileiras, convenções internacionais de direitos humanos e a interpretação que lhes é dada por cortes regionais de direitos humanos e adota, como critérios e métodos, o princípio da proporcionalidade, os padrões doutrinariamente concebidos para a construção de um processo penal que se aproxime de uma meta de eficiência e garantismo e as experiências de outros países pesquisados. / The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established the rights to inviolability of intimacy, privacy and confidentiality of communications, presenting the first two as principles and the last one as a rule. The rule of the inviolability of the secrecy of communications was followed by an exception clause which specifies the hypotheses in which such right may be restricted, notably for purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedure, in the cases and in the form provided by statutory law. One of the possibilities of such restriction is the interception of electronic communications, which this paper aims to analyze in order to verify the limits for state action in the use of such criminal investigation method. In such analysis, in order to define the scope of protection of the abovementioned right, the author considers, in addition to the provisions set forth in the Brazilian Constitution and law, international human rights conventions and their interpretation given and adopted by regional human rights courts, and, as criteria and methods, the principle of proportionality, the doctrinally conceived standards for the construction of a criminal procedure system closer to an objective of efficiency and fundamental individual rights protection, as well as the experiences of other researched countries.

A Constituição brasileira de 1988 estabeleceu o direito à inviolabilidade da intimidade, da vida privada e do sigilo das comunicações, apresentando-se os dois primeiros como princípios e o último como regra. A regra da inviolabilidade do sigilo das comunicações se fez acompanhar de cláusula de exceção pela qual o constituinte admitiu hipóteses de restrição a esse direito, notadamente para fins de investigação criminal ou instrução processual penal, nas hipóteses e na forma que a lei estabelecer. Uma das formas de restrição vem a ser a interceptação das comunicações telemáticas, que o trabalho se propõe a analisar, de modo a verificar os limites da atuação estatal no uso desse método de investigação. Em tal análise, de modo a definir o âmbito de proteção dos direitos acima citados, o autor considera, além dos dispositivos da Constituição e legislação brasileiras, convenções internacionais de direitos humanos e a interpretação que lhes é dada por cortes regionais de direitos humanos e adota, como critérios e métodos, o princípio da proporcionalidade, os padrões doutrinariamente concebidos para a construção de um processo penal que se aproxime de uma meta de eficiência e garantismo e as experiências de outros países pesquisados. / The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 established the rights to inviolability of intimacy, privacy and confidentiality of communications, presenting the first two as principles and the last one as a rule. The rule of the inviolability of the secrecy of communications was followed by an exception clause which specifies the hypotheses in which such right may be restricted, notably for purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedure, in the cases and in the form provided by statutory law. One of the possibilities of such restriction is the interception of electronic communications, which this paper aims to analyze in order to verify the limits for state action in the use of such criminal investigation method. In such analysis, in order to define the scope of protection of the abovementioned right, the author considers, in addition to the provisions set forth in the Brazilian Constitution and law, international human rights conventions and their interpretation given and adopted by regional human rights courts, and, as criteria and methods, the principle of proportionality, the doctrinally conceived standards for the construction of a criminal procedure system closer to an objective of efficiency and fundamental individual rights protection, as well as the experiences of other researched countries.