This thesis makes a unique contribution in exploring the relationship between international legal commitments and women's poverty. Three normative arguments underpin this thesis. First, that poverty is a gender-based phenomenon. Second, that gender-based poverty is a obstacle to human rights. Third, if the promise of human rights is to be realised for all people it is necessary to move gender-based poverty into the realm of international human rights law. The ideal place to theorise on the relationship between human rights and gender-based poverty is CEDAW. Notwithstanding that CEDAW addresses civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and negative cultural attitudes on women, there is no substantive provision in CEDAW requiring State to ameliorate gender-based poverty. The first part of my thesis argues that this gap can be overcome by an evolutionary interpretation of CEDAW. I make the argument, that equality and non-discrimination, two norms that permeate all of CEDAW, can be interpreted to incorporate the harms of gender-based poverty comprehensively into the treaty framework. I use public international law interpretative framework and the Committee's own work to demonstrate that the commitment to eliminating discrimination against women and achieving gender equality in CEDAW necessarily requires State to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of women in poverty. The second part of thesis shifts to examine how this interpretation can be integrated into the work of the Committee. To ensure a coherent and comprehensive approach to gender-based poverty that is consistent with my proposed interpretation of CEDAW in I propose: (i) modifications to the State reporting guidelines and (ii) a comprehensive General Recommendation on women and poverty. This thesis lays the necessary theoretical and practical groundwork so that the Committee and other relevant national and international actors can hold States accountable for women in poverty's human rights.

Thesis (L.L.M.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Law, 2014. / The non-consensual destruction of a nasciturus is a disturbing societal phenomenon that negatively permeates the lived realities of pregnant women with positive maternal intention. These women choose to experience a full term gestation and they choose to give birth to a live and healthy infant. At some point during their gestation they are non-consensually deprived of their choices through active third party violence by commission or passive third party negligence by omission. These women have no legal recourse for their loss, because in South African law, the non-consensual destruction of a nasciturus is not a crime. The nasciturus is not recognised as a victim separate from the pregnant woman despite the manner in which the pregnant woman freely chooses to interpret her pregnancy. The consensual destruction of a nasciturus enjoys legal protection in South African law by virtue of the provisions contained in the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. The choice to terminate a pregnancy is therefore legally recognised in South African law, whereas the choice to continue a pregnancy is not legally recognised. Argument is advanced in this dissertation for the legal recognition of the choice to continue a pregnancy by criminalising non-consensual nascitural destruction through the creation of a Choice on Continuation of Pregnancy Act. Non-Consensual nascitural destruction occurs as a result of violence against pregnant women as well as in situations of medical negligence. Empirical data is provided to demonstrate how non-consensual nascitural destruction can occur in medical settings where negligence is suspected. The inherent human need to safeguard and protect the nasciturus has been in existence since time immemorial. Despite this need, in South African law, legal subjectivity, and the ability to be recognised as a separate victim of crime, remain contingent upon a live birth. Evidence suggests that the requirement of live birth in law developed as an evidentiary mechanism and not as a substantive rule of law. Its relevance in circumstances of non-consensual nascitural destruction is doubtful at best. The law in South Africa has failed to take cognisance of the psychosomatic dimensions of personhood and argument is advanced in favour of a nuanced and constitutionally sensitive approach to matters of moral as well as legal personhood. Authentic female autonomy and reproductive freedom requires a re-evaluation of the paradigms that surround nascitural safeguarding and protection, and a transformative approach to constitutional interpretation. The establishment of a legislative scheme to criminalise the nonconsensual destruction of a nasciturus is proposed. Within this legislative scheme certain precautions and fortifications are suggested in order to avoid any potential erosion of the rights of pregnant women who have negative maternal intention. It is demonstrated that it is in fact possible for pregnant women with positive maternal intention and pregnant women with negative maternal intention to both enjoy legal protection without encroaching upon one another’s constitutional rights to reproductive freedom, bodily autonomy and privacy. It is contended that achieving the aforementioned is the final barrier to authentic female reproductive freedom in South Africa.

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Abstract Many historians would like to discover a time of relative freedom, security and independence for women of the past. The Germanic era, from 400-1000 AD, was a time of stability, and security due to limitations the law placed upon the mundwald and the legal ability of women to possess property. The system of compensations that the Germans initiated in an effort to stop the blood feuds between Germanic families, served as a deterrent to men that might physically or sexually abuse women. The majority of the sources used in this work were the Germanic Codes generally dated from 498-1024 AD. Ancient Roman and Germanic sources provide background information about the individual tribes. Secondary sources provide a contrast to the ideas of this thesis, and information.

Texas law regarding the legal status of women and their property rights developed from the mingling of Spanish and English laws. Spanish laws regarding the protection of women's rights developed during the centuries-long Reconquest, when the Spanish Christians slowly took back the Iberian Peninsula from the Moorish conquerors. Women were of special importance to the expansion of Spanish civilization. Later, when Spain conquered and colonized the New World, these rights for women came, too. In the New World, women's rights under Spanish law remained the same as in Spain. Again, the Spanish were spreading their civilization across frontiers and women needed protection. When the Spanish moved into Texas, they brought their laws with them yet again. Archival evidence demonstrates that Spanish laws in early Texas remained essentially unchanged with regard to the status of women. Events in the history of England caused its legal system to develop in a different manner from Spain's. In England, the protection of property was the law's most important goal. With the growth of English common law, husbands gained the right to control their wives's lives in that married women lost all legal identity. When the English legal system crossed the Atlantic and took root in the United States, little changed, especially in the southern states, when migrants from there entered Texas. When these Anglo-American colonists came into contact with Spanish/Mexican laws, they tended to prefer the legal system they knew best. Accordingly, with the creation of the Republic of Texas, and later the state of Texas, most laws derived from English common law. From Spanish laws, legislators adopted only those that dealt with the protection of women, developed on the Spanish frontier, because they were so much more suitable to life in Texas. Later lawmakers and judges used these same laws to protect the family's property from creditors, as well as to advance the legal status of women in Texas.

Society's attitudes toward criminal offenders changed dramatically over the nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century the system of handling offenders in Montreal was highly institutionalized and based on sex- and age-specific treatment involving the Catholic Church, civic and legal authorities, and Protestant reform organizations. / A thematic study of the relationship of female offenders, concerned organizations, and the criminal justice system at the height of industrial capitalism shows that as the economy expanded and the city grew, there were increasing opportunities for women to break the law. Women's crimes were largely determined by their socio-economic status in Canadian society, often crimes of poverty and survival. The growing potential to commit crime was met with a more organized and institutionalized response and the definition of what was considered wayward female behaviour broadened. The growth of the state over the latter part of the nineteenth century in the form of new and expanded juridical and penal structures resulted in an increase in disciplining the population. For women this meant the use of laws and institutions to punish inappropriate social and sexual behaviour. / This thesis explores the gender-specific treatment of female offenders in the new institutions created ostensibly to rescue them: Fullum Street Prison for Women, the Ecole de Reforme, the Girls' Cottage Industrial School, the Juvenile Delinquents' Court, and the female police force. It looks at the construction of "criminal" and "bad" and the flexible usage of certain laws to curb unruly behaviour.

This thesis questions why young female and aboriginal plaintiffs consistently receive lower damage awards for loss of future earning capacity than young white male plaintiffs. I argue that due to the social construction of law, and specifically tort law, the dividing line between public and private law should be challenged. The effect of tort is partially "public" in nature due to the broad impact tort has on valuing the potential of individual plaintiffs. When damages for female and aboriginal plaintiffs are assessed on a reduced scale due to gender and race, a message is sent that the potential of these plaintiffs, and the potential of the groups to which they belong, is somehow less. Due to the "public" impacts of damages quantification, principles of equality derived from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be considered in the quantification process. I argue further, that the current practice of damages quantification has been the result of the court's over-reliance on "formalist" notions of tort law which has insulated the area from the social context of law. In addition, I suggest that the acceptance by courts of economic evidence, which is often reflective of discriminatory norms in the labour market and our society generally, has had the effect of de-valuing certain members of Canadian society; in particular women and aboriginal plaintiffs. I demonstrate this analysis through an examination of cases dealing with young, catastrophically injured, female and aboriginal plaintiffs. Finally, I suggest that, though an imperfect solution, currently the only equitable method of quantifying damages for loss of future earning capacity is to adopt white male earning tables for all young plaintiffs with no demonstrated earning history.

Recent feminist criticism has resulted in remarkable changes to the interpretation of the refugee definition. Case law, academic commentaries and gender guidelines now recognize that women may constitute a particular social group under the definition of refugee. However, only those who belong to certain subgroups of women are usually granted asylum because being a woman only is considered too broad to comprise a particular social group. Such restrictive interpretation is theoretically and practically problematic, and it is the primary cause for the inconsistency in the interpretation of the definition of a particular social group and refugee determination in gender-based claims. Through an analysis of recent gender-based cases before the Canadian courts and the Immigration and Refugee Board, this paper argues that this inconsistency will be avoided when categorization of women does not require female claimants to prove characteristics other than their gender. Female refugees who are persecuted for being women do not need to provide additional reasons for their suffering, and this broad categorization of women should be consistently applied in Canada.