L’objectif de cette thèse est d’étudier comment les pays membres de l’OMC peuvent gérer leurs différends commerciaux. Dans le premier chapitre, nous analysons empiriquement les déterminants de la participation des pays membres de l’OMC à son organe de règlement des différends (ORD). Nous démontrons que la probabilité qu’un pays porte plainte devant l’ORD dépend de sa structure commerciale, mais également de ses capacités légales et de représailles commerciales. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous déterminons l’impact du commerce illégal sur le bien-être économique. Pour cela, nous construisons un modèle en équilibre partiel dans lequel nous ajoutons du commerce illégal. De plus, nous appliquons ce modèle au trafic d’avocats au Costa Rica. Nos résultats indiquent que le commerce illégal augmente le bien-être économique par rapport à une situation « sans commerce » illégal. En revanche, par rapport à une situation de « libre-échange », le commerce illégal ne compense pas toujours pour les effets néfastes provenant d’une mesure commerciale restrictive. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous utilisons un modèle en équilibre général afin de déterminer si les États-Unis peuvent bénéficier de la menace et/ou de la mise en place d’une politique commerciale basée sur la réciprocité stricte. Nous démontrons que bien que la menace de représailles puisse générer un gain global, sa mise en place réduirait le bien-être économique des États-Unis et du monde. / The objective of this dissertation is to explore how WTO members may respond to trade disputes. In chapter one, we empirically investigate whether the WTO DSS is beyond reach of developing countries. We find that while the structure of trade plays an important role in explaining the probability that a WTO member initiates a dispute at the WTO DSS, the legal capacity and the trade retaliatory capacity of a country also affects its participation in the DSS. In chapter two, we aim to determine the impact of smuggling on economic welfare. We build a partial equilibrium model of trade in which we introduce illegal trade and apply this model to the smuggling of avocado in Costa Rica. Our results show that smuggling improves welfare compared to the “no-smuggling” situation. Compared to the “free-trade” situation, smuggling does not always compensate for the negative effects arising from the restrictive trade measure. In chapter three, we use a general equilibrium model of trade to determine whether the United States may benefit from the threat and/or application of strict reciprocity against its main trading partners. We demonstrate that while the threat of retaliation through reciprocal taxes may generate a global gain, its effective application would reduce the United States and the world’s welfare.

The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) established under the World Trade Organisation, is one of the most notable achievements of the multilateral trading system. African countries need to engage more in this emerging system to defend their trade and economic interests, especially in this time of increasing integration in the world trading system. It is submitted that the weak participation of African countries in the DSU can have negative economic and trade implications on Africa, as it minimises the influence these countries could exert on the development of the DSU legal system at this stage of particular importance to the evolution of international trade law in addition to its direct economic and trade costs. All complaints about impediments in the DSU cannot be rightly claimed to be the core reasons for weak African participation in the system, as the system still stand out as a rule-based with equal treatment to Developed and Developing countries. Additionally, the low participation of African countries cannot be justified by the degree of development basis only, as other developing counties have been very successful in this regard and some African countries managed to make use of the system in a very positive way. Moreover, this dissertation states that the effect of other internal constraints that are reported to hinder African participation, such as lack of sufficient financial resources, limited technical expertise and political factors, could be minimised through joint African cooperation, and by developing national strategies to deal with DSU. Egypt is a good example in this regard; despite its limited financial and technical expertise, it managed to gain accumulated experience through its various forms of engaging in the DSU, and consequently managed to defend its trade and economic interests. The establishment of a national organisational framework to deal with the DSU assisted in the preparation of national expertise that is gaining increasing experience. Egypt’s incorporation of national legislations on Anti-Dumping, Investment Protection, Intellectual Property Rights and other WTO agreements definitely supports the Egyptian position in the DSU. African countries are called to work within the African Union and on the national levels to make the best use of the system to serve their developmental goals. National strategies should be formulated regarding WTO dispute settlement engagement. These should include sound legislations and clear rules of engagement between different departments and the private sector to enable African countries to overcome the major constraints currently limiting their participation. African countries can depend partially on the support system offered by organisations like ACWL, UNCTAD and pro bone assistance from international law firms and NGO’s to overcome the financial and lack of experience constraints. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Public Law / unrestricted

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This thesis examines the impacts and implications of post-1995 linkages between the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the World Trade Organization. Chapters 1 and 2 provide data on the structures, functions, and procedures of the Codex Commission and the WTO and analyze their institutional approaches to risk, danger, risk management and the precautionary principle. Chapter 3 evaluates three impacts of post-1995 linkages between these institutions (the politicization of the Codex Commission, deadlock in the Codex standard elaboration process, and dispute in the WTO) as well as three implications of that linkage (risk v. danger assessment and management, changed interpretations of "science," and changed interpretations of "consensus"). Finally, Chapter 4 applies these impacts and implications to food safety cases. This chapter establishes a framework for understanding issues of food safety, Codex standard elaboration, and WTO dispute settlements in terms of scientific and political consensus and debate. This thesis argues, first, that the post-1995 linkage between the Codex Commission and the WTO changed Codex member state expectations and behaviors relative to standard elaboration procedures and that these changed expectations impacted both member state governments and the WTO. It further demonstrates that the extent of the Codex Commission's ability to elaborate universal standards and the WTO's responsibility for dispute settlement can be explained in terms of scientific and political dispute and consensus. Finally, it illustrates that risk and danger are different concepts, require different food safety approaches, and generate different institutional and national reactions. This analysis addresses existing critiques of the Codex Commission, the WTO, and their post-1995 linkages, examines the potential of both institutions to simultaneously pursue consumer safety and open trade objectives, and points to avenues for future research. / Master of Arts

Complex bargaining between domestic and international actors has characterized world trade since the end of World War II. Moravcsik's commercial liberalism explains that trade policy stems from individuals within democracies, who indicate rational preferences to the government. In the structure of Putnam's two-level game, preferences are then aggregated by self-interested government officials who must reconcile constituency interests with pressures from foreign partners to form trade policy. Since 1995, the structure of world trade has been fundamentally redefined by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Dispute Settlement Understanding has erected a supranational trade judiciary, effectively institutionalizing global increasingly free trade. The independent authority of the WTO has created a three-level strategic game between the domestic, international, and supranational political economic arenas. As illustrated in the softwood lumber dispute and the Boeing-Airbus dispute, the three-level game further empowers a powerful minority to capitalize on a collective action problem in world trade via dispute settlement. Olson's logic of collective action explains the ability of small self-interested coalitions to seek rent from the government, compromising the interests of the latent constituency majority. The result is a politicization of world trade that ultimately threatens the very underpinnings of the WTO itself.

Unlike many other international instruments, accession to the WTO does not simply require the commitment of the government to sign and ratify the multilateral agreements. A country needs to make considerable legislative and administrative changes to comply with the standards of the WTO and its members to finalize the negotiation for accession. For governments with impure free market economy policy the challenges amplify. The government of Ethiopia publicly pronounces its adherence to the ideology of the developmental state. On the other hand the nucleus of WTO principles is progressive trade liberalization. Therefore, this dissertation tries to provide some reflection on the paradox created as a result of the divergence in priority between WTO principles and developmental state in the context of Ethiopian desire to join the organization. The research is an interdisciplinary work. The issues that will be discussed are not purely legal in their nature. They have legal, political and economic dimensions. And the main focus of the paper is on trade in services and foreign investment negotiation aspect of the accession. Furthermore the objective of the dissertation is to give some insight for policy makers about the challenges and opportunities that „Developmental State‟ ideology will pose in the accession process of Ethiopia to the WTO. The research is divided into five chapters. Chapter one gives introductory remarks about the concept of the developmental state and accession to the WTO. The limitations of the WTO accession process and an overview of the features of developmental state in the world and particularly in Ethiopia are also briefly discussed in the chapter. The origin and concept of developmental state in the world, in Africa and Ethiopia is discussed in some detail under chapter two. The chapter also tries to show the impact of developmental state policies in the laws of the country that are going to be deliberated in the process of accession. Chapter three is about accession to the WTO. In this chapter the requirements, benefits, challenges and procedures of accession are dealt in depth. The writer debates and tries to show the fact that the system is slowly shifting from rule based negotiation to power and precedent based negotiation. By analyzing the laws of Ethiopia that are inspired by the principles of developmental state against the legal and precedent requirements to join the WTO, I tried to correlate the findings of chapter two and three in chapter four. Specific strategies and advises on how to move the negotiation forward on certain areas are also outlined in this chapter. Finally, conclusion and my summarized recommendations are placed under chapter five. / Economics / LL.M (with specialization in International Economic Law)

Unlike many other international instruments, accession to the WTO does not simply require the commitment of the government to sign and ratify the multilateral agreements. A country needs to make considerable legislative and administrative changes to comply with the standards of the WTO and its members to finalize the negotiation for accession. For governments with impure free market economy policy the challenges amplify. The government of Ethiopia publicly pronounces its adherence to the ideology of the developmental state. On the other hand the nucleus of WTO principles is progressive trade liberalization. Therefore, this dissertation tries to provide some reflection on the paradox created as a result of the divergence in priority between WTO principles and developmental state in the context of Ethiopian desire to join the organization. The research is an interdisciplinary work. The issues that will be discussed are not purely legal in their nature. They have legal, political and economic dimensions. And the main focus of the paper is on trade in services and foreign investment negotiation aspect of the accession. Furthermore the objective of the dissertation is to give some insight for policy makers about the challenges and opportunities that „Developmental State‟ ideology will pose in the accession process of Ethiopia to the WTO. The research is divided into five chapters. Chapter one gives introductory remarks about the concept of the developmental state and accession to the WTO. The limitations of the WTO accession process and an overview of the features of developmental state in the world and particularly in Ethiopia are also briefly discussed in the chapter. The origin and concept of developmental state in the world, in Africa and Ethiopia is discussed in some detail under chapter two. The chapter also tries to show the impact of developmental state policies in the laws of the country that are going to be deliberated in the process of accession. Chapter three is about accession to the WTO. In this chapter the requirements, benefits, challenges and procedures of accession are dealt in depth. The writer debates and tries to show the fact that the system is slowly shifting from rule based negotiation to power and precedent based negotiation. By analyzing the laws of Ethiopia that are inspired by the principles of developmental state against the legal and precedent requirements to join the WTO, I tried to correlate the findings of chapter two and three in chapter four. Specific strategies and advises on how to move the negotiation forward on certain areas are also outlined in this chapter. Finally, conclusion and my summarized recommendations are placed under chapter five. / Economics / LL. M. (with specialization in International Economic Law)