It is the objective of this thesis to examine contacts between the British government and German opponents to Hitler during the "Phoney War" (September 1939-May 1940). Throughout this nine month period opponents to Nazism within Germany sought both material and moral support from the British government for an overthrow of the National Socialist regime. This work analyzes the channels through which communication between the German opposition and the British government were established and the nature of the discussions which took place. The work also examines the British reaction to the German overtures.

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After Hitler invaded France in 1940, the leadership of the German Social Democratic party, the SPD, decided to accept an official invitation from the British Labour party and come to England. In 1941 London became the recognised seat of the Executive, where there was also a rank and file membership. At first the SPD leaders were given considerable moral and financial support and they believed they would be able to aid the Allied war effort and influence British thinking on Germany. They also applied themselves to the construction of new policies to ensure the survival of the party and to enable it to direct German affairs if and when Hitler had been defeated. By 1942, however, the SPD's work was not meeting with success. The Labour party began to adopt a hostile attitude towards it and, in marked contrast to its earlier practice, the Foreign Office no longer collaborated with German political exiles. The final challenge to the SPD came in 1943 from the German Communists who wished to create a unified Socialist party after Hitler. Faced with political extinction in London, the SPD nevertheless managed to survive. Although it was seriously weakened by 1945, it was strong enough to offer the young Federal Republic loyal support. The failure to cooperate successfully with British authorities during its exile, however, created many difficulties for post-war European Social Democracy. A number of problems are explored in this thesis. They include the wisdom of both Foreign Office and Labour party policy towards the SPD and the people of Germany during the Second World War. Serious confusion was caused by first maintaining and then abandoning the distinction between Nazis and Germans. The nature of exile as a specific form of political activity is also examined especially in the light of the determination of the exiled leaders to return to Germany and achieve power there. Finally, some wider conclusions are drawn about the SPD, its survival in the War and its historical continuity.

During the second world war relations between the United States and Ireland deteriorated to the point that many Irishmen feared that an American invasion of Ireland was imminent. At the same time many people in the United States came to believe that the Irish government of Eamon de Valera was pro-Nazi, This study examines the causes for the deterioration of relations between the two countries and the actual attitudes of David Gray, the United States minister to Ireland, and other American officials toward Irish neutrality. Since there are few secondary works on the subject, the research was undertaken almost entirely among primary sources, personal and diplomatic papers, various American newspapers, and memoirs. Of particular importance were David Gray's personal papers, especially his frequent letters to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.. Copies of some letters, not available among Gray's personal papers at the University of Wyoming, were furnished by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. The study has also made extensive use of the diplomatic papers published by the Department of $tate in the various volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States. Finally, the author corresponded with more than a dozen of those still living who were personally connected with the wartime relations between the United States and Ireland.

This thesis is concerned with the diplomatic reaction of the Axis Countries, Italy, Japan, Spain and Hungary, to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. The immediate origins of the Pact were studied in order to put into context the individual responses of the various countries, known as the Axis Powers. Each of these countries was confronted with a dramatic change in the European situation and each had to adjust its relations with Germany in accordance with its own interests and expectations for the question of war or peace in Europe. / With the exception of Hungary, all were opposed to the Pact because it seemed to run contrary to their national interests and promised to upset the Balance of Power on the European, and indeed, the Asian continent. The thesis thus illustrates the special character of Hitler's diplomacy, in the last year of peace before the Second World War, which did not consider the interests of his partners when concluding his arrangements with the Soviet Union.

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While personal accounts and interpretive overviews have been written about the allied invasion and occupation of Italy during World War II, this study is the first to utilize recently published American Foreign Relations volumes dealing with the wartime conferences. Organized into five chapters, the study surveys allied conferences leading to the invasion of Italy, Italian political developments during occupation, and allied relief and rehabilitation efforts. The conclusions are that Churchill, while correct in .assessing Italy's strategic value, undermined his own policy through political meddling and a desire for revenge. In combination with Roosevelt, whose interest in Italy was political and at best marginal, Churchill needlessly delayed stabilization of Italian economic and political conditions.