This study covers a period of a quarter of a century of Hungarian history, focusing on questions that affected the country's World War Two participation. It invokes the aid of value forming principles in order to reach conclusions. Its guiding principles relate to political theory affecting international relations.

Between 1940 and 1945, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) carried out sabotage and organised resistance across occupied Europe. There have, however, only been a small number of scholarly studies of SOE’s activities, and no specific examination of its involvement in occupied Norway. This thesis, therefore, is the first multi-archival, international, and academic analysis of its policy and operations in this country and the influences that shaped them. The proposition is that it was the changing contribution of both SOE and Norway within the wider strategic context in Europe that was the predominant factor behind its plans for this theatre, and other factors, although material, were of secondary importance. These included SOE’s relationship with the Norwegian government-in-exile and the resistant movements that emerged in response to the occupation, especially Milorg, which set out to form an underground army within the country. As well as collaboration with the other clandestine organisations and regular armed forces that had a military involvement in Norway. Through an examination of these contextual influences this work argues that between 1940 and 1945, in step with its original strategic role, SOE’s policy for Norway consisted of a short-term objective, which through activities such as sabotage was to help undermine German fighting strength, and a long-term objective of forming a secret army. These aims could not, however, be achieved or implemented without the co-operation of the Norwegian military authorities and Milorg, who provided most of the manpower, and the assistance of the other military agencies that often operated alongside SOE. From the beginning, therefore, SOE deliberately set out to work with all these parties, but always on the basis that any joint activity was undertaken in accordance with British and Allied interests. This meant that SOE’s operations in Norway were ultimately the result of a blend of influences. It was, however, this country’s subordinate and peripheral position in relation to the main thrust of Allied strategy in Europe that was the crucial factor. The constructive relationship that the organisation eventually had with the Norwegian authorities and Milorg was also important because it meant that SOE both received the support it required and managed to ensure Allied control over special operations in this theatre. It was, therefore, a relationship that was beneficial and rather than undermining SOE’s plans, it underpinned them and guaranteed they remained in step with strategic and military requirements.

No description available.

This thesis investigates fascist Jewish policy in Italian-occupied southeastern France between November 1942 and August 1943. The fascist government repeatedly refused to hand over to its Nazi ally or to its French enemy foreign Jewish refugees in the Italian occupation zone. This decision, which was tantamount to a refusal to collaborate in the extermination of the Jews, was partially overturned in mid-July 1943. This thesis seeks to explain the rationale for the fascist government’s decisions concerning the fates of foreign Jewish refugees in southeastern France. Current scholarship justifies the fascist government’s decisions as a manifestation either of humanitarianism or political expediency. This thesis argues instead that the Italian refusal to partake in the extermination of the Jews was ideological. As the fascist and Nazi leaderships attributed different relevance to the ‘Jewish question’, they consequently prescribed different methods to ‘solve’ it, in the context of their common military effort to win the war. Through the in-depth reconstruction of fascist Jewish policy in southern France, this thesis argues that although the fascist rulers acknowledged the existence of a ‘Jewish problem’, they never considered its solution as vital to their effort to win the war. Unlike the Nazis who considered their war against the Jew as the pivotal issue, thus rendering the physical eradication of all Jews as a conceivable action in the context of a total war, the Italians considered Jews as a secondary threat compared to communists or enemy aliens residing in their occupation zone. In turn, by analysing fascist Jewish policy in the broader geopolitical, diplomatic and military context of the occupation of southeastern France, this thesis demonstrates how, and to what extent, other ethical and practical considerations interacted with the larger ideology in operation. The overall result was a policy in which the murder of Jews was considered politically inexpedient and morally unacceptable, but which was, nevertheless, still persecutory (the Italian authorities interned foreign Jewish refugees in southern France and took measures to prevent their arrival in the Italian occupation zone). At the same time, this thesis reveals that, although the Jewish policy was consistent with the regime’s declared goal to ‘discriminate, but not persecute’ the Jews, it was not a necessary consequence of that goal. Instead, this policy could be negotiated and adjusted should the political need arise, as proved by the decision (ultimately without consequences) to surrender German Jews in mid-July 1943.

From June 1940 until May 1945, Guernsey children either lived under German occupation or were evacuated to England for the duration of the war. This thesis presents a small case study that uses oral testimony and resilience theory to describe Guernsey children’s experiences during World War Two. Its intent is to contribute towards the larger picture of British children’s experiences during this period. This thesis also aims to understand how the majority of those who were children on Guernsey during this time judged that, despite the obvious challenges related to wartime, their experiences had a net positive effect on their lives. Findings suggest that, consistent with resilience theory, children found the support they needed both internally using optimism, empathy, comparison, and the attitude of ‘getting on with it’ and externally from family, teachers, and the local people with whom they lived during evacuation or occupation. / Graduate

No description available.

The American military experience in the European Theater of Operations during the Second World War is one of the most heavily documented topics in modern historiography. However, within this plethora of scholarship, very little has been written on the contributions of the United States Cavalry to this era. The six mechanized cavalry groups assigned to the Third Army served in a variety of roles, conducting screens, counter-reconnaissance, as well as a number of other associated security missions for their parent corps and the Army. Although unheralded, these groups made substantial and war-altering impacts for the Third Army.

Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University, 1952

During the Second World War the United States mobilized its industrial capacity to become the great "Arsenal of Democracy," as vehicles, ships, and small arms flowed out of American factories. Perhaps the most impressive accomplishment was the mobilization of the aviation industry, which grew rapidly after the war began in Europe. In 1940 the United States produced 24,600,000 pounds of airframe. By 1943 this figure had grown exponentially, with 760,926,600 airframe pounds produced. This was achieved through the cooperation of the United States government and the aviation industry. It required creative techniques in funding and manufacturing, and the construction of expansion facilities throughout the country, including Dallas, Texas. The city was selected as the site of a factory operated by North American Aviation. This plant produced some 18,784 aircraft in all, making it one of the most prolific in the country. This dissertation is a study of the North American factory in Dallas. It begins with decisions leading to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's call for 50,000 aircraft in May of 1940. From there the focus moves to the selection of Dallas as a location, the construction and opening of the factory, its operation, its relations with the local community, and the closure of the facility at the end of the war. Utilizing government documents, company records, and news reports from the era, the dissertation is constructed in a chronological narrative format. It serves a dual purpose as a case study for how industrial mobilization was achieved, as well as documenting the contributions that the citizens of Dallas made towards the war effort.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / Turkey emerged from the Lausanne Conference free but isolated. The Lausanne Treaty gave her, within her narrowed borders, a sovereignty that the later Ottoman Empire had not known. The economic and judicial capitulations were abolished. The British, French and Italian zone were forgotten. But the Allied Powers remained hostile; they begrudged the Angora regime the treaty revision which it had wrestled from them. Soviet Russia was friendly, but the much vaunted Russo-Turkish relation was largely a solidarity of outcasts. The young Republic's isolation was brought into relief by its first diplomatic crisis. In December 1925, the Council of the League of Nations awarded the Mosul Vilayet to Great Britain's protege Iraq. There was speculation whether the Turks would try to recover the province by force. France announced her solidarity with Britain. Greece appeared ready for a war of revenge; and Mussolini left his balcony to speak from the deck of a battleship. Soviet Russia promised neutrality, nothing more [TRUNCATED]