Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li Zheng zhi da xue dong ya yan jiu suo. / Photo from typescript.

No description available.

文灼非. / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 1999. / 參考文獻 (leaves 158-175) / 附中英文摘要. / Wen Zhuofei. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)-- Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1999. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 158-175) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / Chapter 第一章 --- 緒論 --- p.1 -26 / Chapter 第二章 --- 中共對香港「飛地」的政策 --- p.27-54 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「飛地」黨派報紙的政治定位與分工 --- p.55 -79 / Chapter 第四章 --- 中共對左派報紙組織與營運的控制 --- p.80-102 / Chapter 第五章 --- 中共與港英在「飛地」的政治衝突 ´ؤ´ؤ「三一事件」與「六七暴動」 --- p.103-126 / Chapter 第六章 --- 左派報人對黨忠誠的悲哀 ´ؤ´ؤ羅孚個案剖析 --- p.127-150 / Chapter 第七章 --- 結論 --- p.151-157 / 參考資料 --- p.158 -174 / 訪問人士名單 --- p.175

在数据分析的基础上，本文检验了两个理论假设--“政治资本假设与“冲突性偏差假设，以分析国家主导的市场化进程对共产党员收入优势的影响。主流观点认为，在中国，党员身份代表了一种政治资本，因而在经济转型期，共产党员收入优势的变化就相应地反映了市场化进程中政治资本收益（或党员身份政治资本含量）的变化，即关于党员身份的“政治资本假设。而“冲突性偏差假设则考虑了市场化进程中，政治资本和人力资本对个体的职业流动和收入回报的双向影响，以及这种双向影响在回归分析中造成的偏误。通过运用 Pearl（2000）有关冲突性偏差（ collider bias，选择偏差的一种）的分析结论，笔者推断，在市场化进程中，控制“单位体制类型和“干部位置会导致党员身份和个人收入之间出现虚假的负偏差，因此，即使党员身份带来的政治资本收益不变，“党员身份对“个人收入的回归系数（控制“单位体制类型和“干部位置后）也会因为选择偏差的上升而呈现出下降甚至转变为负的趋势。如若“党员身份对“个人收入的回归系数在控制“单位体制类型和“干部位置后变为零，反而证明“党员身份对“个人收入仍存在积极的直接效应--这就是关于市场转型期中国共产党员收入优势的悖论。通过运用 2008年中国综合社会调查（CGSS2008），回归分析结果充分验证了“冲突性偏差的经验预测。这也提醒研究者：在对当代共产党员的收入优势进行理论解读时，主流观点忽视了冲突性偏差所造成的影响。在文章的最后，笔者讨论了此发现对将来研究的启发。 / This study examines two hypotheses for the impact of deepening marketization on the income returns to party membership in socialist China: the political capital and collider bias hypotheses. The prevailing view holds that party membership brings political capital (positional power and connections) and changing income returns reflects the changing leverage of political capital in market transition. The collider bias hypothesis acknowledges the expanding role of unobserved ability in the determination of income in the presence of party clientelism. Drawing on Pearl’s analysis of collider bias, we argue that recent marketization would lead to a paradoxical increase of negative bias on the income returns to party membership even if the political capital benefits of party membership persist as the prior literature maintains. Consequently, after conditioning on sector and cadre position, regression coefficient of party membership on income would be suppressed and become even negative. The paradox is that, if the income effect of party membership vanishes after controlling sector and/or cadre position, there must be a true positive party effect on income. Results based on the 2008 Chinese General Social Survey consistently support the predictions of collider bias hypothesis. The prevailing interpretation of previous findings is seriously undermined by ignorance of this pervasive selection bias. Implications for future research are discussed. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 朱灵. / "2012年7月" / "2012 nian 7 yue" / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-40). / Abstract in Chinese and English. / Zhu Ling. / 摘要 --- p.I / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 目录 --- p.III / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一节 --- 研究背景 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二节 --- 研究问题 --- p.2 / Chapter 第二章 --- 文献回顾 --- p.3 / Chapter 第一节 --- 市场转型与党员收入优势的转变 --- p.3 / Chapter 第二节 --- 经济-政治体制双重转变：政治资本与人力资本的双重效应 --- p.8 / Chapter 第三节 --- 总结：市场化进程中共产党员收入优势下降的谜题 --- p.10 / Chapter 第三章 --- 冲突性偏差（COLLIDER BIAS） --- p.11 / Chapter 第一节 --- 双重效应、冲突变量（COLLIDER VARIABLE）与冲突性偏差（COLLIDER BIAS） --- p.11 / Chapter 第二节 --- 冲突性偏差的方向 --- p.13 / Chapter 第三节 --- 冲突性偏差的大小：通常在被选择的群体中更显著 --- p.13 / Chapter 第四章 --- 理论假设与实证预测 --- p.15 / Chapter 第一节 --- 理论假设 --- p.15 / Chapter 第二节 --- 实证预测 --- p.19 / Chapter 第五章 --- 研究设计：数据、变量和方法 --- p.22 / Chapter 第一节 --- 数据来源 --- p.22 / Chapter 第二节 --- 主要变量 --- p.22 / Chapter 第三节 --- 统计模型 --- p.24 / Chapter 第六章 --- 模型分析及结果 --- p.25 / Chapter 第七章 --- 结论与讨论 --- p.31 / 参考文献 --- p.34 / Chapter 一、 --- 中文部分 --- p.34 / Chapter 二、 --- 英文部分 --- p.35 / 图表部分 --- p.41 / 图1 --- p.41 / 图2 --- p.41 / 图3 --- p.42 / 图4 --- p.43 / 表一 --- p.44 / 表二 --- p.47 / 表三 --- p.48 / 表四 --- p.49 / 表五 --- p.50

How does the Chinese Party-State renew its political elite and maintain its cohesion in the post-Mao era? This is a key question to understand the evolution of China’s political system and still the explanations one can find in the literature are far from satisfactory. Overall, the literature on transformation of the Chinese political elite focuses on the broad outcomes, the fact that since the 1980s officials tend to be younger and more educated, but it falls short in unveiling the mechanisms at play. It gives a limited answer to the elite renewal issue as it leaves politics aside. By focusing on educational levels and technical skills it forgets about the importance of political commitment. I approach these questions through a unique account of the role played by the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) in terms of cadres’ recruitment and promotion since the 1980s. Using biographical data and a snowball sample of 92 interviewees I reconstructed the trajectories of CYL cadres. Beyond my focus on the central organization of the CYL in Beijing, I compared the situation of the CYL in the capital cities of two very different provinces and in four universities. Through this mixed methods approach, I could assess the evolution of the CYL as a path to power in post-Mao China. My main findings are as follows: First, due to post-Cultural Revolution politics and the need for leaders at the time to recruit loyal young cadres, a “sponsored mobility” system was developed to renew the Party-State’s elite. College students are recruited and trained through the Party’s youth organizations. They are put then on a unique promotion path, which includes specific opportunities and trainings, and which leads them to leadership position in the Party-State. This contrasts with what happened in the Soviet case in particular. Under Khrushchev (1953-1964), the Soviet elite was renewed through the cooptation of professionals with technical skills rather than by recruiting young cadres who spent their whole career in the Party-State. Second, through the various steps of the sponsored mobility process, the young recruits develop a specific social role as future officials and transform their social circles. As a result, they cultivate a political commitment to their career in the Party-State and to the survival of the regime. Third, the decentralized nature of the Party-State and its youth organizations make it difficult for the young recruits to establish cohesive groups which could organize against the Party-State itself.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong Baptist University, 2000. / Thesis submitted to the Dept. of Government and International Studies. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-127).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1971. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-151).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [321]-332).

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Far East, Southeast Asia, The Pacific))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Miller, Alice L. ; Second Reader: Chakwin, Mark. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 15, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Confucianism, Confucian ideals and values, PLA modernization, PLA professionalization, PLA Core Military Values. Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-60). Also available in print.