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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Disorderly decolonization the White paper of 1939 and the end of British rule in Palestine /

Apter, Lauren Elise, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
2

Apocalyptic theopolitics : dispensationalism, Israel/Palestine, and ecclesial enactments of eschatology

Phillips, Elizabeth Rachel January 2009 (has links)
This thesis is a critical analysis of the theology and ethics of dispensationalist Christian Zionism in America. Chapter One introduces the thesis and its method, which draws constructively from history, sociology, and anthropology while remaining substantively theological. Chapter Two describes dispensationalism's origins in nineteenth-century Britain and its dissemination and development in America. Chapter Three moves from broad, historical description to the contemporary and particular through an introduction to Faith Bible Chapel (FBC), an American Christian Zionist congregation. This description arises from an academic term spent at FBC observing congregational life and conducting extensive interviews, as well as fieldwork undertaken in FBC's "adopted settlement" in the West Bank, including interviews with Israeli settlers about partnerships with American Christians. The remaining chapters move to more explicitly doctrinal analysis. Chapters Four through Six are shaped by William Cavanaugh's concept of 'theopolitics' (Theopolitical Imagination, 2002): a disciplined, community-gathering common imagination of time and space. Through the exploration of a key historical text (The Scofield Reference Bible, 1917) and its continuing legacies in the life and thought of FBC, these chapters examine the theopolitics of dispensationalist Christian Zionism, demonstrating that it is a complex system of convictions and practices in which the disciplines of biblicism and biblical literalism form an eschatology which subordinates ecclesiology and Christology, nurturing an imagination of the roles of Christ and the church in time and space which sever social ethics from necessary Christological and ecclesiological sources. John Howard Yoder's work is used to bring this system into relief, and to establish that eschatology per se is not inimical to Christian social ethics. Chapter Seven concludes the thesis with a summary of its findings, as well as a discussion of the positive functions of apocalyptic in Christian social ethics, pointing toward the possibility of alternative ecclesial enactments of apocalyptic theopolitics.
3

A Questão da Palestina e a Fundação de Israel / The Palestinian Question and the Foundation of Israel

Aura Rejane Gomes 29 June 2001 (has links)
O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer” os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.
4

A Questão da Palestina e a Fundação de Israel / The Palestinian Question and the Foundation of Israel

Gomes, Aura Rejane 29 June 2001 (has links)
O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer" os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.
5

British intelligence and policy in the Palestine mandate, 1919-1939

Wagner, Steven Benjamin January 2014 (has links)
This research argues that during the inter-war years in Palestine, British power was dependent upon intelligence. Intelligence was fundamental to the security of the country, since it varyingly augmented understrength force, or supported overwhelming force. Intelligence also supported policymakers as issues of governance were debated. It allowed British decision makers to avoid making a decision on self-government during the 1920s and it supported Britain’s failed attempts to introduce a constitution during the 1930s. Intelligence also was crucial to Britain’s relations with the Arab nationalist and Zionist communities. Of particular importance was Britain’s partnership and subsequent war with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. This thesis sheds new light on the role of intelligence in British colonial policymaking, the development of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and how Britain failed to manage communal violence. This research offers a new and improved explanation of the origins, unfolding, and defeat of the Palestinian Arab rebellion. British intelligence and policymakers failed to grasp the sophistication of the Palestinian national movement until the mid-1930s, and even then, they focused on clan competition and the politics of ‘notables’. Intelligence and military records explain how British police and military struggled, but ultimately succeeded to suppress and defeat this rebellion. Victory was made possible by innovations within the intelligence and planning staffs, as well as Zionist cooperation. Intelligence shaped policy most clearly at the beginning and end of the period under examination. During 1918-20, the military government was administered by intelligence officers who guaranteed Britain’s future control in Palestine both domestically, and at the League of Nations. In 1939, British policy abandoned its traditional Zionist partners when the need to impose a solution on Palestine coincided with the opportunity, revealed by signals intelligence, to bolster and leverage the influence of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud over the Arab national movement.
6

Into the past : nationalism and heritage in the neoliberal age

Gledhill, James January 2017 (has links)
This thesis examines the ideological nexus of nationalism and heritage under the social conditions of neoliberalism. The investigation aims to demonstrate how neoliberal economics stimulate the irrationalism manifest in nationalist idealisation of the past. The institutionalisation of national heritage was originally a rational function of the modern state, symbolic of its political and cultural authority. With neoliberal erosion of the productive economy and public institutions, heritage and nostalgia proliferate today in all areas of social life. It is argued that this represents a social pathology linked to the neoliberal state's inability to construct a future-orientated national project. These conditions enhance the appeal of irrational nationalist and regionalist ideologies idealising the past as a source of cultural purity. Unable to achieve social cohesion, the neoliberal state promotes multiculturalism, encouraging minorities to embrace essentialist identity politics that parallel the nativism of right-wing nationalists and regionalists. This phenomenon is contextualised within the general crisis of progressive modernisation in Western societies that has accompanied neoliberalisation and globalisation. A new theory of activist heritage is advanced to describe autonomous, politicised heritage that appropriates forms and practices from the state heritage sector. Using this concept, the politics of irrational nationalism and regionalism are explored through fieldwork, including participant observation, interviews and photography. The interaction of state and activist heritage is considered at the Wewelsburg 1933-1945 Memorial Museum in Germany wherein neofascists have re-signified Nazi material culture, reactivating it within contemporary political narratives. The activist heritage of Israeli Zionism, Irish Republicanism and Ulster Loyalism is analysed through studies of museums, heritage centres, archaeological sites, exhibitions, monuments and historical re-enactments. These illustrate how activist heritage represents a political strategy within irrational ideologies that interpret the past as the ethical model for the future. This work contends that irrational nationalism fundamentally challenges the Enlightenment's assertion of reason over faith, and culture over nature, by superimposing pre-modern ideas upon the structure of modernity. An ideological product of the Enlightenment, the nation state remains the only political unit within which a rational command of time and space is possible, and thus the only viable basis for progressive modernity.

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