Every day, in thousands of companies around the world, in every industry, savvy managers inspire their workers to fight for market share. Every day, the business press makes heroes of firms that have successfully captured competitors' market share, and recounts tales of woe of those vanquished. Do gains and losses in market share provide information that investors use in making their capital allocation decisions? This study investigates the effect on the market's valuation of earnings when firms capture market share from, and lose market share to, their competitors. The Industrial Organization literature provides a link between market share change and expectations about future performance and growth opportunities. Accounting researchers long ago linked current earnings with expectations about future earnings and growth opportunities. This paper combines these two areas and investigates the role that changes in market share play in the market's valuation of earnings. I specifically examine a firm's change in market share from the prior period, and the pattern of market share changes over a three-year period. I then analyze the relevance of current earnings, conditional on these market share measures, in both earnings prediction and market valuation contexts. I find the link between current performance and future performance is significantly enhanced in the presence of market share gains. Further, I find this relation holds for up to two years into the future after introducing other measures that represent the markets' beliefs about future growth prospects. In addition, I find the market incrementally prices the earnings of firms that are increasing market share, and firms that exhibit momentum in market share growth, when the market perceives future growth opportunities to be greater relative to when growth opportunities are perceived to be fewer. / A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Accounting in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2004. / March 22, 2004. / Momentum, Market share / Includes bibliographical references. / Richard M. Morton, Professor Directing Dissertation; Thomas W. Zuehlke, Outside Committee Member; Bruce K. Billings, Committee Member; Carol C. Dee, Committee Member.

The influence of corporate governance on financial reporting is of current interest because regulators are in the process of devising and evaluating substantial reforms in the wake of recent accounting scandals. This paper investigates the relation between corporate governance and aggressive accounting and tests the existence and strength of this association. This paper defines corporate governance more comprehensively than previous studies, acknowledging that the behavior of corporate officers is subject to many influences. Corporate governance is defined here as those measures and processes outlined by Jensen (1993): (1) legal and regulatory mechanisms, (2) internal control systems, (3) capital market mechanisms, and (4) product and factor market conditions. I test the relation between these measures of corporate governance and aggressive accounting for firms identified by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) as having restated their financial statements because of aggressive accounting. Other researchers have simultaneously tested only selected corporate governance variables, and only against surrogates for earnings management (e.g. discretionary accruals or accounting principle choice). / A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Accounting in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2006. / March 31, 2006. / Corporate Governance, Aggressive Accounting, Restatement / Includes bibliographical references. / William A. Hillison, Professor Directing Dissertation; Jeffrey A. Clark, Outside Committee Member; Bruce K. Billings, Committee Member; Richard M. Morton, Committee Member.

This study intended to extract factors that could be successfully used to increase purchase intent. Moreover, this study attempted to increase existing knowledge in marketing of sportswear. This study's main focus was to test which emotions are the most commonly experienced by the respondents during active sports participation. It was hypothesized that the use of those sports-related emotions in advertisements would improve sportswear purchase intent for those who actively participate in athletic activities. This study confirmed the importance of affect in advertising. However, it failed to establish a clear marketing model that would strictly rely on affect as a major force to increased purchase intent. An adjusted affective marketing model was proposed. / A Thesis Submitted to the School of Communication in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science. / Spring Semester, 2010. / December 7, 2009. / Sports, Purchase Intent, Marketing Model, Affect, Advertising / Includes bibliographical references. / Steven McClung, Professor Directing Thesis; Joe Cronin, Committee Member; Jay Rayburn, Committee Member.

I test for the existence of an investor valued assurance component of auditor reputation that is separate from the well documented insurance value component of auditor reputation. More specifically, I test whether office level auditor size is a characteristic being used by the market to assess the assurance component of auditor reputation, while controlling for insurance value effects. I find both higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs) and lower cost of equity for clients audited by Big 4 auditors from larger offices compared with clients audited by Big 4 auditors from smaller offices. I also find evidence that investors in firms with less pre-disclosure information assign higher values to the additional assurance that auditors from larger offices provide. Such evidence supports the theory that investors value the assurance that auditors provide (in addition to the implicit auditor provided insurance), extends the current model of auditor reputation to include a component related to the size of the auditor's office, and shows that investor values for auditor reputation are increasing in information asymmetry. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Accounting in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2010. / April 20, 2010. / Auditor, Size, Office, Office Size, Reputation / Includes bibliographical references. / Bruce Billings, Professor Directing Dissertation; Thomas Zuehlke, University Representative; Allen Blay, Committee Member; Rick Morton, Committee Member.

The extant audit pricing literature has provided little support for the existence of a relationship between low balling and impaired auditor independence. Nonetheless, for over thirty years regulators have expressed concerns that a positive relationship exists between low balling and impaired auditor independence. Recent evidence suggests that low balling occurs because auditors fall prey to the winner's curse (Hobson, Mellon, and Stevens 2010). However, no link has been made between this form of low balling and auditor independence. Consistent with regulators concerns, I provide evidence of a positive relationship between this form of low balling and impaired auditor independence by shirking. The evidence suggests that when pricing is not considered, auditors select a less than economically optimal level of audit effort. Upon realization by the auditor that a low ball price offer has been accepted, their effort is further reduced. Evidence is also provided that the amount of audit effort is a function of the auditors' social orientation and their prior experiences with shirking. Auditors whose prior shirking went undetected and who experienced positive outcomes are more likely to shirk in the future; whereas, auditors whose prior shirking was detected and penalized are less likely to shirk in the future. / A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Accounting in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Fall Semester, 2010. / July 20, 2010. / Low Balling, Auditor Independence, Audit Quality / Includes bibliographical references. / Douglas E. Stevens, Professor Directing Dissertation; Timothy C. Salmon, University Representative; Gregory J. Gerard, Committee Member; Allen D. Blay, Committee Member.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has recommended company-sponsored research to address the need for greater analyst following of smaller companies. Anecdotal evidence suggests company-sponsored research is more optimistic than research from traditional brokerage firms (Kalra 2004; Lee and Metaxas 2004; Richardson 2006). Using a sample of companies that are followed by both company sponsored analysts and traditional analysts, I examine whether the conflict of interest between the company-sponsored research firm and the client company leads to more optimistic recommendations and forecasts. In the first part of my dissertation, I find that analysts at company-sponsored research firms are more likely to issue favorable recommendations than analysts at traditional brokerage firms. This optimism appears to be a result of company-sponsored analysts upgrading their recommendation more quickly and downgrading their recommendations more slowly than analysts at traditional brokerage firms. Furthermore, recommendations issued by company-sponsored analysts appear to be overly optimistic since portfolios of stock based on their recommendations underperform relative to similar recommendations issued by traditional analysts. Finally, I find that the market does not appear to differentiate between recommendations issued by company-sponsored analysts and recommendations by traditional analysts. In the second part of my dissertation, I find that forecasts issued by company-sponsored analysts are not significantly different from forecasts issued by traditional analysts. I find neither a significant difference in bias or accuracy between forecasts issued by company-sponsored analysts and forecasts issued by traditional analysts. However, company-sponsored analysts appear to revise their forecasts less often then analysts at traditional brokerage firms. Finally, I find that the market reaction to forecast revisions issued by company-sponsored analyst is not significantly different from zero, but I cannot reject the hypothesis that the market reaction to forecast revisions issued by company-sponsored analysts is the same as the market reaction to forecast revisions issued by traditional analysts. The results of my dissertation suggest that the relationship between the company-sponsored research firm and the client company influences analysts' recommendations but not forecasts. These findings are consistent with Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000) and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) who suggest that analyst affiliation does not affect near-term EPS forecasts. The different results for company-sponsored recommendations and forecasts may be due to the fact that recommendations are more difficult to objectively evaluate than forecasts, and EPS forecasts tend to be geared toward sophisticated institutional investors who are more likely to recognize the conflict of interest (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007a; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 2007). I also find that company-sponsored analysts revise their forecasts less often than analysts at traditional brokerage firms. This is consistent with Agrawal and Chen's (2005) theory that commissions from trading volume play an important role in shaping analysts' forecasting behavior. Analysts who are compensated by commission revenue appear to be more willing than company-sponsored analysts who are paid a fixed fee to issue timely revisions that reflect changing expectations about earnings. These findings suggest that company-sponsored research may not be an adequate substitute for research from analysts at traditional brokerage firms. / A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Accounting in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2009. / March 27, 2009. / Meet or Beat Earning, Analysts' Forecasts, Analysts' Recommendations, Paid-For Research, Company-Sponsored Research, Forecast Revisions / Includes bibliographical references. / Bruce K. Billings, Professor Directing Dissertation; William A. Christiansen, Outside Committee Member; G. Ryan Huston, Committee Member; Richard M. Morton, Committee Member.

This dissertation describes an experimental study of impression management in the principal-agent relation. First, I utilize agency theory and efficiency wage theory to hypothesize productivity and planning benefits to the principal. Second, I predict workers will utilize impression management and gain excess surplus from the manager. Third, using rational expectations theory, I predict managers will detect the level of honesty in the workers' reporting and forecast errors will decrease. Next, I present an experimental setting in which to test my hypotheses. The results indicate workers acted opportunistically and used impression management to achieved increased rewards. Managers did not detect the workers' dishonesty and share in the surplus. By incorporating impression management into the traditional principal-agent setting, this study expands our understanding of organizational control. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Accounting in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Fall Semester, 2009. / October 30, 2009. / Experimental Markets, Reciprocity, Gift-Exchange, Impression Management / Includes bibliographical references. / Douglas E. Stevens, Professor Directing Dissertation; Robert Mark Isaac, University Representative; Gregory J. Gerard, Committee Member; William A. Hillison, Committee Member.

This study examines the effects of risk preference and loss aversion on individual responses to differently framed incentive contracts. Individual risk and loss preferences are measured using the Holt and Laury (2002) measure of risk aversion and a new measure of loss aversion that is developed in this study. The relationship between these preferences and behavior under economically equivalent contracts of different frames is examined using two experiments. Participants are assigned to a contract that is framed as either having a bonus incentive, penalty incentive, or combination of bonus and penalty incentives. In experiment one, participants make choices between increasingly attractive incentive contracts and a flat salary, as in Luft (1994). Experiment two assigns participants to an incentive contract and asks them to make an effort choice. Results indicate heterogeneous risk and loss preferences, and these preferences explain some of the behavior observed between different contract frames. Results also indicate that contracts that combine bonus and penalty incentives are less attractive to participants than bonus or penalty-only incentives, but lead to higher effort choices. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Accounting in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2008. / April 4, 2008. / Incentives, Compensation Contracts, Bonus, Penalty, Frames, Loss Aversion / Includes bibliographical references. / Douglas E. Stevens, Professor Directing Dissertation; Timothy C. Salmon, Outside Committee Member; Martin G. Fennema, Committee Member; Gerald R. Ferris, Committee Member.

The categorization and organization of political cartoons has historically been a non-starter; both a lack of resources and a lack of interest have been cited as reasons for the exclusion of these works from the historical record. The advent of the "Computer Age" has laid both of these reasons to waste. But how to accomplish the feat? Which paths of organization for this particular media are well-chosen or ill-advised? This study seeks to shed light on wither we should go and how we should get there. / A Thesis submitted to the School of Information Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science. / Fall Semester, 2002. / April 24, 2001. / Categorization, Organization, Political, Cartoon / Includes bibliographical references. / Kathlen Burnett, Professor Directing Thesis; Myke Gluck, Committee Member; Gary Burnett, Committee Member.

The quality of financial reporting has come under increased scrutiny in recent years because of high-profile financial reporting failures, such as Enron and WorldCom, and the significant increase in the number of financial restatements. While most of the attention following these financial reporting failures has focused on the capital market consequences and the negative impact on investor confidence, very little analysis has adopted a contracting perspective. As accounting information is often used in contracts, the reliability and quality of the accounting information plays a critical role. A financial reporting failure casts doubt on the quality of the financial information, and consequently, leads to greater contracting uncertainty. I posit one means of restoring credibility of the accounting numbers following a financial reporting failure is to take a more conservative approach in reporting firm performance. Therefore, this study investigates whether firms report more conservatively following a financial restatement in order to restore the trust and confidence of the contracting parties and to protect the interests of the contracting parties. I specifically examine whether firms report more conservatively in the three years following a restatement announcement, and whether an increase in conservatism is related to the extent of debt and compensation contracts. I then examine various corporate governance variables as possible explanations for an increase in conservatism following a restatement. I find restating firms significantly increase conditional conservatism in the three year period following the restatement announcement year. In addition, I find that both the level and change in conditional conservatism following a restatement is greater for firms where debt and compensation contracting are more important. These results are consistent with the contracting explanation of conservatism provided in Watts (2003). Lastly, I find little support for corporate governance variables as explanations for the increase in conservatism. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Accounting in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2008. / January 11, 2008. / Restatements, Conditional Conservatism, Conservatism, Financial Reporting / Includes bibliographical references. / Richard Morton, Professor Directing Dissertation; Gary Benesh, Outside Committee Member; Bok Baik, Committee Member; Bruce Billings, Committee Member.