Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 363-367). Also available online via the University of Texas at Austin Library website (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/).

Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2006. / "Submitted to Department of Management Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy" Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-84)

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cleveland State University, 2009. / Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Dec. 18, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 128-134). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center and also available in print.

This thesis addresses the problem of pricing perishable inventories such as airline seats and hotel rooms. It also analyzes the airline seat allocation problem when two airlines compete on a single-leg flight. Finally, several existing models for seat allocation with multiple fares on a single-leg flight are compared. The pricing framework is consistent with modern yield management tools which utilize restrictions such as weekend stayover to segment the market. One model analyzed considers a restriction which is irrelevant to one set of consumers, but which the others find so onerous that they will not purchase a restricted ticket at any price. If the consumers who do not mind the restriction are less price sensitive than those who find the restriction onerous, then the thesis shows that there is an optimal policy for a monopolist which will sell fares at no more than three price levels. When two restrictions are allowed in the model, if one is more onerous than the other in the sense that the set of consumers who would not buy a ticket with the first restriction is a subset of those who would not buy it with the second restriction, then the restrictions are said to be nested. If the sets of consumers who would not buy tickets with the first restriction is disjoint from those who would not buy with the second restriction, then the restrictions are said to be mutually exclusive. If two restrictions are either nested or mutually exclusive, then a monopolist needs at most four price levels with three types (i.e. combinations of restrictions) of product. With two general restrictions, the monopolist may need five price levels with four types of product. The pricing model is applied to restrictions which are based on membership in a particular organization. For example, employees of an airline are frequently eligible for special fares. Some airlines provide special fares for government employees or for employees of certain corporations. An analysis is given to help airlines understand the costs and benefits of such arrangements. A model of two airlines competing on a single-leg flight is developed for the case where the airlines have fixed capacity and fixed price levels for two types of fares-full and discount. The airlines compete by controlling the number of discount fares which they sell. The split of the market between the airlines is modelled in two different ways. First, the airlines might share the market for a fare class proportionally to their allocation of seats to that fare class. In this case, under certain conditions, there exists an equilibrium pair of booking limits for the discount fare such that each airline will protect the same number of seats for the full fare customers, even when the demands are random and stochastically dependent. The second market sharing model assumes that the two airlines share the market demand equally. In this case, when the demands are deterministic, then there is an equilibrium solution where each airline will protect enough seats to split equally the market for the full fares. Finally, three existing seat allocation models for multi-fare single-leg flights with stochastically independent demands are compared. It is shown that the optimality conditions for each of these models are analytically equivalent, thus providing a unified approach to this problem.

No description available.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the way in which civil airlines exploit their resources in order to gain and sustain competitive advantage. This is done within the framework of the resource-basedv iew, rather than using the market basedv iew, thought without of cause presuming to test that paradigm. The first chapter offers a fairly detailed account of the airline industry. This is felt to be necessary to render the thesis accessible to readers who may not be industry experts. The second chapter examines the literature on and overall merits of the resource based and market based view, reformulates the research objectives and outlines the methodology, primarily the use of data published in specialist sources, supported by personal industry knowledge. The subsequent chapters develop the thesis with regard to cross airlines ownership stakes and occasional merger and acquisition, the leverage exercised by bigger airlines at airports, and the issue of strategic alliances. The findings that emerge from this exercise are that in a sense checked via a series of interviews with key informants, and some qualifications to the resource based view are offered before proceeding to a summary statement of the conclusion.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Texas A&M University, 2005. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-114).

Thesis (MBus) -- Auckland University of Technology, 2004. / Also held in print ( 2 v., 30 cm.) in Wellesley Theses Collection (T 387.74 VAN)

Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 1993. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [34]-35).

Thesis (LL.M.). / Written for the Institute of Air and Space Law. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2009/06/17). Includes bibliographical references.