Thesis (M.A.)--Brigham Young University, Dept. of History.

Abraham Alonzo Kimball was born of Heber C. Kimball and his plural wife, Clarissa Cutler Kimball, in Nauvoo, Hancock County, Illinois on April 16, 1846. At this time the Mormons were being expelled from Nauvoo so young Abe was taken to Winter Quarters with the major portion of the Mormon refugees. Clarissa Cutler Kimball refused to come West with the Mormons. Instead, she took her young son to Iowa to join a break-off church founded by her father, Alpheus Cutler, called the True Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Abe's mother died about three years later and he was brought up in Iowa by his grandparents, Alpheus and Lois Cutler.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [202]-219)

Thesis--University of Southern California. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 274-279).

I should like to make an attempt to get at that spiritual essence possessed by Mr. Stagg. We all have our own particular qualities in this respect, but Mr. Stagg is truly one of our great men today, and to discover what lies behind his greatness is to make the problem of registering his strength that much clearer. Mr. Stagg stands for something conceded to be great force in American athletics. His code of living, playing, and fighting, and his lifetime spent in guiding young men according to his standards for these activities, have stamped him as a veritable monument in the eyes of our youth. There is strength in the name Stagg, strength in the man, and in the eyes that watch so keenly as boys continue to pass under his tutelage. This strength is moral, a kind of pillar lacking in the structure of many so-called successful men who grew into power during Mr. Stagg's years. He has never compromised his position when opportunities for doing so were plentiful. I should like to make one further point. This is in relation to the material. The medium used is Jarrah wood. It is hard enough to suggest strength, red enough to imply warmth, and yet soft enough to be in sympathy with the generosity of the man portrayed. Stone is cold. It would be more suitable to a portraiture of a Rockefeller, certainly not a Stagg. Wood is a material that comes from a growing life-form, rooted in the ground. It takes its strength gradually as the years roll by. What better choice of medium could be made? At this point the reader may or may not agree with me when I say that the diverse pattern of mental gymnastics undergone by the artist demands more understanding than the observer of his work can fathom. Aside from the psychological and philosophical relationships there are the technical aspects of the creative effort. These latter consideration will be found in the text of the paper. Mr. Amos Alonzo Stagg was the model chosen for the sculpture. The choice was prompted by Dr. Tully C. Knoes who was to have been the subject for the study. Dr Knoles preferred that his close friend and fellow worker, Mr. Stagg, be selected. At this point it became necessary to develop the preliminary sketches for the purpose of deciding upon a composition suitable to the dimensions of the wood.

This thesis is a collection of Mr. Stagg's contributions to athletics covering a period of the last sixty-six years, partly as a participant, but largely as a coach, director of physical education, and as a leader of men. Herein the author wishes to bring tribute to this great man who has contributed more to the field of athletics and the development of manhood than could be written hare in the form of facts and figures. His achievements and inventions in the various phases of athletics speak for themselves and will go down in the archives representing this field of endeavor. As a true Christian leader Mr. Stagg has created an enviable character that has left its imprint on many thousands of men whom he has guided through college and university careers. Through this truly great influence on men, his ideals and code of ethics will be felt throughout the world for many centuries to come.

MARTINS, Francisco Gomes. A lógica das entidades intencionais. 2012. 130f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2012. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-12T12:03:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2012-DIS-FGMARTINS.pdf: 986022 bytes, checksum: dc59d2215a6ff9289414db0edc6b00d1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-12T14:25:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2012-DIS-FGMARTINS.pdf: 986022 bytes, checksum: dc59d2215a6ff9289414db0edc6b00d1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-12T14:25:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2012-DIS-FGMARTINS.pdf: 986022 bytes, checksum: dc59d2215a6ff9289414db0edc6b00d1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / A feature of the distinction between extensionalism and intensionalism, which has been widely taken as a criterion to separate the two positions, is that within an extensionalist logic, substitution is possible salva veritate (that is, without thereby changing the truth-value of the statement concerned) with respect to identical instances of some basic logical form – and in an intensionalist logic it is not. The different logical forms with respect to which such substitution might take place accounts for some of the variety of different extensionalisms on offer in the current philosophical landscape. So our starting-point is Frege’s puzzle. This question is frequently accepted as one of the foundations of modern semantics. To explain why a true sentence of the form “a = b” can be informative, unlike a sentence of the form “a = a”, Frege introduced an entity standing between an expression and the object denoted (bezeichnet) by the expression. He named this entity Sinn (sense) and explained the informative character of the true “a=b”-shaped sentences by saying that ‘a’ and ‘b’ denote one and the same object but differ in expressing (ausdrücken) distinct senses. The problem, though, is that Frege never defined sense. The conception of senses as procedures that is developed here has much in common with a number of other accounts that represent meanings, also, as structured objects of various kinds, though not necessarily as procedures. In the modern literature, this idea goes back to Rudolph Carnap’s (1947) notion of intensional isomorphism. Church in (1954) constructs an example of expressions that are intensionally isomorphic according to Carnap’s definition (i.e., expressions that share the same structure and whose parts are necessarily equivalent), but which fail to satisfy the principle of substitutability. The problem Church tackled is made possible by Carnap’s principle of tolerance (which itself is plausible). We are free to introduce into a language syntactically simple expressions which denote the same intension in different ways and thus fail to be synonymous. Tichý’s objectualist take on ‘operation-processes’ may be seen in part as linguistic structures transposed into an objectual key; operations, procedures, structures are not fundamentally and inherently syntactic items, but fully-fledged, non-linguistic entities, namely, constructions. / Um grave problema presente quando aplicamos semântica composicional, que atribui simples valores de verdade a frases, é que quando essas seqüências estão presentes em alguns contextos específicos, a substituição de certas expressões com a mesma referência pode cambiar o valor de verdade da frase maior ou então impedir que inferências válidas sejam realizadas. Por exemplo, da afirmação "Pedro acredita que Alexandre o Grande foi aluno de Aristóteles", não se pode inferir corretamente neste contexto de crença que a substituição de "Alexandre o grande" por "o vencedor da batalha de Arbela" seja válida porque eventualmente Pedro pode não saber que "Alexandre o Grande é o vencedor da batalha de Arbela" e por isso a verdade das premissas não garante a verdade da conclusão: "Pedro acredita que o vencedor da batalha de Arbela foi aluno de Aristóteles". A conclusão não se segue pois ela não depende da relação de identidade efetiva entre “Alexandre o Grande” e “O vencedor da Arbela”, e sim depende, de maneira contingente, do conjunto de crenças de Pedro; ou ainda, segundo Frege, depende do sentido que Pedro associa a descrição “Alexandre o Grande”. Em contextos intensionais a verdade da conclusão (após substituição) depende de uma maneira específica da maneira de conceber o nome em questão, por isso a substituição entre nomes cujo referente é o mesmo, mas que diferem em sentido, não funciona em todos os casos. O fato é que Frege nunca estabeleceu critérios de identidade para o sentido (Sinn), apenas reservou-se a declarar simplesmente que o sentido é o "modo de apresentação" da referência. Pretendemos apresentar critérios de identidade para o sentido em geral, e em contextos intensionais, em particular. Os sucessores de Frege, dentre eles o lógico Alonzo Church e o filósofo Rudolf Carnap foram os primeiros a estabelecer que duas expressões têm o mesmo sentido se e somente se são sinonimamente isomorfas e intensionalmente isomorfas, respectivamente. Tais critérios devem ser entendidos à luz dos pressupostos lógicos de Church em sua Lógica do Sentido e da Denotação (LSD) e das idéias de Carnap – muitas delas constituintes do programa filosófico do Positivismo lógico, em seu livro Meaning and Necessity. Mais recentemente, Pavel Tichý estabeleceu de maneira mais exata o que é o sentido e sua identidade através do Procedural isomorphism o qual constitui um dos fundamentos da Lógica Intensional Transparente (TIL).