Utopia, as a concept, has experienced a resurgence within literature of various genres, ranging from scholarly work inside the 'academy' to diverse accounts of utopian and/or dystopian imaginaries within diverse fictional stories. Identifying what utopia picks out conceptually, however, is challenging, not least due to the limitations inherent in the ways we perceive the world could be. In this dissertation, I first defend a 'processual' account of utopia, contrasting this way of thinking about the idea against any fixed or granular description of some candidate, concrete state of affairs. I then look at the primary methodology leveraged by most processual utopian theorists, namely: utopian hope. After considering this affective, performative stance against what I call 'merely-political' combat, I demonstrate how utopian hope, within processual accounts, turns out to be equivalent to religious faith. As such, processual utopian projects require a return to a mystical, transcendent field of play for both their theoretical and methodological constituents. The second half of my project attempts to outline a fledgling, practical methodology for processual utopia, first identifying a very counter-intuitive directional focus on the part of the privileged when pursuing utopian ends. This focus requires the privileged to consider alternate imaginaries for possible futures while additionally requesting assistance from the marginalized to appropriately parse them. I conclude by examining several instances of liminal 'utopias' that have occurred in the wake of tragic events. These are placed in conversation with fictional accounts of utopian effort in order to highlight why utopian performativity must begin from a space of mutual vulnerability. / Doctor of Philosophy / In this dissertation I aim to do two things. In the first half, I defend the concept of "processual utopia" as a more fruitful way to think about striving for societies that feature less stratification in the way they distribute opportunity and privilege. I contrast this idea with those theories that try to describe, using present-day imaginaries, concretely-imaginable utopias in the here and now. I argue that the latter effort is a fool's errand, a process that incurs insurmountable difficulties in that opposing visions are immediately juxtaposed against any solidified description of what utopia might look like. I then examine the primary constituent of processual utopia's process, namely: utopian hope. I contrast this with the kind of affective performativity normally found within politics and political struggle, concluding that these efforts do not result in utopian ends. This is because what I call the 'merely-political' is bent on a kind of binary striving for power, focused on proving the 'other' side to be subhuman and irrational. Utopian hope counters political maneuvering for a particular vision of 'better' societies on a more transcendental foundation. It looks for a reality that humankind cannot yet understand or describe – something that remains on the horizon as a target for our dreams and efforts. This affective viewpoint should motivate our actions to make currently unimaginable realities possible in a distant, not-seen-by-us, future. I also suggest that utopian hope, although talked about a great deal over the past century by writers such as Ernst Bloch and Ruth Levitas, has its conceptual genesis in religious faith. I argue that the two are equivalent in the case of utopian affect and desire. My foils in this effort are Kierkegaard and St. Augustine and examining their accounts of faith reveals the parallel nature this mystical logic shares with contemporary ideas about utopian hope. In the second half of the dissertation, I connect processual utopian theory to potential practice. The investigative point-of-view throughout is that of the currently privileged. I argue that those who possess the highest levels of opportunity within realms of social and political power tend to defend the status quo, even when suggesting or devising initiatives to supposedly level the playing field more fairly. Privileged actors, it seems, are culturally programmed to reinforce the same logics that prevent substantive change. This also means that our targets for 'better societies' tend to simply reinforce the same stratifications of opportunity that exist currently. Privileged actors not only need help understanding the ideas of the marginalized concerning more just societies, they also need to engage in what might seem like 'dystopian' effort (from our perspective) in order to actually strive for something more 'utopian' in the future. To help orient those wishing to be allies to the marginalized, I examine various accounts of alternate futures, explaining how those challenge our default ways of understanding the world. These, in turn, should motivate the privilege to ask for help (from the marginalized) in order to understand them, a request the latter must answer if processual utopia is the goal of all concerned. This highlights what I call an 'ethical minefield' that highlights divisive issues we can observe in our current socio-cultural moment. I end with an analysis of both tragedy and dystopian fiction, arguing that a sense of mutual vulnerability is needed for an actor to pursue processual utopia.