This diploma thesis deals with the historical development of the Israeli nuclear program and examines motives which led either to the decision to acquire nuclear weapons or to further develop Israeli nuclear arsenal. Indentified motives are compared with the theory by Scott Sagan who proposed three 'models in search of the bomb'. Security Model sees the effect of nuclear weapons on state security as the motivation, the Domestic Politics Model considers nuclear weapons to be a tool for gaining political profit and the Norms Model emphasizes their symbolic value. My proposition is that other than abovementioned motives, or more motives from different models might be found. Such a result would pose a challenge to Sagan's theory, and could be used a basis for further research. To define independent variables, which are the motives in my case, the method of process tracing is used. I identify critical moments which led to changes in the direction of the program, and define motives on their basis. In the thesis, I further deal with the policy of strategic ambiguity, which consists in complete non-acknowledgement of Israel's nuclear status and enabled Israel to reduce negative effects of the region's nuclearization.