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This dissertation consists of three essays. Essay 1: Delegation and Threat in Bargaining.Two principals ("nations") appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy. Essay 2: Delegation of Bargaining and Power.Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals delegate to agents that are relatively disinterested in the public good and give them all power. The fact that both principals have the possibility to delegate is, in equilibrium, harmful to at least one of them. The equilibrium may even be Pareto dominated by the outcome under autarchy. Essay 3: Labor- and Product-Market Structure and Excess Labour.This study analyzes under what labor- and product-market structures a firm may hire more labor than needed to produce its profit maximizing output. Three labor-market structures are studied: (1) decentralized (firm-specific unions), (2) one-sided centralization (central union and several firms), and (3) centralized (central union and employers' association). Excess labor is explained by the risk-sharing motive that in the model exists between the risk-averse workers and the risk-neutral firm owner. Labor may be excessively hired in any of the labor-market structures and under a wide range of product-market structures; duopoly, oligopoly etc. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1998

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

This thesis examines the theoretical and empirical predictions of the effects of reductions in hours of work on wages and employment, the economic efficiency arguments for such reductions and the related issue of the determination of hours of work in a bargaining framework. The conventional approach, assumes that workers will want to maintain their incomes in the face of reductions in hours of work per period. This is difficult to justify theoretically, when hours and union/worker utility are taken properly into account. Rather, unions and workers that desire reductions in hours of work are likely to opt for the same or even a reduced hourly wage, leading to a significant employment effect of any such measure. We show that this result is true in labour markets and economies where unions determine or bargain over the wage and in models where firms set the wage because it affects their workers' productivity. It is also true when firms demand positive overtime, when such models account properly for the long-run movement of hours of work. The thesis examines also the determination of hours, employment and wages in a bargaining framework and shows that the employment effects of unionism are likely to be overestimated when no account is taken of the hours determination procedure. This allows us also to provide an economic rationale for union behaviour regarding reductions in hours of work and maximum hours legislation and determine the conditions under which reductions in standard hours of work can increase union utility and firm profits. Finally, empirical evidence is provided with a test of the relationship between the hourly wage and weekly hours of work, using aggregate data. We use a large number of variables and different estimation techniques to avoid simultaneity. Our results suggest, in line with the theoretical predictions, that changes in hours of work have no effect on the hourly wage.

Business transfers and accompanying business changes are a focal point for the tension between the protection of rights of employees, including their property rights in the job and their "right" to meaningful participation, and the interests of management in achieving its economic objectives effectively. A comparison of the law in the United States, South Africa and the United Kingdom can cast the divergent interests, which become conspicuous during corporate reorganisations, into bold relief, and suggest how those interests can be reconciled. This study shows that conventional labour law with its emphasis on voluntarism has not been able to resolve the basic conflict between the economic demands for restructuring and rationalisation (one of the main consequences of the global economy), and the social demands for workers' protection. By arguing that collective bargaining has never succeeded in effectively mitigating the power of management over the workforce, pluralist support of voluntarism is criticised. The main point that emerges from the comparison of the way in which the three countries deal with the phenomenon of structural business changes and the effect of such changes on workers, is that law, even though its effectiveness to bring about major changes in an industrial relations system is limited, can make some difference. Law can intervene in labour relations to set standards and lay down procedures for the exercise of managerial prerogative; specifically, law can introduce the values of liberal society into the workplace, such as rationality, fairness, and respect for individual rights. This study shows how, through the introduction of some of these values, legislation for the protection of workers' acquired rights, can provide a solution to the tension between managerial prerogative and employees' rights.

Thesis (Ph.D) -- McMaster University, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-144). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1987. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-135). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Mainz, 1974. / Includes bibliographical references (p. v-xvi).

Thesis (Ed.D.)--Teachers College, Columbia University. / Typescript; issued also on microfilm. Sponsor: Harold Noah. Dissertation Committee: Peter Moock. Includes tables. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Illinois State University, 1985. / Title from title page screen, viewed June 8, 2005. Dissertation Committee: Ned B. Lovell (chair), Mary Ann Lynn, Ronald Halinski, Carroll Taylor, Alan Hickrod. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-149) and abstract. Also available in print.