Competition among firms is a central feature in all free market economies such as South Africa. One of the biggest threats to competition is the presence of cartels in markets. Cartels are firms which collude and compete unfairly in order to obtain monopoly-like profits. For more than fifty years South Africa’s economic landscape has been dominated by a vast network of cartels invital industries, such as bread, cement and fertiliser. South Africa promulgated the Competition Act 89 of 1998 to eradicate cartels and promote and maintain competition within the South African economy. The Competition Act 89 of 1998 prohibits cartel activity and provides for a fine of 10% of turn over for firms found to have engaged in cartel activity. For a variety of reasons, these administrative fines have failed to deter firms from commencing and/or continuing to engage in cartel activity. This is evidenced by the increasing number of firms engaged in large -scale cartels in essential industries, such as construction and food. Public outcry and global trends have persuaded legislators to enactment more stringent penalties in the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. Section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act , which inserts section 73A, creates a cartel of fence in terms of which a director who causes his firm to engage in cartel activity faces ten year imprisonment or a fine of R500, 000. This research shall critically analyse the Competition Amendment Acts effect on deterring cartel activity in South Africa. Despite the legislators’ aim to provide a bigger deterrent for engaging in cartel activity, section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act arouses scrutiny. Firstly, the promulgation of the new cartel offence is contrary to the decimalisation trend in South African company law which recognises the difficulty in enforcing complex regulatory offences with criminal provisions. Secondly, Section 73(5)A appears to infringe an accused director's right to be presumed innocent. Lastly there are co-ordination issues between the National Prosecuting Authority and the Corporate Leniency Policy relating to the granting of prose cutorial immunity for firms which cooperate with the Competition Commission. There search will out line these problems in full. With regards to the problems caused by section 73A, the research will use a comparative analysis with the positionin the United States. Of all the jurisdictions which criminalise cartel activity, the United States was one of the earliest and the most prolific insecuring convictions for directors who cause their firms to engage in cartel activity. The United States has taken innovative steps to supplement their public cartel enforcement drive such as the prosecution of international cartels and the use of private actions. In this regard, the research will extrapolate favourable cartel enforcement measures from the United States for recommendation in order to assist with South Africa’s cartel enforcement and alleviate the problems caused by section 73A, outlined above.

Law / LL.M.

Law / LL.M.

LL.M. / Modern competition occurs in a global market and straddles various state borders. This international dimension of competition law (antitrust law) subsequently raises concerns whether one state can apply its competition rules extraterritorially against an undertaking in another country, when the latter behaves in an anti-competitive manner that, for example, have adverse effects in the territory of the former. In the context of such extraterritorial enforcement, the concept of the Effects doctrine as created and developed in the antitrust jurisprudence of the United States plays an important role. In this dissertation the issue of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction is investigated in an attempt to suggest a suitable basis for assertion of such jurisdiction. The evolution of the Effects doctrine in the United States and its further development and qualification in American Antitrust jurisprudence is addressed as well as its interrelation with the concept of international comity. Thereafter the basis for assertion of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction by the European Community is investigated. In this regard the long favoured Single Economic Entity Theory is addressed as well as the development of a form of Effects doctrine by the European Commission which eventually culminated in acceptance of an “Effects/Implementa-tion doctrine” by the European Court of Justice in the Wood Pulp case. It should however be noted that the scope of the extraterritorial application of the competition rules of the European Community is extended by the EC Merger Control Regulation 139/2004. Thus, the jurisdictional range of the Merger Control Regulation is considered in chapter 4. It is submitted that although the Effects doctrine is competent as sole basis for exercising extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction, it has various disadvantages, inter alia that it evokes conflict between states due to differences in competition law and policy and various states interests. Consequently co-operation on a bilateral level is investigated in chapter 5 as a possible solution. Finally, the South African stance on the extraterritorial enforcement of its Competition Act 89 of 1998 is investigated in chapter 6 and certain observations and suggestions are made for future exercise of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction.

Theses / The Competition Act no.89 of 1998 coupled with its amendments ushered in a new era in the competition analysis and merger approval process in South Africa. This research paper's purpose is to intimately explore the emergent doctrine of "public interest" institutionalized in this new dispensation of competition legislation. In particular this report places under the spotlight the treatment of public issues in case law jurisprudence as developed in the consideration and determination of large and notifiable mergers under the auspices of the competition tribunal of the Republic of South Africa since the inception of the said new legislative order. The efficacy of the determination of socio-political issues and pure competitive efficiency issues separately but under and by the same entity are also examined. The contrast between the South African approach to the application of the doctrine of the public interest and that of some other competition jurisdictions abroad is also explored.

M.Comm. / South Africa's new political dispensation has indicated that it regards unbundling of conglomerates and antitrust policy as appropriate means to ensure black empowerment and create wealth among the victums of the apartheid-era. Unbundling will however not necessarily aid the distribution of wealth due to the existing shareholder structure in the country. The creation of an entrepreneural class is seen as an effective means to alleviate the jobless problem and empower the masses, but will be difficult to establish without help from government, and more importantly, big business. PURPOSE The main purpose of this study is to investigate the causes of bundling and current business size and how black empowerment and wealth creation can be addressed through new structures. METHOD OF STUDY In this study information was obtained from existing literature sourced from the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Small Business Development Corporation, investment community, Business Periodical Index and libraries at Rand Afrikaans University and University of South Africa. FINDINGS The historic reasons for current business size are essentially the same as those in the rest of the world, with the exception that politics played a major role in South Africa. The exclusion of certain population groups led to political instability and the sanctions-era, which increased the tendency for big business to bundle or form conglomerates. Evidence exists that unbundling will not create wealth by distributing ownership of companies but could in fact only benefit existing shareholders. Black empowerment and wealth creation can be established by the forming of new pyramid-structures and the creation of an entrepreneural class with help from existing conglomerates and government. South Africa is part of the international economic environment and needs big businesses in order to be competitive. Small businesses on the other hand can be utilized to address the unemployment problem especially in rural areas. Conglomerates can assist small businesses with mangement and finance which should prove to be a better alternative in the long run than unbundling.

One of the recognised ways through which a firm may increase its market share or reorganise its presence in a market is through a merger. A merger occurs when independent firms combine their businesses. Section 12A of the Competition Act, 1998, provides two grounds in terms of which mergers must be evaluated by competition authorities. These are competition and public interest considerations. The Act is reticent on which, between the two considerations, should take precedence in the event that the two conflict. The anterior purpose of this study is therefore to provide an in-depth analysis on which consideration must take precedence in the event of conflict. On analysis, the majority of case law suggests that the competition considerations must take precedence. This observation is also buttressed by a significant amount of literature, which holds that in merger analysis, the public interests only play a secondary role to the competition inquiry. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Mercantile Law)

In South Africa compliance with competition law has become a major concern for firms that achieve and maintain certain levels of success and growth in the market, as their actions are often a source of complaints and litigation by rivals and competition authorities. With substantial financial penalties often levied against them for a variety of conduct deemed to constitute an abuse of their market position, dominant firms must constantly be aware of the likely impact of their business strategies and actions on both rivals and consumers. What were once thought to be normal and economically sound business practices and decisions, such as cutting prices to attract customers, have now acquired new meanings, with devastating consequences for dominant firms. So, are dominant firms under attack from competition law? In this study I aim to determine this. I track the historical development of competition law in three jurisdictions: South Africa, America, and the EU, with the aim of identifying traces, if any, of hostility towards dominant firms in the origins of competition law. I further investigate whether the formulation and enforcement of certain aspects of existing abuse of dominance provisions manifest as hostility towards dominant firms. While acknowledging the important role that competition law enforcement plays in promoting competition and enhancing consumer welfare, I conclude that significant unjustified economic and legal prejudice is suffered by dominant firms as a result of the way in which certain abuse of dominance provisions have been formulated and applied. I also offer appropriate recommendations. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.