Issued also as thesis (PH. D.) Columbia university. / Bibliography: p. 42.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1975. / Vita. Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1936. / Typescript. Includes abstract and vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-134).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1960. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 42-43).

The research reported here used Coombs' (1964) theory of data and evidence drawn from attitude change research to construct two models which, if correct, would describe the attitudinal choice and judgmental processes of, for the first model, an uninvolved S and, for the second model, a highly involved S. Both models were dependent on two of Coombs' (1964) eight classes of data, Petrusic's (1966) findings using single stimulus response latencies and the evidence from Sherif and Hovland (1961) and Ager and Dawes (1965) that a judge's attitude will affect his judgment of favourabiIity of alternative positions on a social issue. The test of the models occurred when single stimulus response latencies were collected from Ss who were required to accept or reject a position and then indicate if the position was more-pro or less-pro than his ideal position on issues of high, medium, and low involvement. The accept-reject task was, according to Coombs' (1964) formulation, Qllb data and the more-pro, less-pro task was QIIa(c.) (categorization relative to an ideal point). The data did not follow the predictions of the models for any of the four Ss used. Thus, our major hypothesis that an individual who is not involved in a social issue will judge alternative positions according to our first model (J-scale model) and that an individual who is highly involved in a social issue will judge alternative positions according to our second model (I-scale model) was rejected. Additional classes of data collected did, however, replicate and confirm the findings of Petrusic (1966). We were able to show that the latency data collected, whatever the attitudinal choice process involved, was reliable and orderly for each S over each issue. (Except for one S on one issue where a speed orientation was clearly shown). The order Iiness of the data was shown by the ability of QIIa(c.) and QIlb inferred orderings to predict the ordering of QIa (preference ordering) data. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

[No abstract submitted] / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

What difficulties will a person encounter, and what defenses will he use, if placed in a position where he must verbally attack a group with which he has strongly identified himself? In an attempt to gain some insight into this problem, two groups of people were selected. One group was made up of fifteen male university students who had strongly ego-involved attitudes toward the Christian Church. The second group, the controls, consisted of fifteen male students who scored in the neutral zone of the Thurstone-Chave scale of Attitudes Toward the Church. Both groups found it more difficult to attack the church than to support it. Also, when attacking the church, both groups tended more to weaken their arguments by qualifications and by making concessions to the opposing view-point. In terms of group differences, the religious group were much more effective (convincing) in their arguments in favor of the church than were the neutrals. There was no significant difference, however, in their relative abilities to attack the church in a convincing manner. The religious group showed the greatest disparity in terms of ratings gained when supporting the church, minus ratings gained when attacking it. This difference in disparity scores was not statistically significant. Therefore, our principal hypothesis was not supported. Continuous G.S.R. records were made while the subjects were engaged in the two tasks. From the data obtained, we are unable to say that either of the two activities is more tension-producing for either group. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of this study was to compare the effectiveness of three strategies for achieving more positive measured attitudes toward the Native Indians of Canada; namely, role playing, reading, and principle testing. The literature suggested that the most effective strategy for changing attitudes would be the one that would introduce inconsistency into one's psychological system for the purpose of demonstrating the potential psychological satisfaction of a new attitude without, at the same time, posing a threat to the subject's perceived psychological freedom. Although the literature suggested that all three strategies should produce significant attitudinal change, there was not enough clear empirical evidence to employ directional hypotheses. The role play strategy most closely fit the requirements for attitudinal change; therefore, it is stated in hypothesis one that the role play strategy would produce an attitude change significantly different than either reading or principle testing. It was also hypothesized that each of the strategies, (role playing, reading, and principle testing) would produce an attitude change significantly different than the control group. The literature also suggested that the dogmatic personality was an intervening variable in the process of attitude acquisition; dogmatic students were expected to resist change in all three experimental situations. Therefore, it was also hypothesized that there was a strong inverse relation between the degree of one's dogmatism in one's personality and the amount of attitude change. A 2 x 4 (dogmatism x method) factorial design was used in this study; the four levels being compared consisted of three experimental strategies and one control group; the two levels of dogmatism consisted of dogmatic and non-dogmatic students, (as determined by ranking out scores on a dogmatism scale pretest). The student sample consisted of four intact groups taking a compulsory English 11 course in a large senior secondary school located in a predominantly Caucasian, middle income socio-economic area. The students had been assigned previously to these groups in an arbitrary manner but the treatment levels were assigned to the groups randomly. The treatment period ran approximately four days. The role playing strategy required that various students take on the role of either Native Indians or Whites and attempt to convince other members of the class of the validity of their adopted value positions. The reading strategy required that the students read and discuss a short novel that showed some degree of empathy toward Native Indians. In the principle testing strategy the teacher attempted to clarify the value positions of students toward Native Indians by using various discussion strategies. An analysis of covariance revealed that none of the strategies produced a significant attitude change; furthermore, it showed that dogmatic personalities were not interacting significantly with attitude change. The researcher suggests several possible reasons for these results, some of which are: the device used to measure attitude change may not have been sensitive or subtle enough to measure the true feelings of the students; the materials used in the strategies may not have been long or strong enough to demonstrate that a legitimate inconsistency was present; and perhaps a longer incubation period is needed to assimilate the inconsistency and to reorganize one's attitudes toward the subject. / Education, Faculty of / Curriculum and Pedagogy (EDCP), Department of / Graduate

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