Thesis advisor: Shep Melnick / This dissertation examines the use of coordinated multistate lawsuits by state attorneys general (SAGs) as a tool to create national policy. Entrepreneurial SAGs have increasingly employed multistate litigation against private industry and the federal government, reaching numerous out-of-court settlements and favorable court judgments. These lawsuits have imposed new national regulatory requirements across several policy areas and have challenged regulatory regimes established by Congress and federal agencies. This study investigates three interrelated questions about multistate SAG litigation: (1) how SAGs have used this litigation to achieve national regulatory goals, (2) why this activity has increased over time, and (3) what the consequences are for American politics and policy. Employing both qualitative and quantitative analysis, I examine these questions through two stages. First, I present an analysis of an original dataset containing SAG lawsuits and legal settlements in four key policy areas covering 1980 through 2009. Second, I examine three case studies involving pharmaceutical litigation, air pollution control litigation, and lawsuits against the firearms industry. I find that changes in federal law instituted by Congress and the federal courts have created new opportunity points for SAGs, helping spur a dramatic increase of multistate litigation. The SAGs built upon earlier successful efforts, including their blockbuster settlement with the tobacco industry in 1998, to create new avenues of collaboration among their fellow SAGs, public interest groups, and the private bar. The result has been to substantially alter the regulatory landscape in areas including prescription drug pricing, pharmaceutical advertising, and greenhouse gas emissions. By shedding light on this significant form of "regulation through litigation," this dissertation illustrates how SAGs have seized upon the trend towards adversarial legalism in America by using the courts to achieve policy goals when attempts to do so in other venues fail. This runs contrary to a line of scholarly literature suggesting that litigation and courts have a limited impact on significant social change. This study also demonstrates how American federalism, commonly thought to serve as a restraint on the federal government by diffusing power, can be used by skillful political actors to create more energetic government and stronger national regulation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

The study involved an examination of the function of the Attorney General of Indiana as legal adviser to public school authorities in Indiana.The purposes of the study were (1) to present information concerning the legal basis upon which the Office of Attorney General was founded; to describe: (2) the organization of the Office of the Attorney General of Indiana; (3) the procedure for requesting and rendering opinions from the Office of the Attorney General of Indiana; to ascertain: (4) the effect of such an opinion once said opinion has been rendered; (5) the relationship between the Office of the Attorney General of Indiana and local school corporation authorities with respect to the function as legal adviser; and (6) the relationship between the Office of the Attorney General of Indiana and local school corporation authorities with respect to the function as legal adviser.

The past several decades have witnessed a remarkable increase in the number of amicus curiae briefs filed at the U.S. Supreme Court. While scholars debate the effectiveness of amicus curiae briefs, they generally agree on the effectiveness of briefs filed by executive attorneys. A plethora of studies address the amicus curiae brief activity of the solicitor general, but relatively few examine state attorneys general. State attorneys general are the legal representatives of the states and have become increasingly successful as amici since the early 1980s. I explore state attorney general amicus curiae brief activity and argue that existing theories of amicus curiae participation by the solicitor general and interest groups, are inadequate for state attorneys general because of the unique institutional context in which state attorneys general operate. State attorneys general, I argue, must balance political, legal, and administrative factors when filing amicus curiae briefs. I also recognizes that amicus curiae briefs are not a singular event and are instead a process in which actors make several decisions across a variety of contexts. Within each context each factor takes on a different weight. I conclude state attorneys general are strategic political actors who consider political, legal, and administrative factors in their amicus curiae briefs.