This paper investigates whether the bidding induces the occurrence of herding, and analyses the effects of behavioral factors, information, and fundamental characteristics of real estate on the performance of bank auction. Our sample is from July 2001 to January 2003, the real estate that intermediaries sold was held by bank in Taiwan, including 363 the real estate and the price of bidding under bank auction. We obtain some interesting implication. First of all, we find that herding of bidding not only could explain premium but also discount. After controlling informational factors and fundamental characteristics of real estate, it could not weaken the significance of herding of bidding. For the strategy of the reserve price by the vendor, the higher discount is to encourage bidding actively, which is consistent with the view of Welch (1992). Secondly, we find bidders could easily reduce search cost by observing the bidding of competitors under bank auction, and herding of bidding on the auction process could enhance efficiency of information aggregation. Furthermore, herding of bidding makes the performance of auction different between court and bank. Finally, we overcome the selective bias and find the real estate held by bank had poor performance under court auction; however, the real estate held by court had better performance under bank auction. This implies the mechanism of court auction should be transformed into the open-outcry bidding in order to achieve effective recovery of debt and the policy of reducing losses. Robustness analysis of this study, first of all, for the herd measure that not isolated from informational factors, we find the insignificant effect of behavioral factors on the performance of English mechanism, and auction premium and discount are dominated by the informational factors. Secondly, the choice of the methods about true value of real estate may affect the conditional probability of the herd measure, and make inconsistent conclusions that the effect of behavioral factors on the performance of English mechanism. Whether we choose cluster analysis or regression method to obtain the true value of real estate, the conclusion that the effect of behavioral factors on the performance of English mechanism could be supported, and those can not switch the results of the minimum sum method. Thus, the conclusion that behavioral factors influence the performance of the auction is full of evidences.

於土地標售成交案例中，市場上不乏以高溢價率標得土地之案例。惟究竟土地投標人何以願意支付高出底價甚多之金額取得土地?何以部份土地溢價率相對較高，其他土地溢價率相對較低?則未能從過去之單一文獻探究。 本文透過彙整過去關於土地標售溢價率之文獻，歸納拍賣理論共同價值觀點、私人價值觀點、特徵價格理論觀點、實質選擇權理論觀點，建立土地標售溢價率之分析架構。此外，本文以新莊副都心為實證分析標的，說明該分析架構之操作方式。其中，透過列聯表分析，卡方獨立性檢定、相關係數及其檢定，驗證新莊副都心土地標售溢價率高低之成因能透過前述四大觀點切入，且影響溢價率可再歸納為受人的因素、地的特質影響。至於該實證分析衍生之政策意涵有二。第一，若以財政角度切入，政府得將待標售抵費地劃分為面積較小之土地，藉以降低進入門檻；此外，政府亦能透過加強宣傳或採第二價格密封拍賣制增加競標人數，以創造高溢價率、達到增加財政收入之目的。第二，以社會責任角度切入，政府應擬定及檢視相關政策是否能減少因得標後短期轉售土地所創造之高溢價率，以降低市場上之投機情形。 / Why do the land auction participants bid a land at a premium? While reviewing the paper about the land auctions, none of the papers can describe the high premium situation in land auction completely. This thesis constructs a framework of price premium analysis in land auctions and includes the views of auction theory, hedonic model theory and real option theory. Besides, this research presents how to analyze the price premium in land auctions with an empirical study. Using the contingency table, Pearson's chi-squared test of independence and calculating the correlation coefficient with 52 land auction data in Xinzhuang Fuduxin, there are two findings. First, we can use the points of the analyzed framework to describe the price premium. Second, the reason of the price premium can be summarizes as the factors of people and land characters. According the empirical result, there are some policy implications. First, due to the view of enhancing revenue, the government can create high premiums by dividing the land into small areas to lower the entry barrier to participate the auction. Besides, the government can have more advertisements or sell the land through second price sealed bid auctions to increase the number of the competitors. Second, due to the view of responsibility, the government should restrain the phenomenon of selling the land in the short term.