The large accounting firms recently created U.S.-based audit support groups to advance efficiency and consistency by applying firm-wide methodologies and standard audit procedures in judgmental/routine accounting areas. These groups—hereafter called the centralized audit team (CAT)—service several engagements simultaneously and execute procedures independently without core teams' oversight. However, the core teams are required to review and finalize the CAT's completed assessments and audit conclusions. This authority can result in unintended consequences, such as the core team discounting the results of the CAT's testing, which can reduce consistency across engagements. I investigate this concern by conducting an experiment to examine if the core team's review of the procedures used by the CAT and the client's views about the CAT's evidence requests influence core team reviewers' evaluations of the CAT's work. I predict and find that dissimilarities between the nature and extent of audit procedures used by core teams in prior audits and those currently used by CATs create an association effect such that reviewers are more likely to disagree with the CAT's conclusions. Inconsistent with my prediction that core teams will feel the need to please their clients, I find marginal evidence that reviewers are more likely to agree with the CAT's conclusions when clients complain versus when clients do not complain about CATs' excessive evidence requests. I fail to find evidence of an interaction effect. This study contributes to existing research and practice by highlighting conditions that can affect firms' ability to obtain their anticipated consistency and efficiency goals because core teams may discount the CAT's audit approach. / Doctor of Philosophy / Audit clients hire external audit firms to evaluate their financial information and provide reasonable assurance to the public that the financial information is presented in accordance with U.S. accounting standards, the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Once a client hires a firm, the firm assigns a core team to the audit engagement. The core team performs interim and year-end audit procedures to assess the client's financial statements. To ensure that core teams conduct a sufficient assessment that meets U.S.-based auditing standards, firms employ firm-wide audit methodologies and standard tools that aid auditors in planning, performing, and documenting their procedures. However, inspections conducted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) indicate that some core teams do not adequately follow firms' methodologies, often leading to engagements that do not meet certain requirements in the auditing standards. These types of discrepancies identified during PCAOB inspections could lead to monetary fines and damage firms' reputations. To help combat these issues, audit firms have begun employing Centralized Audit Teams (CATs) whose objective is to assist core teams by using firm-wide methodologies to perform standard procedures on certain audit areas within engagements. By applying standard procedures to multiple audit engagements simultaneously, CATs have the potential to improve the firms' audit consistency and efficiency. While the CAT plans, performs, and documents its audit procedures in the assigned area, the core team remains ultimately responsible for the overall audit. Therefore, the core team must review the CAT's work to ensure they completed sufficient and appropriate procedures. Existing audit research documents that different conditions within an audit can affect reviewers' judgment. For instance, a reviewer is less likely to scrutinize and disagree with the preparer's audit conclusion when the reviewer is familiar with the preparer. In my dissertation, I examine if certain factors that occur during CAT audits impact core team reviewers' judgment, lowering the possibility that firms will achieve their audit efficiency and consistency goals across engagements. Extant research posits that some core teams choose to follow firm standard methodologies while others choose to deviate from the methodologies and perform client-specific procedures. Once the core team chooses to perform standard or client-specific procedures, it does not often change procedure type. Thus, the standard procedures that CATs employ may be similar or dissimilar to the procedures that core teams performed in prior years. In this dissertation, I conduct an experiment using experienced external auditors to determine whether the similarity between core teams' prior audit procedures and CATs' standard procedures impact core team auditors' judgments when reviewing CATs' work. I predict that core team reviewers will form favoritism towards CATs when CATs perform procedures that are similar as opposed to dissimilar to the procedures that their team utilized in prior years. Therefore, the core team reviewers will be less likely to scrutinize and disagree with the CAT's audit conclusion. Audit research also indicates that clients complain when auditors inconvenience them in hopes that the complaint will cause the auditors to behave in a manner that pleases them. For example, clients may complain when auditors ask them to provide a significant amount of evidence to support the reporting of a certain account balance. Since CATs follow standard procedures, they make similar evidence requests to all clients; however, these requests may differ from the core team's prior requests (i.e., clients should be more accustomed to the core team's prior requests). This dissimilarity may cause clients to complain. I predict that core team reviewers are more likely to attempt to please their client by adjusting a CAT's audit conclusion in a manner that favors the client when the client complains about the CAT compared to when the client does not complain. However, prior research also implies that reviewers are more likely to react to a client's complaint if they believe it is authentic. Therefore, I predict that core team reviewers are more likely to adjust a CAT's audit conclusion when the client complains about a CAT that conducts dissimilar versus similar procedures relative to the core team's prior procedures. The results of my study imply that when the CAT's standard audit procedures are dissimilar to the core team's prior procedures, reviewers are more likely to overrule CAT's audit recommendations by making significant changes to the audit results. These results are driven by the reviewer's perception that the CAT is more competent to audit the client's financial information accurately when the CAT uses similar procedures. I also find marginal evidence that when a client complains about the CAT, core team reviewers are more likely to agree with the CAT's conclusions even though the conclusions do not favor the client. I fail to find evidence that reviewers are even more likely to disagree with the CAT when the client complains, and the CAT's procedures are dissimilar as opposed to similar. My study sheds light on how CAT audit engagement conditions can influence core team reviewers' judgment. Given that firms have made significant investments to create and employ CATs, this dissertation provides insight to audit practitioners by highlighting engagement factors that lower firms' ability to achieve their related efficiency and consistency goals.