Recent financial crises and accounting scandals resulting from perceived audit failures have given rise to increase criticism in the manner which accountants and auditors respect their professional code of ethics. As a consequence, the SEC rules in 2000 limits the services auditors are allowed to provide to their clients and also set limits on fees for internal audit services. In addition to this, they called upon all firms to disclose all fees paid to auditors for both audit and non-audit services. This thesis investigates whether the provision of Non-Audit Services is associated with auditor’s independence evidence from the earnings management perspective proxy by discretionary accruals. I began this study by examining the relevant textbooks and related articles of accounting and auditing. Furthermore, the hypotheses and research model are proposed based upon related accounting and auditing theories. The data for this thesis were manually collected from the NASDAQ OMX website from the annual financial reports of 107 Swedish public listed firms in the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The selection of these companies was based on their capitalization i.e., Large, Medium and Small size firms. In this study, quantitative research method has been used to explore the relationship between provision of NAS and auditor’s independence with the help of statistical soft wares (SPSS and Excel) for data analysis. My research outcome provides evidence that the amount of non-audit services rendered by a firm’s external auditors is not associated with earnings management; therefore, the auditor’s independence is not compromised for providing NAS to their clients. This no association is an indication that, the auditor’s independence is strengthened during the provision of non-audit services a result consistent with that of prior researches (e.g., DeFond et al. (2002); Crabtree et al. (2004); Chung & Kallapur (2003)). I also found out that, the provision of audit services is not associated with earnings management, an indication of no management discretionary accruals. Therefore, the auditor’s independence is not compromised when providing a joint audit and non-audit services. These results provide an insight concerning the perceptions of auditor independence and also afford empirical evidence regarding the role that non-audit and audit services fees plays in establishing confidence among the users of firms’ annual financial report.

Problem: That the clients expectations could be influenced by the relationship either positively or negatively. The relationship phases were redefined by Ruyter and Wetzels in 1999 describing the relationship in depth. Purpose: This paper’s purpose is to identify if there are any patterns in the relationship phases regarding the expectations and to discover how high expectations every phase has. Method: We have chosen positivism as our research philosophy and used a mix of a qualitative and quantitative study where we interviewed eight micro-company managers in Sweden. The paper is based on a deductive approach where we try to validate theories that have already been made. Theory: Our study contains theories discussing the audit profession, relationship phases, and the role of auditors, rules to keep an auditor unbiased, expectations on auditors and how an auditor can keep his objectivity, impartiality and independence. Conclusions: The conclusions of our study are that the expectations vary depending on which relationship phase they are in. Another conclusion is that the communication itself could be a major factor in building their relationship. We noticed that there were patterns between the two.

This study investigates the effect of communication channel (e.g., face-to-face, written) and management information (i.e., background information on the reliability of client personnel) on auditors’ judgments of evidence persuasiveness in a management inquiry setting. Management information directs auditors to focus on the source of the evidence, creating a goal of assessing management during evidence collection. Auditors are distracted away from the evidence when the communication channel presents management characteristic cues (i.e., face-to-face), unrelated to the message and related to their new unconscious goal of assessing management. By comparison, when evidence is communicated by a channel that does not provide additional management characteristic cues (i.e. written), auditors are better able to evaluate the evidence without distraction. I predict an interaction effect, where communication channel effects auditor judgments when management information is provided, but not otherwise. I design a 2x2 between-participants experiment to test my theory and present results of an experiment with 122 practicing senior auditors. Auditor participants receive an explanation from a client’s assistant controller to explain an unexpected fluctuation in a financial ratio. I manipulate the means by which the assistant controller communicates with the auditor (communication channel) and the presence of background information about the assistant controller (management information). Results of my experiment indicate an interaction effect of the communication channel and management information. When management information is provided, auditors assess the evidence as more persuasive when communication is face-to-face versus text. Auditors not receiving management information do not assess the evidence any differently, irrespective of communication channel. I also find evidence that auditors assess management differently when management information is provided. The results suggest that auditors are focused more on evaluating management when communicating through face-to-face versus written channels. Further, these assessments of management are consistent with the pattern of persuasiveness, indicating that they use this information more in their judgments when communicating face-to-face versus text and only when management information is provided. The results of this research suggest auditors may be assessing evidence as more persuasive than merited when management information is present and auditors are communicating with management face-to-face. Auditors as well as regulators should be aware of this effect so that adjustments can be made. Future researchers should consider these results in future research on management inquiry.

Although auditors engage in considerable social interaction (Gibbins & Mason, 1988; Solomon, 1987), little is known about how social interaction influences an auditor's moral reasoning process. In order to address this gap, this study used an experiment to examine the effect of social influence on 288 auditors' moral reasoning on realistic moral dilemmas. The results of this study indicate that social interaction influences the moral reasoning of auditors. Auditors' level of prescriptive reasoning appears to increase after engaging in discussion of a realistic moral dilemma, particularly for those which discuss dilemmas with others at high levels of moral development, while auditors' level of deliberative reasoning appears to decrease after engaging in discussion of a realistic moral dilemma. At a practical level, these findings suggest that auditors should be encouraged to prescriptively discuss moral dilemmas with others of high levels of moral development as this tends to result in the use of more principled moral reasoning. In contrast, auditors should avoid deliberative discussion of moral dilemmas, as this tends to result in the use of less principled moral reasoning than would be used in the absence of discussion.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Dept. of Accounting, 2000. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 333-424).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1999. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 42-45). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1999. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 42-45). Also available on the Internet.

A research report submitted In partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Commerce in Accounting, School of Accountancy University of Witwatersrand, 2018 / This paper explores the change in auditors and whether it enhances auditor independence and credibility of financial statements. In recent years due to financial crises and accounting scandals, the rotation of a company’s auditors, after long standing relationships, have come into the limelight. The independence of auditors has come into question and the credibility of financial statements. Interviews were conducted to gain an understanding of how an audit client, referred to in this report as the Company, changed its auditors. The interviews gained an understanding of how the Company: • Made the decision to change and appoint new auditors • Determined whether this change enhanced independence and • Created processes in order to manage the changeover. The Company carrying out the change was analysed in order to understand the processes which were put in place to manage the change. Understanding the criteria and skills required from the new auditor was also investigated. The study finds that the process of appointing and transitioning to new auditors is a comprehensive and rigorous task. This process requires proper and careful planning, risk identification and process and project management. Throughout the process, the Company met with business its operations and provided feedback to members of the boards to ensure gaps were filled and targets and milestones were met. The onboarding of the new auditors required engagement with both the auditors and different functions and businesses of the Company. The success of this project required intense planning and incredible momentum, which the study shows, over the period of time in which the change took place. It required integration with all businesses of the Company and the group finance function. / PH2020

No description available.

This study explores the relationship between an individual's current professional occupation and the effect of the order of information on their evaluation when making internal control effectiveness judgments. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires a new mindset for individuals that have responsibility for the internal controls in place at an organization. SOX requires both auditors and management to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controls over financial reporting. Prior to the implementation of SOX, auditors were required to evaluate internal controls and their effect on the reliability of the financial statements; however, neither group was required to provide an opinion to the public regarding the findings of the evaluation. This study utilizes a within- and between-subjects research design, using the subjects' occupation (auditor or management) as one independent variable, and manipulating the order in which the cases are received by the subjects for the second independent variable. For each case, the subjects were provided three internal control judgments: effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and Sarbanes-Oxley required internal control effectiveness judgment. Additionally, subjects indicated their reliance on each of the internal control effectiveness cues included by allocating 100 points among each of the six cues included in the instrument. Based on the results of the current study, auditors and management did not provide different judgments. Additional analyses were conducted to explore whether experience impacts the self-insight individuals have into their reliance on cues when providing judgments. Findings did not indicate that subjects with greater experience were more likely to have greater insight into their reliance on information. The findings suggest that neither role nor case ordering affected the subjects' professional judgment. Overall, auditors and management did not provide statistically significant different judgments in relation to Sarbanes-Oxley judgments. The similarity in judgments should provide some reassurance to auditors and investors that given no guidance but the same information for judgments, management and auditors will come to similar conclusions regarding the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting. / Ph. D.