As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared.

As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared.

Whether the virtue of humility has a great influence on today¡¦s leadership? For the issues, one study had found that leaders are able to transform their enterprises either from mediocre or those full of crisis to great companies. Collins et al. believed what made the differences depend on the leaders¡¦ personal humility and professional will. The result was out of everyone¡¦s expectation, including Collins et al., because it was generally believed that an outstanding leadership won't be relevant with humility. Published in AMJ, the study of Owens & Hekman (2012) uncovered that leader humility involved leaders modeling to followers how to grow and produced positive organizational outcomes by leading followers to believe that their own developmental journeys and feelings of uncertainty were legitimate in the workplace. Although a growing number of leadership writers argue that leader humility is important to organizational effectiveness, little is known about the construct, what it produces, and what influences its effectiveness, what these behaviors lead to, or what factors moderate the effectiveness of these behaviors. Above all, the key point is exactly what the ¡§conceptualization of the humility¡¨ is. The lack of clarity about leader humility is due to the fact that the existing evidence (qualitative or quantitative) supporting writers¡¦ ideas regarding leader humility. In addition, the humility has further implications. This study integrates the viewpoint of Chinese and Western on humility, and then probes into the real implications of humility, and established the definitions, constructs and scale of humility; further explorations of the important issues on the level, timing, and principle of the humility are rarely suggested in literatures. The results suggest that reliability and validity of this scale are adequate. Analysis of survey data is from 33 dyads samples of the supervisor-subordinates and 187 subordinates of various companies in Taiwan¡¦s organizations. The study found that: (1) authority and trust have a positive influence on compliance; the influence of authority is stronger than that of trust; (2) humility significantly moderates the relation between ability and compliance, such that the relation is more strongly positive at high levels of humility than that at low levels of humility, while the compliance of low humility is higher than high humility at low levels of ability; (3) humility has marginally significant moderating relation between integrity and compliance, such that the relation is more strongly positive at high levels of humility than that at low levels of humility; However, (4) humility does not significantly moderate the relation between authority and compliance; (5) humility does not significantly moderate the relationship between benevolence and compliance, either; (6) the interaction of humility, authority and integrity is significant on compliance; (7) the interaction of humility, authority and benevolence is also significant on compliance. Humility and integrity can lead to get compliance and then get better to each other. Finally, it is hoped that this study¡¦s conclusions, suggestions and findings would serve as a future reference for humility in leadership research.

Thesis (M. Sc. in Landscape design)--University of Michigan, 1935. / Typewritten. Extra numbered leaves inserted. "Shutting's Official map of Chattanooga, Tenn., c1931." "Zoning ordinance, Chattanooga, Tenn., as corrected ... by City planning commission May 21, 1926" in pocket.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 2002. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 142-146).

One of the most important distinguishing marks of the Christian faith is that it is a revealed religion. The Christian faith professes that God has graciously and with authority revealed himself to his creatures. Therefore, the doctrine of Scripture, specifically biblical, is an issue of central importance in any theological formulation that is distinctly Christian. Despite the centrality of biblical authority in the system of Christian faith, there is perhaps no other doctrine under greater reproach. In light of the increased criticism of the doctrine of Scripture, Christians have adopted various theologies of revelation in order to explain what the biblical text is, how it relates to God, and how it functions authoritatively. And yet many of these proposals fail to take advantage of the resources provided by the communicative categories of the rich Christian trinitarian tradition. Specifically, very few evangelical proposals related to biblical authority consider how the specific modes of subsistence related God the Father (unbegottenenss), God the Son (eternal begottenenss), and God the Holy Spirit (procession) contribute to a Christian understanding of divine authorship. This dissertation is an exercise in dogmatic and exegetical theology that gives an account of the relationship between biblical authority and trinitarian communicative activity. This dissertation will argue that the Bible is authoritative because it has God the Father as its source, God the Son as the content and mediator of the Father's speech, and God the Spirit as the efficacious power who speaks the Word that he receives from the Father and Son. Therefore, Scripture is authoritative because God the Father, God the Son, and God the Spirit all speak, with one voice, an authoritative Word.

Philosophers have long thought that practical authority is morally problematic. The most familiar explanation is that exercising authority (for example, by the giving of commands) interferes with a subject’s responsiveness to the reasons that apply to her; in this sense, authority is thought to be irrational or somehow inconsistent with autonomy. This explanation of the problem presupposes an account of what it is to exercise authority: to exercise authority over a subject is to intentionally change the reasons that apply to that subject. In this paper, I begin to develop a new account of authority’s problematic nature by focusing on the relation between the content of authoritative directives and an agent’s intention in obeying. In cases of personal authority, the issuing of a command involves the giving of an intention to act to the subject; I argue that this breaks down the self-other asymmetries which theorists of self-knowledge assume exist with respect to the ‘privileged access’ one is said to have of one’s own mind. This understanding of the problem is missed if we think about authority primarily in terms of reasons and reason-giving, as in the case of Raz’s service conception. / text

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In this thesis I ask: "What are Nova Scotia women's narratives concerning authority in their education? Does 'shyness' come into play in these educational narratives? What are the ways in which these women accepted and/or resisted authority?" This research grows from my position as an academic initiate, and my experiences of "growing up girl" in Nova Scotia. Using a qualitative feminist methodology, I interviewed three women who moved through the Nova Scotia educational system. Here I situate their stories in relation to scholarly work on authority and the context of class, race, and gender in Nova Scotia, and explore the strategies the women undertook to enact agency in their educational lives. These narratives provide rich perspectives on power, agency, and authority as they are lived in local contexts, and point to a need for more educational stories to be told by women of all backgrounds in Nova Scotia and beyond.