published_or_final_version / abstract / Real Estate and Construction / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

I likhet med i andra länder har det i Sverige under vissa högkonjunkturer uppstått ett så betydande kapitalöverskott, att den finansiella marknaden fått problem att bemästra flödena. Konsekvensen har blivit att den aggregerade risknivån ökat i takt med stigande tillgångspriser. När väl en kontraktion uppstått, har det saknats kapital för att i ordnade former bemästra de nya ekonomiska förutsättningarna. Det är den utvecklingen som föregått kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92. Temporära insatser har då måst ske vid sidan av det befintliga institutionella systemet. Forskningen ger för Sveriges del en kriskronologi för det finansiella området med krisåren 1763, 1817/18, 1857/58, 1878/79, 1907/08, 1921/22, 1932/33 och 1991/92. Det har vid kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92 förelegat ett betydande hot om kollaps av det finansiella systemet. Vid dessa tre tillfällen har det efter förhandlingar mellan bankerna och staten kommit att skapas temporära krishanteringsorganisationer – Järnvägshypoteksfonden 1879, AB Kreditkassan 1922 samt Securum AB 1992 – vid sidan om den svenska Riksbanken. Kriserna har hävts med hjälp av de temporärt skapade krisorganisationerna, vilka samtliga har haft en Lender of Last Resort-funktion. Krishanteringstekniken vid krisen 1921/22 kan ses som en vidareutveckling av den som kommit till användning 1878/79. Även om bakgrunden till krisen 1991/92 skiljer sig åt från de två här tidigare nämnda tillfällena, kom tekniken med överflyttandet av tyngande engagemang till ett nytt bolag att likna den teknik som användes redan av AB Kreditkassan. Trots detta betydde tidigare svenska erfarenheter mindre för krisen 1991/92 i detta fall. Idéerna till Securum hämtades istället från senare tids bankkrishantering i USA med inrättandet av så kallade ”bad banks”. Syftet med denna avhandling är att med en institutionell ansats klarlägga och analysera hur de två första av dessa tre finansiella kriser har hanterats. Avhandlingen belyser i detalj det förhandlingsdrama mellan statens och marknadens aktörer som föregått inrättandet av respektive krisorganisation.

Banks play a pivotal role in economic growth and development of all countries and therefore the stability of the banking system is a vital goal of bank supervisors. Banks act as delegated monitors of depositors’ funds and this relationship, like all principal-agent relationships, presents agency problems. In the case of banks agency problems arise because depositors cannot accurately assess the financial health of banks due to the asymmetry of information existing between banks and depositors. Because banks possess private information on their borrowers, which depositors cannot access, it exposes depositors to risk of loss of deposits in cases of bank failures originating from nonrepayment of such loans. This asymmetry of information also exposes banks to runs by depositors and these runs can lead to bank failures with devastating effects for the financial system and the economy at large. It is for this reason that banks are regulated and supervised more than other institutions. Bank failures are a worldwide phenomenon and South Africa is no exception as evidenced by historical and recent bank failures in South Africa. This thesis investigates the desirability of introducing an explicit deposit insurance scheme in South Africa as a means of protecting small, unsophisticated depositors who are almost always the losers when banks fail, and promoting financial stability. The study finds that bank failures in South Africa are mainly attributable to mismanagement of banks, liquidity problems and fraud. Bank failures as a result of the aforementioned reasons have led to depositors losing their deposits in South Africa. The absence of a clearly defined depositor protection scheme in South Africa, the inadequacy of the hitherto implicit guarantee system to protect depositors, and the poor record of the South African Reserve Bank in bank failure resolution, form the basis of the conclusion of the study, i.e., there is a case for the introduction of deposit insurance in South Africa. In order to assist South African policymakers in designing an effective deposit insurance scheme for the country, the thesis further provides a guide on how the most important design features of deposit insurance should be handled. This is in an attempt to ensure that the moral hazard problem inherent in deposit insurance is overcome.

This paper examines the relation between banks' dividends and their future financial health. Using banks' Nonperforming Loans Ratio, Loan Loss Provision Ratio, and Z-score as proxies for their financial health, I show that there is a strong positive relation between banks' dividends lagged by one quarter and their financial health in the current quarter. This main finding continues to hold following several additional tests, including the application of an instrumental variable approach, the use of change in dividends as the key independent variable, the exclusion of banks that are subject to stress test, the addition of macroeconomic variables, the exclusion of too-big-to-fail banks, and the exclusion of non-depository banks. I also find that the positive relation between banks' dividends and their future financial health is more pronounced for banks with a higher degree of opacity, a lower Tier 1 capital ratio, and during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This paper contributes to three strands of the finance literature, including the Risk Reduction Hypothesis of dividend signaling in corporate finance, bank dividend policies, and the determinants of banks' financial stability. First, I show that there is a positive relation between banks' dividends lagged by one quarter and their financial health in the current quarter, also meaning that banks' dividends are negatively associated with their future risk conditions. This finding is consistent with the Risk Reduction Hypothesis regarding dividend signaling. Second, Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2015) propose a new idea that banks use dividends to signal financial health, and they rely on this idea to explain why banks have a higher and more stable propensity to pay dividends vis-à-vis industrials during the past several decades. My finding that banks' dividends are positively associated with their future financial health empirically supports this idea proposed by Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2015). Last, to my knowledge, no prior study has attempted to extensively detect a direct relation between banks' dividends and their financial stability. I fill this gap by investigating whether this relation exists. I show that banks' dividends have significantly positive explanatory power on their future financial stability, as proxied by three risk conditions.

A sound banking system is essential to a well-functioning economy. With the financial crisis beginning in 2007, a renewed interest in the safety of financial institutions has dominated both the political and financial landscape. Mounting loan losses in real estate lending led to the failing of over 460 banks from 2008 to 2012. This crisis is not unique; in fact, the Savings & Loan Crisis of the 1980's to early 1990's led to the closure of 700 savings institutions. Both instances created a panic in financial markets and heavy losses to deposit insurance funds. These losses are ultimately borne by taxpayers and prudently managed banks, especially if the insurance fund requires re-capitalization. The focus of this paper is on explaining the contributing factors to different categories of loan losses. Namely, total loan losses, residential real estate loan losses, commercial real estate loan losses, and commercial and industrial loan losses are examined. A multivariate regression approach is taken in this paper to explain the four rates of loan losses for the period of 2001 to 2012. Aggregate macroeconomic data from 2001 to 2012 is used to explain loan losses across categories. It was found that the delinquency rate of loans, the consumer financial obligations ratio, and the financial crisis were all significant factors in explaining loan losses.

This dissertation studies how the digitalization of commercial banking affects bank competition, financial stability, and monetary policy transmission. In the first chapter, The Digital Banking Revolution: Reduced Form Evidence, I use hand-collected data and a novel identification strategy to show that after adopting digital platforms, banks branchlessly operate in more markets, and mid-size banks, those with relatively high quality digital platforms but without extensive branch networks, grow faster. Further, bank balance sheet composition tilts to uninsured deposits on the funding side, and to high income borrowers on the loan side. In the second chapter, The Digital Banking Revolution: Aggregate Effects on Competition and Stability, in order to disentangle the underlying mechanisms and quantify aggregate effects, I build a structural model of the U.S. banking system and compare the observed digital equilibrium to a counterfactual without digital platforms. The model allows for endogenous adoption of digital platforms, branch networks, market entry, and accounts for digitalization among non-banks. Digitalization decreases local and national market concentration, and average markups fall in deposit and loan markets, holding fixed the size of the banking sector. Consumers capture most of the surplus created by digitalization, however it accrues mostly to wealthier segments of the economy. As for stability, it increases the average market share of lightly-regulated mid-sized banks, increases the uninsured deposits ratio of the banking sector while re-sorting uninsured deposits towards larger digital banks, and doubles credit risks associated with lending in market segments that are less-well served by digital technologies. In sum, digital banking increases competition and poses risks to financial stability. In the third chapter, Destabilizing Digital "Bank Walks", which is co-authored with Tano Santos and Luigi Zingales, we study the impact of digital banking on the value of the deposit franchise and the transmission of monetary policy through bank balance sheets. We find that when the Fed funds rate increases, deposits flow out faster and the cost of deposits increases more in banks with a digital platform. The results are similar for insured and non-insured deposits. We find that correcting for digital betas and deposit outflows results in a deposit franchise value that is significantly lower for digital-broker banks relative to a traditional bank without digital platform. We apply this analysis to Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and find that the reduced value of the deposit franchise explains why SVB was insolvent in early March 2023, even before the bank run occurred.