This dissertation begins with a comprehensive examination of the current state of research regarding organizational buying behavior. Through this review we identify a significant gap in our existing knowledge regarding organizational buying behavior in the public sector. Due to the high level of impact that government purchasing has on the economy, and the nuances that differentiate public from private sector purchasing practices, I further explore organizational buying behavior in the public sector to make the following contributions. First, I highlight the common practice in business-to-government (B2G) and business-to-business (B2B) transactions where buyers limit suppliers’ access to them during the buying process. This research terms these buyers “barricaded buyers.” Despite their prominence in practice, research related to barricaded buyers remains virtually non-existent. Therefore, the present research draws on insights gleaned from eight case studies over a period of approximately eighteen months to shed light on this important topic. Second, this dissertation advances a conceptual framework highlighting competitive actions a focal supplier can take to improve its selection likelihood when selling to barricaded buyers. The framework identifies novel ways suppliers can gain advantage by reducing competitive intensity in the pre-barricade phase (e.g., by peacocking) and by enhancing their RFP response quality in the post-barricade phase (e.g., by offering consummate solutions). Importantly, the framework invokes the notion of strategic information disclosure whereby a focal supplier may gain advantage by knowing when to convey what types of information in barricaded buying environments.